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CONFLICT OF LAWS-RIGHT OF STATE TO REFUSE TO ENFORCE FOREIGN
RIGHT OF ACTION WHICH IS OPPOSED TO LOCAL POLICY. [United
States Supreme Court]
The purpose of the framers in inserting the Full Faith and Credit
Clause' into the Constitution was to establish a "nationally unifying
force" 2 which would serve to guarantee that rights established in any
one of the several states would be given nationwide application. The
inescapable effect of the clause is to deprive the individual states of
some of the elements of sovereignty,3 because they are not entirely free,
as they would be under international comity, to decline the enforce-
ment of foreign-acquired rights. Since the Supreme Court has said
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require the complete
subordination of the state's right to refuse the enforcement of such
foreign-acquired right of action,4 the problem is to determine in what
instances the state prerogative shall be forced to give way to the dictates
of the clause.
Until recently it was generally believed that a state was free to
decline to enforce foreign-acquired rights of action when such rights
were opposed to the public policy of its own state5 as evidenced
by statutes enacted by the legislature. 6 This supremacy of the policy
"U. S. Const. Art. IV, § i: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
2
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 439, 64 S. Ct. 208, 214, 88 L.
ed. 149, 155 (1943).
3Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 56 S. Ct. 229, 8o L. ed. 22o
(1935); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589, 79 L. ed. 1100 (1935); 12
Am. Jur., Constitutional Law §705.
'Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 2o8, 88 L. ed. 149 (1943);
Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U. S. 2oi, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. ed. 152
(1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L.
ed. 1477 (1941); Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. ed. 940 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. ed. 1o44 (1935); Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. ed. 1026 (1932).
rGriffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481 (1941); Good-
rich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1949) §,i; Minor, Conflict of Laws (19o1) §6. In
Griffin v. McCoach, Justice Reed said: "[The Supreme Court] has recognized that
a state is not required to enforce a law obnoxious to its public policy."
OState policy has been declared to be evidenced by the state statutes. Harding
v. American Glucose Co., 182 II- 551, 55 N. E. 577 (19o2); Minor, Conflict of Laws
(1901) §6.
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of the forum was established by the Supreme Court in the oft-quoted
case of Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.7 Here the plain-
tiff was the widow of an engineer killed in an accident while in the
employ of defendant Ohio corporation. Both plaintiff and decedent
husband were citizens of Pennsylvania. Alleging negligence on the
part of the railroad company, the widow brought suit in Ohio and
obtained a judgment in the trial court. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Ohio upheld defendant's contention that this action could not be
maintained in the courts of Ohio because the statute providing for
suits in Ohio for wrongful deaths inflicted in other states was intended
to cover the deaths only of citizens of Ohio.0 In affirming this decision
the United States Supreme Court declared that "the State may de-
termine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, and the character of
the controversies which shall be heard in them. The state policy decides
whether and to what extent the State will entertain, in its own courts,
transitory actions, where the cause of action have arisen in other juris-
dictions." 10 The doctrine of the Chambers case was subsequently invok-
ed by the Court in cases holding that the state where the contract was
entered into between employer and employee is free to apply its own
compensation law to the injury of the employee rather than the law of
another state where the injury occurred;" that the state of the place
of injury is free to apply its own law to the exclusion of the state of
"207 U. S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 34, 52 L. ed. 143 (1907).
'Suit was brought under certain parts of the constitution and laws of Pennsyl-
vania. Chambers v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 2o7 U. S. 142, 146, 28 S. Ct. 34, 34, 52 L. ed.
143, 145 (1907)-
'Bates, Annotated Statutes of Ohio §6134a: "... whenever the death of a citizen
of this state has been or may be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default in
another state, territory, or foreign country, for which a right to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof is given by a statute of such other state,
territory, or foreign country, such right of action may be enforced in this state within
the time prescribed for the commencement of such action by the statute of such
other state, territory, or foreign country." See Chambers v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 207
U. S. 142 at 147, 28 S. Ct. 34, 52 L. ed. 143 at 146 (19o7). The phrase, "of a citizen
of this state," does not appear in the similar section of the present Ohio Code.
Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1910) §10509-166.
"'Chambers v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 149, 28 S. Ct. 34, 35, 52 L. ed. 143,
146 (1907).
"Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 547,
55 S. Ct. 518, 524, 79 L. ed. io44, 1052 (1935):"Prima facie every state is entitled to
enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges
that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by the
full faith and credit Clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational
oasis, that of the contlicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior
to those of the forum."
CASE COMMENTS
the usual place of employment; 12 that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not require the courts of the forum to enforce against local policy-
holders certain assessments valid under the laws of incorporation of
a mutual insurance company; 13 and that the forum may decline to
enforce an insurance policy in favor of beneficiaries who have no in-
surable interest under local law.
14
In recent years some inroads into the supremacy of state policy
have been made in a few fields such as commercial law and workmen's
compensation, in which the Court considered uniformity particularly
desirable. Thus, the rather rigid rule has been imposed that the
forum must defer to the law of the place of contract generally and of
the state of incorporation as regards stockholder's liability;' 5 and a
state statute applicable to employer and employee within the state,
which by its terms provides compensation for the employee if he is
injured in the course of employment which temporarily is in another
state, has been held to be binding on the state of temporary occu-
"Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 3o6 U. S.
493, 502, 59 S. Ct. 629, 633, 83 L. ed. 940, 945 (1939): "It has often been recognized
by this Court that there are some limitations upon the extent to which a state may
be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of
another state in contravention of its own statutes or policy .... And in the case
of statutes, the extrastate effect of which Congress has not prescribed, as it may
under the constitutional provision, we think the conclusion is unavoidable that
the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own
statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another
state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of
its enactment with respect to the same persons and events."
"Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U. S. 201, 210, 62 S. Ct. 241, 246, 86
L. ed. 152, 158 (1941): "But the very nature of the federal union of states, to each
of which is reserved the soverign right to make its own laws, precludes resort
to the Constitution as the means for compelling one state wholly to subordinate its
own laws and policy concerning its peculiarly domestic affairs to the laws and
policies of others."
"Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. ed. 1481 (1941). In
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, the Court, while recognizing that state courts are
bound to honor foreign judgments, said: "In the case of local law, since each of the
states of the Union has constitutional authority to make its own law with respect
to persons and events within its borders, the full faith and credit clause does not
ordinarly require it to substitute for its own law the conflicting law of another state,
even though that law is of controlling force in the courts of that state with respect
to the same persons and events." 320 U. S. 430, 436, 64 S. Ct. 208, 212, 88 L. ed. 149,
154 (1943)-
15John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129,
81 L. ed. io6 (1936); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589, 79 L. ed. 11oo
(1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 S. Ct. 415, 56 L. ed. 749 (1912).
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pation.16 Outside of these few limited fields, however, the supremacy
of forum policy continued unassailed.
17
Thus the situation stood until the recent case of Hughes v. Fetter, s
concerning an action based on the Illinois wrongful death statute and
originally brought by an administrator in a Wisconsin court. The
deceased and defendant, both citizens of Wisconsin, became involved
in a fatal accident in Illinois, allegedly caused by defendant's negli-
gence. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing the com-
plaint on the ground that the Wisconsin wrongful death statute, which
creates a cause of action only for deaths caused in that state, establishes a
public policy against the courts of Wisconsin entertaining a suit
brought under the wrongful death act of another state. The Supreme
Court of the state affirmed over the plaintiff's objection that such con-
struction of the state statute violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
On appeal, the question of whether Wisconsin could close its courts
to a cause of action created by the Illinois statute was presented to the
United States Supreme Court, which declared in a 5 to 4 decision, that
"Under these circumstances we conclude that Wisconsin's statutory
policy which excludes this Illinois cause of action is forbidden by the
national policy of the Full Faith and Credit Clause."' 9 This decision
would seem to be a notable departure from the view adopted in the
Chambers case and subsequent decisions based on it. The majority of
the Court apparently attempts to avoid this conclusion by saying that
Wisconsin does not really have a policy against wrongful death suits,
inasmuch as the state regularly provides a forum for such suits under
its own statute. However, it is not the function of the Supreme Court
"Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. ed. 1026
(1932); Joseph H. Weiderhoff, Inc. v. Neal, 6 F. Supp. 798 (W. D. Mo. 1934); Cole v.
Industrial Commission, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520 (1933).
1'In 1942 Justice Murphy, in a dissenting opinion, discussing the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, declared, "That clause should no more be read 'with literal exact-
ness like a mathematical formula' than are other great and general clauses of the Con-
stitution placing limitations upon the States to weld us into a Nation .... Rather it
should be construed to harmonize its direction 'with the necessary residuum of
state power'." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 308, 310, 63 S. Ct. 207, 217,
218, 87 L. ed. 279, 291, 292 (1942). Justice Jackson in an appraisal of the clause
observed that ". . . as to extraterritorial recognition or non-recognition of state law
it is doubtful if a century and a half of constitutional interpretation has advanced us
much beyond where we would be if there had never been such a clause. Local policies
and balance of local interests still dominate the application of the federal require-
ments." Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution
(1945) 45 Col. L. Rev. 1, 33-
1341 U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980,95 L. ed. 1212 (1951).




to tell a state what its policy is. While Wisconsin does not have a policy
against wrongful death recoveries generally, it does have a policy,
evidenced by a statue, against such recovery based on foreign statutes.
It is not apparent why the position taken by Wisconsin should be any
the less a valid state policy because aimed at certain wrongful death
recoveries rather than all wrongful death recoveries.
Justice Frankfurter, in a strong dissenting opinion in which he was
joined by Justices Reed, Jackson and Minton, supported the state
policy and argued that there are enough inconsistencies in the various
wrongful death statutes to make preferable their applications by local
judges who are familiar with the particular state's system. He distin-
guished the cases in which it was held that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause must be honored in order to give certainty to a pre-existing
relationship, pointing out that there was no such relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant in this case. Conceding that the wisdom
of Wisconsin's exclusionary policy might be open to question, Justice
Frankfurter nevertheless declared that "There is no support, either
in reason or in cases, for holding that this Court is to make a de novo
choice between the policies underlying the laws of Wisconsin and
Illinois. I cannot believe that the Full Faith and Credit Clause pro-
vided a 'writer's inkhorn' so that this Court might separate right from
wrong."
20
The point was also made that an Illinois statute contains a similar
restrictive clause, and if the case had come up under reverse circum-
stances, the Illinois court would have presumably dismissed the suit
exactly as the Wisconsin court did. Justice Frankfurter concludes suc-
cintly that; "There is no need to be 'more Roman than the Romans'." 21
It seems that the dissent has followed the view formerly taken by the
Court as to the general supremacy of the state policy in such conflicts,
while the majority has departed therefrom.
In practical effect the Hughes decision appears to overrule the
Chambers case, though there is no expression of such intention in the
majority opinion. It is true that the Chambers case was based on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause while the Hughes case was based on
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. However, in the Chambers case it
was decided that Ohio could deny a remedy to a cause of action
brought by a citizen of Pennsylvania based on the wrongful death
2°Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 6o9, 614, 620, 71 S. Ct. 98o, 983, 986, 95 L. ed. 1212,
1217, 1220 (1951).
"Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 6o9, 614, 621, 71 S. Ct. 98o, 983, 987, 95 L. ed. 1212,
1217, 1221 (1951).
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of a citizen of Pennsylvania since the Ohio policy, limiting recov-
ery in Ohio courts to deaths of Ohio citizens, would have likewise
denied the remedy if the action had been brought by a citizen of
Ohio. The Hughes case has decided that Wisconsin cannot deny a
remedy to a suit brought by one of its citizens based on the Illinois
statute, even though such suits based on foreign wrongful death
statutes are opposed by state policy. Therefore, it would seem to follow
that if a citizen of Illinois were to bring a suit in a court of Wisconsin
based on the Illinois statute, since Wisconsin cannot deny a remedy
to one of its own citizens on such a suit, it could not deny such a remedy
to this Illinois citizen without violating the Privileges and Immun-
ities Clause. The conclusion is that a state cannot close its courts to
a suit brought by a citizen of a foreign state, based on foreign law,
even when the forum has a policy denying such actions. This is a
direct contradiction to the doctrine of the Chambers case.
The question naturally arises as to just what weight state policy now
carries in a case of conflict. It may be that if the state policy is more
strongly set out than it was in the Hughes case situation the Supreme
Court will honor it;22 or, on the other hand, it may be that state policy
will be consistently subordinated to the nationalizing force of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. Perhaps wrongful death cases are to be put
in a special class along with commercial law and the workman's com-
pensation cases. But it appears that state soverignty has received a
definite setback by the decision of this case. The questions which arise
cannot be answered with any degree of assurance on the basis of this
decision. The Supreme Court has left itself convenient leeway by pre-
facing its decision with the indefinite phrase, "under these circum-
stances." Just prior to using this phrase the Court had mentioned that,
in its opinion, Wisconsin had no real feeling of antagonism to such suits,
that the forum non conveniens doctrine did not apply here, and that
'For example, in the case of Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211, 55 S. Ct. 356, 79 L.
ed. 865 (1935), which involved conflicting claims to the Montana assets of an Iowa
corporation, the Court held that the petitioner, who claimed as liquidator and
successor to the corporation under the statutes of Iowa, must prevail over the
judgment creditors under the Full Faith and Credit Clause unless Montana clearly
had a local policy whereby the title of a statutory successor was to be subordinate
to later executions at the suit of local creditors. The cause was remitted to the
Montana Supreme Court so that it might declare what the policy of the state was on
the subject. That court held that the state policy permitted attachments and exe-
cutions against insolvent foreign corporations and that the rule would prevail against
a statutory successor. The United States Supreme Court promptly, and without




Wisconsin may be the only jurisdiction where service could be had as an
original matter on the defendant insurance company. It could be
argued that the Court will follow its present ruling only in future
cases in which these same considerations are all present, or in which any
one of them is present. On the other hand the decision may have a
much more widespread importance in that the court may reach the
same conclusion in any future case in which state policy denies a
remedy to a cause of action derived from the statute of a foreign state.
Only on the basis of future decisions can the influence of this case
in the field of conflicts be estimated with any degree of certainty.
ROBERT LEE BANSE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF DIVORCE IN STATE DECREEING IT
WHEN DIVORCE COURT'S JURISDICTION HAS BEEN IMPEACHED BY
COURT OF SISTER STATE. [Federal]
The status of a divorce decree in other states than the one render-
ing it, when the respondent in the suit was not domiciled in the
divorcing state, was served only by constructive service, and did not ap-
pear and defend, has long created a perplexing legal question with acute
social ramifications. Haddock v. Haddock,1 one of the early decisions
rendered by the Supreme Court as the final arbiter2 as to what recog-
nition must be given to the decree under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution,3 created the threat of such an undesirable
social situation that the legal doctrine there established has been
severely critized.4 In that case the Court proceeded on the premise that
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 5o L. ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. i
(19o6). Another such decision was Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 33 S.
Ct. 129, 57 L. ed. 347 (1913).
'Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 at 302, 63 S. Ct. 207 at 215, 87 L. ed.
279 at 288, 143 A. L. R. 1273 at 1282 (1942); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.
1949) 407.
3"Article IV, §i of the Constitution not only directs that 'Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the .. . judicial Proceeding of every other State' but
also provides that 'Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which such
• . . Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.' Congress has exercised
that power. By the Act of May 26, 1790, c. i1, 28 U. S. C. 687, Congress has provided
that judgments 'shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state
from which they are taken'." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 293, 63 S. Ct.
207, 210, 87 L. ed. 279, 283, 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1277 (1942).
"For criticisms of the Haddock case see Beale, Constitutional Protection of
Decrees for Divorce (1906) 19 Harv. L. Rev. 586; Richards, The Full Faith and Credit
Clause of The Federal Constitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce (1920) 15 111. L.
1952]
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the spouse who obtained the divorce in Connecticut was domiciled in
that state and that the divorce was valid there, but held that since the
Connecticut court did not have personal jurisdiction over the respon-
dent, the divorce was not entitled to recognition elsewhere by force
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Justice Holmes, accepting the
premise of validity where obtained, dissented vigorously and decried
the grave dangers the decision would make possible, of a man having
two legal wives or a wife having two legal husbands, each being a
bigamist for living in a state with the only one which another state
would recognize as the lawful spouse. Children of a second marriage
would be bastards in one state but legitimate in another.5 However
since the Haddock case dealt with the single point of the divorcing
husband's duty of support and the power of another state to relieve
him of this duty by granting a divorce upon constructive service over
the wife, it does not appear that the dangers suggested by Justice
Holmes were in fact created by the decision.6
To remove the threat of such incongruous martial situations, the
Supreme Court in 1942 expressly overruled the Haddock case in its
first Williams v. North Carolina decision,7 a bigamy prosecution of a
man and woman who had left North Carolina and gone to Nevada,
obtained a divorce from their respective spouses who were served by
constructive service only, married each other, and returned to North
Carolina to live together as man and wife. The North Carolina court
refused to recognize the Nevada divorce and convicted the defendants
of bigamy s but the Supreme Court struck down the North Carolina
Rev. 259. But cf. Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417. For a
criticism of both the Haddock and the Thompson cases cited in note i supra, see
Parks, Some Problems in Jurisdiction to Divorce (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 525.
5Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 628, 26 S. Ct. 525, 551, 5o L. ed. 867, 894,
5 Ann. Case 1, 24 (igo6). In this case the only danger Holmes actually spelled out
was bastardizing children, and he couched the other dangers in the term "consid-
erable disaster to innocent persons."
6Bingham, The American Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court-In the Matter
of Haddock v. Haddock (1936) 21 Conn. L. Q. 393; Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock
Overruled? (1943) 18 Ind. L. J. 165; Morris, Divisible Divorce (1951) 64 Harv L. Rev.
1287. In Estin v. Estin, 3.4 U. S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. ed. 1561, 1 A. L. R. (2d)
1412 (1948) the distinction suggested by Bingham and Cook was recognized.
7Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 279, 143
A. L. R. 1273 (1942) (hereafter referred to as the first Williams case), commented on
by Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Overruled (1943) 52 Yale L. J. 341; Rodman, The
Last of Mr. and Mrs. Haddock? (1943) 31 Cal. L. Rev. 167; Cook, Is Haddock v.
Haddock Overruled? (1943) 18 Ind. L. J. 165; Bingham, Song of Sixpence (1943)
29 Corn. L. Q. i.
"State v. Williams, 22o N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941).
[Vol. IX
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decision as violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The holding was
dependent upon the Court's expressed assumption that the defendants
in the criminal prosecution had been domiciled in the State of Nevada
where the divorce was obtained, and that the divorce was valid there.
Under the circumstances of the first Williams case, the majority opinion
pointed out that if the decrees of a state affecting "the marital status
of its domiciliaries are not valid throughout the Union even though
the requirements of procedural due process are wholly met, a rule would
be fostered which could not help but bring 'considerable disaster to
innocent persons' .... 9
Even though the unfortunate consequences pointed out by Justice
Holmes in his dissent in the Haddock case might not have resulted from
the actual decision in that case, they would have arisen from a con-
trary decision in the first Williams case, because there the Court was
confronted with the problem of a state's power to reinstate its domi-
ciliaries' power to marry. Nevertheless, the rule adopted by the case
had previously been criticized as infringing on a state's sovereignty to
decide for itself the matter of marital status, even insofar as it in-
volves the power to marry.' 0 In answer to this argument, the Court
declared that the Full Faith and Credit Clause substituted a command
for the former principles of comity, thus intergrating the parts of the
Union into a whole, and that "such is part of the price of our federal
system.""
After the Supreme Court's decision was handed down, North
Carolina retried the Williams case. This time the North Carolina
court found that the defendants who had obtained the divorce in Neva-
da had not established bona fide domicile there, and therefore, that the
Nevada court had no jurisdiction which would enable it to render a
decree entitled to full faith and credit.12 Thus, in the second Williams
case 13 the issue before the Supreme Court ws whether a sister state
could make its own determination of whether the party obtaining
the divorce was actually domiciled in the divorcing state. The Supreme
OWilliams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 301, 63 S. Ct. 207, 214, 87 L. ed.
279, 287, 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1281 (1942) approving the objections of Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 628, 26 S. Ct. 525, 551, 50 L. ed. 867,
5 Ann. Cas. 1, 16 (19o6).
'0See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 605, 26 S. Ct. 525, 542, 50 L. ed. 867, 884,
5 Ann. Cas. 1, 16 (19o6).
uWilliams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 302, 63 S. Ct. 207, 215, 87 L. ed.
279, 288, 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1282 (1912).
"State v. Williams, 224 N. C. 183, 29 S. E. (2d) 744 (1944).
='Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. ed. 1577, 157
A. L. R. 1366 (1945) (herein referred to as the second Williams case).
1952]
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Court recognized the existence of that power, pointing out that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not make the judgment of one state
a judgment in a sister state, and that in order for a judgment of one
state to have force in another state it must be made a judgment
there by suing on the prior judgment in the second state or by inter-
posing the prior judgment as a defense to a suit in the second state.
14
The decision of the second Williams case again created the possi-
bility of the dangers decried by Justice Holmes in the Haddock case and
purportedly struck down by the Supreme Court in the first Williams
case, if, but only if, the divorce decree rendered under the circumstances
of the second Williams case still has validity within the state where
rendered. Quite aside from any question of recognition in a third
state, the dangers exist if the divorce is valid in the divorcing state and
can be refused recognition elsewhere, because parties are then validly
divorced and permitted to remarry in one state but not in others. If
to this validity in one state is added the possibility that some third
states will recognize the validity by comity and some other third states
will refuse to recognize it, then the situation is made worse.
The question of the validity of the divorce in the state which
rendered it after the divorce court's jurisdiction to do so had been
impeached has never been decided by the Supreme Court. The prob-
lem, however, was argued in the concurring and the dissenting opinions
in the second Williams case.15 These opinions have caused confusion,
as was evidenced in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit sitting in Illinois when that court was faced
squarely with the problem in the recent case of Sutton v. Leib.'0
The plaintiff, Sutton, the former wife of the defendant, Leib, sued
for back alimony which was provided for in an Illinois divorce decree.
After the plaintiff obtained a divorce from the defendant in an Illinois
court, she went to Reno and married Walter Henzel, who had just
obtained a divorce in a Nevada court from Dorothy Henzel, a New
York resident. Dorothy Henzel had been served only by publication
and did not appear. Following the divorce and remarriage, plaintiff
and Henzel returned to New York, where Dorothy Henzel instituted
a separate maintenance proceeding against Walter Henzel, which re-
sulted in a decree in her favor, the New York court having first de-
clared the Nevada divorce null and void, pursuant to the authority
"'The circumstance in italics was the inferential holding of the first Williams
case, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942).
5Williams v. North Carolina, 32 5 -U. S. 226, 239, 244, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 1099, 1ot,
89 L. ed. 1577,1587, 1589, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1375, 1377 (1945).
3188 F. (2d) 766 (C. A. 7th, 19p), cert. granted, 72 S. Ct. 73 (1951).
[Vol. IX
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of the second Williams case. Plaintiff then instituted a suit for an-
nullment in New York against Walter Henzel, and the New York court
entered a decree in her favor declaring the nullity of the marriage of
plaintiff and Henzel on the ground that he had another wife living at
the time of their marriage. After the plaintiff had again remarried,
she brought a suit in the federal court in Illinois to recover forty ali-
mony installments allegedly due under the Illinois divorce decree. The
claim covered the time she had thought she was married to Henzel and
the interval between the annullment of the marriage and her last
marriage. The defendant, Lieb, denied the claim on the ground that
his liability under the Illinois divorce decree had been terminated
by the plaintiff's marriage to Henzel in Nevada. When the federal
district court rendered a summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dant 7 the plaintiff appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment. It was reasoned that the validity of the plaintiff's marriage to
Henzel depended on the compliance of the parties with the marriage
laws of Nevada, which compliance in turn depended on the validity in
Nevada of the antecedent divorce of Henzel from his New York wife.
The court ruled that if Nevada could give the divorce any validity in
the face of the New York decision denying that there was domicile in
Nevada which would give Nevada courts jurisdiction to render a
divorce entitled to full faith and credit, then Illinois could and would
give the divorce the same effect by way of comity.'s The concurring
opinion in the first Williams case' 9 and the concurring and the dis-
senting opinions in the second Williams case20 were then cited for the
'TSutton v. Leib, 91 F. Supp. 937 (S. D. Ill. 1950).
18 The court did not specifically say it was giving the Nevada decree effect in
Illinois by way of comity, but this must have been the basis of this decision since it
had been decided in the New York decision that the Nevada decree was not entitled
to full faith and credit.
"Here Justice Frankfurter, concurring, remarked: "It is indisputable that
Nevada decrees here, like the Connecticut decree in the Haddock case, were valid
and binding in the state where rendered." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287,
307, 63 S. Ct. 207, 217, 87 L. ed. 279, 290, 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1284 (1942). In this con-
curring opinion, however, it was assumed that there was a bona fide domicile
established in Nevada, whereas in the principal case that domicile has been col-
laterally impeached. Further indication that what Justice Frankfurter said in the
first Williams case is not support for the Court of Appeals' argument is language
used by him in the second Williams case. "Since divorce, like marriage, creates a
new status, every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the effect should
be the same wherever the question arises." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S.
226, 230, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1581, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1369 (1945).
-The Court of Appeals cited the following language from the concurring
opinion in the second Williams case to support its holding: "The State of Nevada
has unquestioned authority consistent with procedural due process to grant divorces
on whatever basis it sees fit to all who meet its statutory requirements. It is en-
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proposition that such a divorce is valid where rendered until held void
there. And in the absence of a decision in Nevada as to the validity of
the decree in that state after the Nevada court's jurisdiction to render
the decree had been impeached by New York, the federal court held
that the decree would be assumed to be valid where rendered.
Although it was not stated in the opinion, the court must have
reasoned along the lines of one of two theories: (i) Admitting that such
a divorce is not valid even where rendered if there is no domicile there,
yet every state has the right to make such determination of domicile
for itself, and one state's finding of no domicile in another state is not
binding on the other state.21 Thus, since Nevada could find domicile
of the party there irrespective of the New York finding, then domicile
will be asumed because of the prior Nevada finding until impeached in
Nevada.2 2 (2) Admitting that the decision of a court of a sister state
titled, moreover, to give to its divorce decrees absolute and binding finality within
the confines of its borders." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 239, 65 S. Ct.
io92, iog9, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1587, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1375 (1945). This language,
however, "restricts internal power by confining it to what is 'consistent with pro-
cedural due process.' Would this be satisfied by adequate notice and chance to be
heard as in dealing with nonresident mortorists, or does it suggest some standard
of the relation of the petitioner to the state of the forum?" Powell, And Repent at
Leisure (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930, 939. The Court of Appeals cites the dissent
in the second Williams case for having pointed out that the majority opinion in that
case did not hold that the Nevada judgment was invalid in Nevada. Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 244, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 11o, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1589, 157
A. L. R. 1366, 1377 (1945). As to this being authority for the validity of the Nevada
judgment in Nevada, it is sufficient to point out that such validity was not in issue,
and thus, it was not necessary for the Court to decide the point.
"In a closely analogous situation involving inheritance tax it was held in the
case of In re Dorrance Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 17o Ad. 6o1 (1934) that a finding by
the courts of Pennsylvania in the case of In re Dorrance's Estate, 3o9 Pa. 151, 163
Atl. 3o3 (1932) that the deceased was domiciled in the state of Pennsylvania and,
therefore, the deceased's estate was liable for inheritance tax did not preclude the
state of New Jersey finding that he was domiciled in New Jersey and his estate was
liable for inheritance tax in that state. An effort to obtain review from the Supreme
Court of the United States was unsuccessful when certiorari was denied. 298 U.S. 678
(1936). This tax case is not authority for the holding in the principal case, however,
since in the tax case there was a finding that there was domicile in the forum and
each state has a direct interest in making such a finding, whereas in the principal
case there is no contention that there is domicile in the forum, and the decision is
that there is domicile in Nevada after New York has found that there was no
domicile in Nevada. Since Illinois has no such direct interest as there was in the
tax case, a prior state's finding as to domicile should be binding on such other
disinterested states where both of the parties directly concerned with the question
were before the court.
mIt has been said that "No recognized conception of full faith and credit could
make binding on Nevada such a determination in a proceeding to which she is not a
party. Thus North Carolina's say-so on an issue of jurisdiction in Nevada could no
more be binding on Nevada than should Nevada's say-so on its jurisdiction be
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impeaching the finding of domicile in Nevada is binding on Nevada,
yet the divorce may be valid where rendered, because domicile is not
required to give a divorce validity where rendered if the state rend-
ering the divorce does not require domicile.23 By this reasoning, the
divorce may be assumed to be valid where rendered, unless that state
declares such divorce void, and the decree may be recognized by another
state by way of comity.
In rebuttal of the first of these two theories, it may be said that the
reason the Nevada court's finding of domicile was not binding on
New York is that if there was no domicile in Nevada, in fact, then
the Nevada court had no jurisdiction over the case in which the find-
ing of domicile in Nevada was made. On the other hand, however, it
is not contended that New York has no jurisdiction in the case in
which it was found that there was not in fact any domicile in Nevada,
as the parties were admittedly domiciled within the state of New
York at the time. Thus, the only attack which can be made on the
New York finding is the correctness of it. It is well settled, however,
that if a court has proper jurisdiction, the correctness of such court's
decision can be attacked only on appeal, 24 and no appeal was ever taken
from the New York decision.
To hold that the New York decision is not binding on Nevada and
Illinois is to say that the decision of a state court of competent juris-
diction is to be excepted from the general mandate of the Full Faith
the Credit Clause. Under that view the New York court would not
be attributed equal dignity with the Navada court, since if the Nevada
court had had jurisdiction to make the finding of domicile (domicile
in fact giving it such jurisdiction), then the Full Faith and Credit
Clause would command recognition by the New York court.
If the court was following the second of these two theories that
domicile is not necessary for the divorce to be valid where rendered, the
binding on North Carolina." Powell, And Repent at Leisure (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev.
930, 978.
2"It is not logically necessary to deny Nevada's mastery within her own bound-
aries in order to deny her power of projection beyond them. Freedom of home man-
ufacture and consumption does not necessarily entail freedom of export ...."
Powell, And Repent at Leasure (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 93o, 936. This would mean
that a court has jurisdictional capacity in two senses-in one capacity to give the
decree validity at home and in another capacity to give the decree standing in the
full faith and credit sense. But Nevada and Illinois have in effect held that there is
jurisdictional capacity in a divorce case only in the full faith and credit sense as
both of these states require the same basis for jurisdiction as the Supreme Court
requires for the Full Faith and Credit Clause to apply, and that is domicile. See notes
25 and 26 infra.
24Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3 d ed. 1949) 627.
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validity of the decision depends on two conditions: (a) That such a
divorce is valid under Nevada law; and (b) That if it is valid in Nevada,
Illinois will recognize its validity on principles of comity. An investi-
gation of the law of Nevada discloses that if no domicile exists in
Nevada, a divorce decree rendered there is void.25 Furthermore, even
if Nevada were to regard such a decree to be valid it would not be
recognized under the state law in Illinois on principles of comity, as
the Illinois courts hold that divorce decrees are invalid unless at least
one of the parties is domiciled in the state whose court renders the
decree.
26
Such holdings of the Nevada and Illinois courts refusing to recog-
nize the validity of decrees are based on some finding of lack of domi-
cile-that is, a finding of no domicile subsequent to the initial finding
of domicile by the divorce court either by the Nevada, Illinois, or some
other court whose finding the Nevada and Illinois courts are required
to recognize under the command of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
In the principal case neither Nevada nor Illinois has made such a
finding, but the New York court has. The question, then is again the
same as it was under the first theory considered-that is, whether the
New York finding of no domicile in Nevada is entitled to full faith
and credit. Since the parties were unquestionably domiciled in New
York when the New York court declared the Nevada divorce void,
that court clearly had jurisdiction of the case before it, and its judg-
2In Aspinwall v. Aspinwall, 40 Nev. 55, 184 Pac. 8io (1916) the court pointed
out that the question of domicile was vital in determining jurisdiction. In Walker v.
Walker, 45 Nev. 1o5, 198 Pac. 433 (1921) the court declared: "Residence in this state
for the statutory period ... is not sufficient to give jurisdiction, but a bona fide resi-
dence with the intention of remaining must appear."
28In Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N. E. (2d) 645 , 649 (1937) an almost
idential situation was presented, and the court held: "Since the Nevada court
was without jurisdiction and "therefore without power or authority to enter the
divorce decree, such decree was not legally effective to sever the martial relation
existing between the defendant and his then wife. That divorce being void, defendant
was not free to remarry and his marriage afterwards to plaintiff pursuant to it was
also void. The invalidity of marriage of the parties to this proceeding was an es-
tablished fact since its very inception .... "; Forrest v. Fey, 218 Ill. 165, 75 N. E. 789,
i L. R. A. (N. S.) 740 (i9o5) commented on with approval by Richards, The Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce
(1920) 15 Ill. L. Rev. 259; Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737, 738
(1887): "The marriage of a man and woman, when one of them has a husband
or wife by a prior marriage, who is then living and undivorced, is void, and not
merely voidable. Being a nullity, no decree is necessary to avoid the same." Thus, if
there is a finding of no domicile in Nevada binding on Illinois, then Illinois treats
such a Nevada divorce as being void. Then, if the marriage is void the condition
subsequent, marriage, provided for in the Illinois divorce decree alimony provision,
involved in the principal case, did not take place when the plaintiff purported to
marry in Nevada.
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ment should be binding on other state courts. Moreover, there is
authority which would have sustained an opposite conclusion by the
Court of Appeals in the principal case in regard to the binding effect
of the New York decision. The Supreme Court has held that where
both of the parties were before the divorce court and litigated the
question of domicile there,27 and then the question of jurisdiction is
later raised in a sister court, the divorce court's finding of domicile
within its state is entitled to full faith and credit. 28 This rule had as
its purpose the ending of litigation where both parties to the divorce
contested the question of the divorce court's jurisdiction, and they
have done this in the New York litigation involved in the principal
case.2
9
From the standpoint of these considerations of reason and authority,
the court's holding in the principal case is undesirable, and appears to
have confirmed the fear that the second Williams case may have opened
the doors wide to the dangers pointed out by Justice Holmes in the
Haddock case, which were thought to have been struck down in the
first Williams case. 30
JAMtES W. H. STEWART
uThis was held to be res judicata in Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83
L. ed. 26, 118 A. L. R. 1518 (1938). It is not clear, however, whether this is res judicata
where the opponent was in court but where the issue of jurisdiction was not litigated.
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3 d ed. 1949) 400.
21 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 92 L. ed. 1429 (1948). Since
this is an application of full faith and credit to the principle of res judicata it may
be that the same treatment would be given under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
the situation where the opponent was before the court but where the issue of juris-
diction was not litigated as is given under the doctrine of res judicata. See Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws (3 d ed. 1949) 400.
nDThis rule is broader than the one which is contended should be applied in
the principal case in regard to the binding effect of the New York decision, for it
does not guard against the possibility that the rendering court has no jurisdiction in
fact to make such a finding, whereas in the circumstances of the principal case there
is no question as to New York's jurisdiction over the case to make a finding as
to domicile.
'If such is the decision, then it can truly be said, as the story goes, about the
man traveling on a Pullman with a lady, who when asked by the conductor if the
lady was his wife answered, "I don't know, that depends upon which state we are
passing through." Richards, The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce (192o) 15 Ill. L. Rev. 259, 263. See also Cook,
Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? (1943) 18 Ind. L. J. 165, 179, for similar language.
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CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION OF PURCHASE CONTRACT CONTAINING BOTH
ESTIMATE OF INDEFINITE QUANTITY AND STANDARD OF MEASUREMENT
OF REQUIREMENTS. [Federal]
Until relatively recent times, contracts for the purchase of the re-
quirements of one's business or the requirements for a certain project
were generally held to be unenforceable, largely on the grounds that
they lacked consideration and left performance optional'. The courts
appeared at a loss for a specific meaning of the word, "requirements,"
and in their attempt at interpretation construed it to mean "wants" or
"desires." 2 It was ruled that there was no mutuality of obligation be-
cause the buyer did not bind himself to an absolute agreement, inas-
much as he did not promise to take any specified amount of the goods
and could, by discontinuing his business or altering its operation,
avoid buying any goods at all.3
The recent case of M. W. Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating
Co.4 illustrates a complete reversal of this early stand regarding con-
tracts for requirements. The defendant, Kellogg Co., agreed to purchase
from the plaintiff, Standard Co.,5 a quantity of steel for use in con-
structing a fluid catalytic cracking unit. The contract stated that the
requirements would be one hundred twenty-five tons of steel "more
or less," and detailed specifications of the project were furnished to the
seller. In fact, Kellogg needed only fifty-two tons of the steel for the
construction of the unit, and Standard brought an action for loss of
profits which would have accrued to it had the entire one hundred
twenty-five tons been purchased. The trial court construed the agree-
ment as being not a requirements contract, but rather one for approx-
imately one hundred and twenty-five tons, and awarded the plaintiff
damages for the defendant's breach in failing to accept the full quantity
specified in the contract. The United States Court of Appeals, however,
by a two to one decision reversed the trial court and held that "the
dominant measure of quantity under the contract was the needs of
'Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 114 Fed. 77 (C. C. A.
8th, 1902); Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 1o5 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 7 th, 19oi); Bailey v.
Austrian, 19 Minn. 535 (1873).
2A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o7);
Higbie v. Rust, 211 Ill. 333, 71 N. E. 1oo (1904).
3Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 1o5 Fed. 869 (C.C.A. 7th, 19o); Hazelhurst Lumber
Co. v. Mercantile Lumber & Supply Co., 166 Fed. 191 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 19o8); Cohen
v. Clayton Coal Co., 86 Colo. 270, 281 Pac. 111 (1929).
'189 F. (2d) 629 (C. A. ioth, ig5i).
'The plaintiff, Standard Co., was organized specifically and solely for purposes
of this contract. M. W. Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F. (2d)
629, 630 ( C. A. ioth, 1951).
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the purchasers .... 6 rather than the estimated amount, and that
the defendant was not obligated to take more than its actual needs.
One judge dissented on the grounds that certain terms and specifica-
tions attached to the purchase order, a number of conservations be-
tween the buyer and seller, and the special circumstances under which
the contract was entered indicated that the parties did not intend the
contract to be one for requirements.
7
The prevailing opinion in the Kellogg case is representative of the
approach of most modern courts, which, giving recognition to the
needs of business,8 have generally modified the strict legal requisites
of a binding contract sufficiently to hold requirements contracts to be
enforceable. 9 Once their former stand was reversed, the courts appar-
ently had little difficulty in working out a technical basis to support
this type of contract. Consideration was often interpreted to be the
buyer's promise to take his normal requirements,10 or the buyer's
6M. W. Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F. (2d) 629, 632 (C. A.
ioth, 1951). The court, at the same point in the opinion, also said: "To us, it is
manifest that neither Kellogg nor Standard knew with any degree of certainty the
tonnage of steel that would be required to construct the catalytic cracking unit. The
tonnage could have been estimated only after intensive study of the drawings and
specifications."
7M. W. Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F. (2d) 629, 632 (C. A.
1oth, 1951). The dissenting judge argued that in a number of conversations between
the parties before the execution of the contract, an agent of Kellogg informed
Standard that a minimum of one hundred twenty-five tons would be needed for
the project. These conversations indicated the intent of both parties that the
contract was to be for a specific amount, especially in view of the fact that the draw-
ings and specifications of the project were furnished only a day or so before the
contact was executed, and it would have taken a matter of weeks to interpret the
requirements from them. It is further argued that the fact that Standard was or-
ganized only to carry out this contract, owned no steel, and had to purchase on the
market the steel required indicated that both parties were dealing with respect to
the specific requirements of a particular job.
'In T. B. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 2oo Fed. 529, 531 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912), the
court observed with reference to a requirement contract: "Business necessities re-
quire contracts of this class, though more or less indefinite, to be upheld."
'William C. Atwater & Co., Inc. v. Terminal Coal Corporation, 115 F. (2d) 887
(C. C. A. 1st, 1940); El Rio Oils (Canada), Limited v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Co., Inc.,
95 Cal. App. (2d) 186, 213 P. (2d) 1 (1950); Knowles Foundry & Machine Co. v.
National Plate Glass Co., 3Ol Il. App. 128, 21 N. E. (2d) 913 (1939); Hladik v. Noe, 214
Iowa 854, 243 N. W. 18o (1932); Royal Paper Box Co. v. E. R. Apt. Shoe Co., 290
Mass. 207, 195 N. E. 96 (1935); McMichael v. Price, 177 Okla. 186, 58 P. (2d) 549 (1936);
Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 181 S. E. 521 (1935); 1 Williston,
Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) lo4A; Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output
Contracts (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 3-
"°Central States Power & Light Corporation v. United States Zinc Co., 6o F.
(2d) 832 (C. C. A. ioth, 1932); Loudenbach Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co.,
121 Fed. 298 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o); Minnesota Lumber Co. v. White-Breast Coal Co.,
16o Il. 85, 43 N. E. 774 (1895).
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promise not to take his requirements from anybody else." At this
point it should be noted, however, that the courts which have upheld
requirements contracts have insisted that there be some standard of
measurement, such as the requirements for operating a business for a
certain time,12 or the requirements for the construction of a certain
project.
13
The principal case' 4 presents a further factor of significance in
regard to requirements contracts in that the steel purchase agreement in-
cluded both a standard of measurement and an estimate of the prob-
able requirements. Where an estimate is the only indication of what
quantity of material is to be purchased, the courts have generally
allowed only a small varation from it.15 But where there is some addi-
tional standard of measurement, the modern view is that this other
standard, rather than the estimate, controls the quantity to be taken un-
der the contract. 10 The estimate is then generally discarded as imma-
terial, except that it must have been made in good faith.17 Deliberately
"Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corporation, 279 Fed. 19 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1922);
Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., 154 Minn. 204, 191 N. W. 431 (1923).
2Nabors Oil Corporation v. Samuels, 17o La. 57, 127 So. 363 (193o); Parks v.
Griffith g= Boyd Co., 123 Md. 233, 91 Atl. 581 ('914); Edison Electric Illuminating
Co. of Brooklyn v. Thacher, 229 N. Y. 172, 128 N. E. 124 (1920).
'Webber v. Johnston, 214 Cal. 378, 5 P. (2d) 886 (1931); Miller v. Leo, 35 App.
Div. 589, 55 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1898).
14M. W. Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F. (2d) 629 (C. A. ioth,
1950.
2 Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 6 S. Ct. 12, 29 L. ed. 366 (1885); American
Steel Foundries v. Indian Refining Co., 275 Fed. Soo (C. C. A. 7th, 1921); Worcester
Post Co. v. W. H. Parsons Co., 265 Fed. 591 (C. C. A. ist, 192o); United States v.
Republic Bag & Paper Co., 250 Fed. 79 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
"GThe ready formula for construction of contracts of this nature was first an-
nounced in the early case of Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 168, 171, 24 L. ed.
622, 623 (1877) in which the court said: "Where a contract is made to sell or furnish
certain goods identified by reference to independent circumstances . . .and the
quantity is named with the qualification of 'about,' or 'more or less,' or words of
like import, the contract applies to the specific lot; the naming of the quantity is
not regarded as in the nature of a warranty, but only as an estimate of the probable
amount, in reference to which good faith is all that is required of the party making
it." This formula has been the prevailing view ever since. Wolff v. Wells, Fargo &
Co., 115 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902); Maryland Dredging & Contracting Co. v. Coplay
Cement Mfg. Co., 265 Fed. 842 (E. D. Pa. 1920); Barkemeyer Grain and Seed Co. v.
Hannant, 66 Mont. 1ao, 213 Pac. 2o8 (1923); 55 C. J. 39 o. The formula is generally
applied by the courts whether the divergence between the estimate and the quantity
actually used or the actual price is large or small.
"Biglione v. Bronge, 192 Cal. 167, 219 Pac. 69 (1923); Holland v. Rock, 5o Nev.
340, 259 Pac. 415 (1927). See Note (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 223, 228: "In all types of
requirement contracts, it is common for the parties to insert an estimate of the
quantity required. Such provisions seem designed to limit the seller's obligation
roughly and to give him a basis for computing the buyer's probable needs. The
legal effect of the estimate, however, is remarkable in its disregard of the facts. The
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misrepresenting one's probable requirements to mislead the other con-
tracting party results in making the misrepresenter liable for damages
for failure to accept the full amount of the estimate. However, the good
faith demanded in making the estimate is not to be regarded as mean-
ing that the estimate must be made with substantial accuracy, for that
condition would defeat the advantages of requirements clauses. It
appears that the courts, in virtually ignoring the specific advance es-
timate of the amount of material to be purchased and in concluding
that the contract calls for the purchase of the unspecified quantity
which may actually prove to be needed in the designated business or
project, are deliberately making the contract one for requirements
even though there is a reasonable basis for construing it to be a con-
tract for a specified amount. Thus, the law has developed from the
early view that requirements contracts are invalid to a point where
courts not only recognize the validity of literal requirements con-
tracts but also construe agreements ambiguous in this respect to be
requirements contracts.
When the contracting parties are both commercial or professional
interests,18 as was true in the principal case, failure to consider the
estimate where there is some other standard of measurement is un-
derstandable. In such instances, each party has the business knowledge
to evaluate the other's estimate or to compute the probable quantity
or cost for itself, thereby eliminating any necessity for reliance entirely
upon the estimate. On the other hand, where one contracting party is
a commercial or professional interest and the other is not, the former
party appears to be placed in an unduly advantageous position if the
effect of the estimate is nullified. Through lack of business or profes-
sional knowledge, the layman is inclined to place strong reliance on
the estimate of the other. The situation in the recent case of Jones v.
Pollock, 19 is typical. Here a contractor agreed with a married couple
to build a house on a cost-plus basis, "within the estimated cost of
$,8,ioo." When the house was completed, the actual cost proved to be
$2o,421, and the Supreme Court of California held the couple liable
for that amount. Apparently the estimate is not regarded as qualifying
the cost-plus character of such contracts, and so the actual expense
provision is usually a nullity, operative, if at all, only when made by the buyer in
bad faith."
2SNational Pub. Co. v. International Paper Co., 269 Fed. 9o (C. C. A. 2d, 1920);
Maryland Dredging & Contracting Co. v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 265 Fed. 842 (E.
D. Pa. 192o); N. S. Sherman Machine & Iron Works v. Carey, Lombard, Young &
Co., ioo Okla. 29, 227 Pac. 110 (1924).
"34 Cal. (2d) 863, 215 P. (2d) 73 (1950).
19521
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required to complete the building designated in the contract becomes
the governing factor in determining the owner's liability.
20
The view of such cases is supported by the undeniable fact that
the contractor cannot foresee intervening factors such as rising prices
and labor troubles which render the estimate inaccurate.2 1 Where
there is a cost-plus contract the very nature of the agreement indi-
cates that the only ceiling is to be the actual cost arrived at by the
contractor in good faith.2 2 On the other hand, however, the layman,
with even less ability to make an accurate estimate, is naturally in-
clined to rely heavily upon the contractor's professional estimate, and
might not be willing to enter the contract except on the assumption
that this figure stands as the approximate maximum of his liability.
He supposes that the contractor contracted to take the risks of changes
in prices, and there is no reason to allow the contractor to avoid the
loss involved in the very risk he assumed. If it is admitted that the
layman assumes the same risk that the estimate will prove inaccurate,
even then it appears that the contractor is generally in a better position
financially to bear the loss resulting from the mutual risk. However,
the courts generally take the position that the presence of the cost-plus
term places the risk on the owner and renders his reliance on the esti-
mate unjustifiable.
23
The legal effect of requirements contracts, which have progressed
from complete invalidity to a prominent position in the business
world, is currently being rendered uncertain when an estimate provi-
sion is incorporated. Though courts, in interpreting such contracts
for requirements, have generally given little weight to the estimate
itself, the abundant litigation in which parties base their entire case
on the estimate indicates the misleading effect it often carries. Though
this problem is most acute where one of the contracting parties is
prejudiced by lack of knowledge of commercial and professional
'OIn Eggers v. Luster, 32 Wash. (2d) 86, 200 P. (2d) 520 (1949), the court held
the layman liable to the building contractor for the actual cost of $25,125.64 even
though the estimate was only $134oo.
"Fluctuation in prices of labor and materials in Jones v. Pollock, 34 Cal. (2d)
863, 215 P. (2d) 733 (195o) accounted for the wide divergence between the estimate
and the actual cost for which the owner was held liable.
-2It is stated in 17 C. J. S. 827 regarding cost-plus contracts that "If there is no
agreed limit as to price, the fact that the actual cost exceeds that contemplated by
the parties is no ground for charging such excess against the contractor."
=Jones v. Pollock, 34 Cal. (2d) 863, 215 P. (2d) 733 (1950); Eggers v. Luster, 32
Wash. (2d) 86, 200 P. (2d) 520 (1949); Kuenzi v. Radloff, 253 Wis. 575, 34 N. W. (2d)
798 (1948). See Blohm v. Kagy, 341 Ill. App. 468, 94 N. E. (2d) 516, 518 (1951).
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practices, the Kellogg case demonstrates that the same difficulties arise
between parties who are approximately equal in that respect.
JAMES H. FLIPPEN, JR.
DAMAGES-RELAXATION OF CERTAINTY RULE TO ALLOW SUBSTANTIAL
DAMAGES IN BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES. [New York]
In order that the jury may have some reliable basis for calculating
the amount of damages to be awarded for a breach of contract, the
plaintiff must introduce evidence indicating the extent of the loss
sustained from the breach.' This burden is regularly defined by re-
citing the general rule that damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty and must not be contingent, conjectural, or remote.2 The
certainty requirement, while setting up a logical and necessary requi-
site to the awarding of truly compensatory damages, often forces the
courts into a position in which they must either allow defendant to
breach a contract with impunity, and thereby deprive a deserving
plaintiff of damages even though the contract has been breached to
his substantial detriment, or rationalize a means of avoiding the cer-
tainty rule thereby awarding damages which may not remotely reflect
plaintiff's actual loss.
The difficulty of resolving this problem is well illustrated by the
recent New York case of Spitz v. Lesser,3 in which plaintiff obtain-
ed a judgment for subtantial damages in the trial court, then suffered a
reduction of the award to nominal damages of six cents in a divided
Appellate Division decision,4 and finally won a reinstatement of the
substantial damages judgment in the Court of Appeals, again on a split
decision. Plaintiff, the inventor of a toy, entered into a contract with de-
fendant, a toy manufacturer, whereby defendant agreed to make the toy
"'for mass production sales'; to 'promote, market and ship same ... ,'
and by January 2, 1949, 'to have production samples . . . ready for
market ... .' Defendant also agreed to pay plaintiff a royalty of 5% on
the first $ioo,ooo of net sales, 3% thereafter, and 'a minimum for the
first year- 19 4 9 -of not less than' $2,5oo."
5 The contract was subject to
the defendant's right to "'return this item ... not later than Apr. ist-
1949-after the Toy Show,' in which event full royalties were to be paid
1i Sedgwick, Measure of Damages (9th ed. 1920) §170.
2McCormick, Damages (1935) §25; Restatement, Contracts (1932) §331. Also see
Griffin v. Colver, 6 N. Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718 (1858).
:'302 N. Y. 490, 99 N. E. (2d) 540 (1950-
4ioo N. Y. S. (2d) 558 (i95o).
r,8o2 N. Y. 490 , 99 N. E. (2d) 540 (1951)-
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for any and all goods shipped under the agreement. .. , and the agree-
ment, which otherwise continued for three years subject to further re-
newal, would thereby be terminated."6 Defendant never took any af-
firmative action toward performing the contract, and on January 24,
1949, he purported to exercise his right to cancel the contract.
In the plaintiff's suit for breach of contract, the trial court awarded
the plaintiff $2,5oo damages, the amount being set by the minimum
royalty provided for in the contract. The Appellate Division, in re-
ducing the damages to a nominal award, declared that "That the
value of the contract at the time of the ... breach must be measured
subject to the cancellation privilege which it contained."7 Admitting
that the defendant's premature exercise of the option to cancel the
agreement was an anticipatory breach of the contract, this court ruled
that it was a mere technical breach, which "would amount to cancel-
lation in contemplation of the law,"s and for such a breach the damages
should not exceed the royalties which would have been paid on any
toys sold up to the time when the defendant could have legally exer-
cised his option to terminate the contract, unless the plaintiff suffered
"special damages for failure of the defendant to make and exhibit
the toy."9 Since the plaintiff had not attempted to prove special dam-
ages and since the defendant had made and sold no toys, there was no
proven basis for awarding substantial damages. The court indicated
that the royalty clause would be the proper measure of damages only
if the breach occurred subsequent to the last day on which defendant
could exercise his option to cancel contract. In the view of the dissent-
ing judge, "Implicit in the agreement was defendant's duty to pro-
duce and ship, up to the date when it could legally have cancelled
.... The record indicates that defendant decided it had made
a bad bargain .... By total non-performance, defendant has breached
its duty, damaged plaintiff, and eliminated every other basis for dam-
ages except the minimum guaranteed by defendant for the first year."'u
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and rein-
stated the judgment for $2,5oo damages, but the specific ground on
which it avoided the certainty rule is left in doubt. The opinion deals
largely in generalities, and though not specifically adopting the theory
of the Appellate Division dissent, seems to'agree with its interpretation
of the contract as to the duty of the defendant to produce and sell toys
0302 N. Y. 490, 99 N. E. (2d) 540, 541 (1951).
7 oo N. Y. S. (2d) 558, 559 (1950).
81oo N. Y. S. (2d) 558, 559 (1950).
'Ooo N. Y. S. (2d) 558, 56o (95o).
0ioo N. Y. S. (2d) 558, 560, 561 (1950).
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prior to the end of the period when the option could have been legally
exercised.
In one of the few specific references to the actual case before it, the
court observed that the minimum royalty provision "was the guaran-
teed compensation in the event of performance in other respects by
defendant; it cannot be less by reason of his breach. Plaintiff may in-
deed have been damaged far more than this sum, but the minimum was
all that could be proved."' The opinion makes no application of this
statement to the contract involved, and a relevant application is dif-
ficult to develop. Obviously the defendant had breached two obliga-
tions, in that he failed to have any samples ready by January 2 and that
he attempted prematurely to cancel the contract. It is difficult to see
what consequences in damages could arise from the first breach, except
as it relates to a failure to produce toys in mass production for the
market. Production samples would be of no substantial value except
in preparation for extensive marketing. Further, no substantial dam-
ages would seem to arise from the premature cancellation, unless it
is assumed that defendant was under obligation to mass-produce and
market toys prior to the last date at which he was authorized to cancel.
Only by such production and sale of the product could plaintiff have
become entitled to royalties under the contract, and so in awarding
damages based on the royalty guarantee, the court apparently assumed
that the defendant was under that duty, which, however, is not ex-
pressed in the contract. The only provision referred to in the opinion
from which such an obligation could be implied was the statement that
in the event of cancellation by the defendant, royalties should be paid
for any of the toys shipped pursuant to the contract up to the final date
for cancellation. This term merely indicates the obvious fact that de-
fendant could produce and sell the toys before that date and that if he
did so he must pay royalties for those goods. This is a very different
matter from requiring defendant to act, and compelling him to pay
the minimum royalties for an entire year's operation if he failed to
operate during the three months prior to the date on which he could
cancel the contract. Even if the duty to manufacture toys during the
option period is assumed, the award of $2,5oo for the breach is exces-
sive, because that duty would exist for no longer than ninety days, after
which defendant could admittedly cancel. If the plaintiff was satisfied
to accept a $2,5oo'guaranty clause for a whole year's production and
sale, it seems highly unreasonable for the court to award him that much
for a period only one-fourth as long.
n302 N. Y. 490, 99 N. E. (2d) 540, 541 (1951).
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Since defendant insisted on reserving a privilege to cancel the
agreement, it seems only reasonable that he desired to have a period
of time in which to decide whether the arrangement was sufficiently
profitable to justify full scale production. Parties contracting in this
state of mind would hardly intend that the manufacturer should be
bound to go through with the heavy initial expense of tooling up and
hiring workers for mass production when he might already have con-
cluded that he would exercise his option to cancel.12 The complaint of
the appellate court dissent that "defendant simply decided it had
made a bad bargain"' 3 and therefore refused to perform is quite beside
the point; the privilege not to perform was precisely what the defen-
dant provided for in the contract.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals does nothing to establish
the logical basis of the judgment. Instead it stresses that the defendant
was a deliberate wrongdoer, and as such should not be allowed to avoid
paying substantial damages. 14 The court observed that "If plaintiff can-
not measure his damages in terms of the minimum royalties upon
which the parties agreed, there is no satisfactory measure of his loss,"
and further that "Since it is defendant's own wrong which has rendered
it impossible for plaintiff to prove his damages with more certainty, he
cannot complain of the alleged uncertainty .... 'The most elementary
conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer
shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has cre-
ated'."'3 In order to effectuate that policy, the court felt it necessary to
seize upon the only definite figure in the contract and make it the meas-
ure of damages. However, to evoke this policy in its logical extreme
would result in the complete collapse of the certainty rule, inasmuch as
it is designed to require the plaintiff to prove his own case specifically
"Though the contract gave the defendant until April a, to make up his mind,
the parties surely would not have intended to compel the making of useless expen-
ditures in preparing for production which was never to be consummated. The ma-
jority of the Appellate Division was apparently taking this view of the contract
when it termed the premature cancellation merely "a technical breach of the con-
tract .. " Spitz v. Lesser, too N. Y. S. (2d) 558, 560 (1950).
lioo N. Y. S. (2d) 558, 561 (1950)-
1This approach is regularly employed by courts which feel impelled by a
sense of justice to award substantial damages to a plaintiff who is unable to prove
the amount of his losses with any certainty. "There are cases ... in which the ques-
tion of an intentional wrong is involved. In such cases the degree of proof necessary is
much relaxed in favor of the injured party. Where the wrongdoer creates the situation
that makes proof of the exact amount of damages difficult, he must realize that in
such cases 'juries are allowed to act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct
and postive, proof'." Wood v. Pender-Doxey, 151 Va. 706, 713, 144 S. E. 65, 638 (1928).
Also, Burckhardt v. Burckhardt, 42 Ohio St. 474, 51 Am. Rep. 842 (1885).1 Spitz v. Lesser, 302 N. Y. 490, 99 N. E. (2d) 540 541, 542 (1951).
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enough to provide the jury with some sound basis for calculating the
amount of damages.' 6
Though this decision, both in placing a dubious construction on
the contract and then in seizing upon an illogical figure as to the
measure of damages, may go somewhat beyond the usual result of
modem cases, it is significant in that it reflects an increasing tendency
of the courts to circumvent the certainty rule in the contracts cases1i
when its application would result in the denial of damages to a plain-
tiff whom the court regards as worthy. Formerly, loss of profits was
regarded as per se too contingent and speculative to be allowable as an
item of damages.' 8 However, with the passage of time, a more lenient
view was adopted, and where the business was an established one,
with a fairly accurate record of past earnings, future profits were more
freely allowed.' 9 There still remained the problem of the new business,
wherein Paola Gas Company v. Paola Glass Company20 presents the
classical view. Representing a more modern trend is the federal case
of Excelsior Motor Manufacturing and Supply Company v. Sound
24A clear demonstration of this salutary employment of the certainty rule may
been seen in Dreelan v. Karon, 191 Minn. 330, 254 N. W. 433 (1934), wherein the
court very properly entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict for
plaintiff, after plaintiff had shown little inclination even to attempt to present
specific proof of the amount of his claim.
'1TIn the forty years from x9o7 through 1946, in the 122 cases listed in the
Decennials of the American Digest System, Damages keynumber 6, in which the cer-
tainty rule was relied upon by defendant to defeat plaintiff's claim for damages
in contract cases, recovery was denied on that basis in 22.7% of those decisions in
1907-1916, in 194% in 1917-1926, in 114% in 1927-1936, and in 8.8% in 1937-1946.
21 Sedgwick, Measure of Damages (9th ed. 192o) §175. Also Smith v. Condry, 1
How. 28 (U. S. 1843); The Lively, 1 Gall. 315, Fed. Cas. No. 8403 (C. C. Mass. 1812).
'w'It is well established that prospective profits are a legitimate item of damages
resulting from breach of contract, when the circumstances are such that future profits
may be computed with some reasonable certainty, and it is held that evidence of
prior profits in the same business furnished a basis for such contemplation." Bux-
buam v. G. H. P. Cigar Co., 188 Wis. 389, 206 N. W. 59, 61 (1925).
=°56 Kan. 614, 44 Pac. 621 (1896). Defendant gas company was under a contract
to provide gas to the plaintiff glass company. Because of an insufficient supply of
heat, due to defendant's failure to supply enough gas, the plaintiff was forced to
cease operation. Plaintiff was in business for approximately two months. In a suit for
damages, prospective profits were not allowed, the court stressing the fact that glass
manufacturing was untried in that section of the country and there was no basis
for estimating profits. The application of the certainty rule to the facts of this
case made the result reached inevitable. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which
the profits sought to be recovered would be more contingent, speculative, or remote.
The court felt constrained to disallow the future profits, but not without some mis-
giving. It proposed an alternative measure of damages in the form of an amount
equal to the rental value of the plaintiff's plant. See also, States v. Durkin, 65 Kan.
1oi, 68 Pac. 1091 (1902); American Oil Co. v. Lovelace, 15o Va. 624, 143 S. E. 293
(1928); Webster v. Beau, 77 Wash. 44, 137 Pac. 1013 (1914).
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Equipment, Inc.2 1 in which a different result was reached on similar
facts. Though the plaintiff's undertaking was a new venture, the court
affirmed a recovery of loss of profits since the plaintiff was able to
prove that the demand for such equipment greatly exceeded the supply.
There can be no criticism of the modern trend, insofar as it rests
on the conviction that the certainty rule is one of broad flexibility,
and that no fixed standard can determine all cases. However, the justi-
fication for the trend toward leniency is difficult to explain in terms
consistent with the original purpose of the certainty rule. It is doubtful
that a greater trust in and respect for the jury's ability to pass on dam-
ages issues* more accurately is a sufficient explanation, though it may
be remotely relevant. It is true that the popular idea of elementary
justice is that a deliberate wrongdoer should not escape payment of
damages on a procedural mechanism or legalistic technicality. Perhaps
the courts feel that there is less risk of harm in grasping for the straw
which will justify granting substantial damages than there is in letting
the defendant breach with complete impunity.
The most satisfactory solution to the problem appears to be in the
more certain and definite drafting of contracts.2 2 Of course, there will
always be certain eventualities and types of breaches which cannot
be anticipated, no matter how much foresight the contracting parties
exercise. Nevertheless, liquidated damages provisos and guaranty
clauses will greatly reduce the number of instances in which the
measure of damages will be left in complete uncertainty. In the prin-
cipal case, if the parties had stated the defendant's contractual obli-
gations more specifically and added definite liquidated damages or
guaranty provisions to cover the probable types of breaches, including
an anticipatory breach by defendant, the problems involving the
certainty rule would not have arisen in the transaction.
RICHARD H. LipscoiB
273 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1934). Plaintiff was exclusive distributor of sound
equipment for motion pictures, at this time a relatively new enterprize. Defendant
manufacturer failed to supply the machines, and the court in allowing a recovery
relied heavily on the plaintiff's evidence that the demand for the new equipment
greatly exceeded the supply.
2" . . . in the majority of cases upon contract, there is little difficulty, from
the nature of the subject, in finding a rule by which substantial compensation may
be readily estimated; and it is only in cases where this can not be done . . ., that
there can be any great failure of justice by adhering to such rule as will most
clearly approximate the desired result. And it is precisely in these . . . cases that
the parties have it in their power to protect themselves from any loss to arise from
such uncertainty, by estimating their own damage in the contract itself, and pro-
viding for themselves the rules by which the amount shall be measured, in case of
a breach .... " Allison v. Chandler, ii Mich. 542, 552 (1863).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-BAsIS FOR WIFE'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR FRAUD-
ULENT INDUCEMENT TO ENTER VOID MARRIAGE. [Virginia]
The common law rule that a wife may not sue her husband for per-
sonal torts committed against her, because a fictional unity and merger
of personality exists between the spouses and because such actions
would have disruptive effects upon marital harmony,' apparently did
not forbid one spouse to sue the other for fraudulent inducement to
enter a void marriage. It can be reasoned that allowance of that action
does not contravene the general prohibition against suits between
spouses since, in legal contemplation, the litigating parties are not
man and wife. Therefore, such considerations as legal unity of spouses
and disruption of marriage are not relevant to this situation.
Though a wife's right of action for fraudulent inducement to enter
a void marriage was recognized in England as early as 16842 and has
been accepted in many American states, the specific issue was not passed
on by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals until the recent case of
Alexander v. Kuykendall.3 A woman brought suit against her supposed
husband, alleging fraudulent inducement to enter a marriage ceremony
in 1944 which defendant had represented as valid when he knew it
would be invalid. The union resulted in the birth of one child and
had, prior to this action, been held invalid.4 Plaintiff asked damages
for embarrassment, humiliation and loss of substantial position of
employment. Defendant demurred on the ground that (1) Virginia law
neither contemplated nor allowed such a cause of action, and, (2) if it
did, the allegations were insufficient to support the action. 5 The Circuit
Court of the City of Norfolk sustained the demurrer without stating
its grounds for so doing. In reversing and remanding the case, the
Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the rule "that an innocent woman
[who is] induced by fraud and deceit to contract a void marriage with
defendant, and subsequently lives with him, performing the normal
'Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. li8o (1990)
(holding a Married Woman's Act did not abrogate the common law rule). See Prosser,
Torts (1941) 898.
2Anonymous, Skinner 119, 9o Eng. Rep. 56 (1684). See The Lady Cox's case, 3 P.
Wins. 339, 24 Eng. Rep. logi (1734) (such a cause of action alluded to).
'192 Va. 8, 63 S. E. (2d) 746 (195).
4Defendant, at the time of entering the marriage ceremony in 1944, was under
disability due to prior existing marriage. Prior to the present action at law for
damages, the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk had decreed annulment of the
1944 marriage.
'The second ground of the demurrer involved a procedural point not here com-
mented upon.
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duties of a wife, is entitled to recover damages in an action for fraud
and deceit."6
Ample authority from other jurisdictions supported the recogni-
tion of a right of action, and the main problem considered by the
Virginia court was whether the recovery should be based upon a
quasi-contract or a tort theory.7 The distinction is important prin-
cipally in regard to measurement of damages. Under the quasi-contract
theory, the woman is permitted to recover on an implied contract the
reasonable money value of services rendered, less the cost of her main-
tenance and supports States following the tort theory allow the woman
to recover in an action of deceit both full compensation and exemplary
damages for fraudulent representation that the marriage would be
valid.9 Another consideration to be noted is that recovery under the
tort theory must depend upon proving the representation to have been
fraudulently made,10 whereas, an innocent representation may be suf-
ficient under the quasi-contract theory."
The quasi-contract theory is based upon the doctrine of assumpsit
and principles of equity. Courts allowing recovery on this basis ap-
parently recognize an exception to the normal quasi-contract rule
OAlexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 12, 63 S. E. (2d) 746, 748 (1951). The case
was subsequently retried on the merits, the following verdict being returned on
December 2o, 1951: "We the jury find in favor of the defendant." Estelle Ferguson
Alexander v. William Oliver Kuykendall, Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, File
Number 7389.
7"This court has never passed upon the question, and there is no Virginia statute
authorizing or prohibiting such an action. However, the right of a party so defrauded
to recover is authorized in most jurisdictions upon one of the other of two theories."
Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 1o, 63 S. E. (2d) 746, 747 (1951). See also authori-
ties cited, notes 8-15, infra. The captions "quasi-contract theory" and "tort theory"
are adopted as a short-hand expression of the two lines of authority.
"Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (ig6); In re Fox's Estate, 178 Wis.
369, 19o N. W. 9o, 31 A. L. R. 420 (1922) (question of what result where both
parties were in good faith was mooted).
'Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 265 Mass. 413, 164 N .E. 699, 62 A. L. R. 525 (1929);
Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888) (frequently cited for reasoning
in criticism of the quasi-contract theory); Amsterdam v. Amsterdam, 56 N. Y. S. (2d)
19 (1945); Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 Ad. 829 (1895).
19It should be noted here that the intent to deceive is not an essential element
of the tort of deceit in Virginia. Union Trust Corporation v. Fugate, 172 Va. 82, 2oo
S. E. 624 (1939); McDaniel v. Hodges, 176 Va. 519, 524, 11 S. E. (2d) 623, 625 (1940):
"In Virginia, however, we have consistently adhered to the minority view that the
intent or good faith of a representator is not in issue and is not controlling." But
fraud must be expressly charged, as a bare allegation of fraud is not sufficient to sup-
port an action for damages. Lloyd v. Smith, i5o Va. 132, 143 S. E. 323 (1928).
"Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. (2d) 95, 69 P. (2d) 845, 111 A. L. R. 342 (1937)-
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that the party seeking to recover damages as compensation for services
rendered must show that the services were not intended as a gratuity.
It is said that the defendant's fraud vitiates the plaintiff's intention
to make a gift of the services, and that the defendant will be unjustly
enriched if he is allowed to retain the benefits rendered by the plain-
tiff under the mistaken assumption that the defendant was entitled
thereto.12 The law implies the promise, and equity demands that the
parties be made whole.' 3 This view has been criticized as ignoring the
realities of the factual situation. Since parties contemplating marriage
do not expect payment for rendering the mutual services of man and
wife, there is no basis for implying a promise to pay. Further, the in-
cident of household services should not be singled out for compensation,
since they are but part of a greater wrong to be proven as an element
of damages. 14 Other objections are also apparent: the recovery in quasi-
contract for the reasonable value of services will rarely be adequate
to compensate the defrauded party for her actual damages, and puni-
tive damages are not recoverable; a balance of the benefits rendered
as against the benefits received may result in a nominal judgment; and,
the criteria of value to the defendant as a domestic servant overlooks
the more valuable benefits of marriage such as love, companionship
and aid in accumulating wealth for the defendant.15
The basis for the tort theory recovery is the same as that for any
tort action for deceit: that the defendant intentionally misrepresented a
material fact intending that the plaintiff rely on it, and the plaintiff,
in reliance, suffered damage. Obviously, this theory enables the plaintiff
to recover compensatory damages on a broader basis, including the
elements of embarrassment, humiliation, loss of economic and social
position and also opens up a possibility of punitive damage.16 While
the quasi-contract theory is criticized for pecuniary inadequacy of the
recovery, the tort theory is criticized for procedural inadequacy.
Thus, if the defendant acts in good faith without fraud, no action lies
since no tort was committed; absent a saving statute, the action will
"Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916); Keener, Quasi-Contracts
(1893) 315-324. See Note (1922) 7 Minn. L. Rev. 172.
"In re Fox's Estate, 178 Wis. 369, 1go N. W. go, 31 A. L. R. 420 (1922).
"'Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888) (quoted at length and
with approval in the principal case).
"See Evans, Property Interests Arising From Quasi-Marital Relations (1924) 9
Corn. L. Q. 246, 252.
"Amsterdam v. Amsterdam, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 19 (1945) (although the plaintiff
was clearly entitled to punitive damages, only compensatory damages were requested).
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not survive the death of either party; and the statute of limitations
17
is usually shorter for tort actions than for contract actions.'
8
Since neither rule assures a just result in all situations, it has been
appropriately suggested, by both writers'9 and occasional decision,
20
that plaintiff be allowed to waive the tort and sue in contract. Thereby,
the plaintiff could elect to sue under the theory which would afford
her the most advantageous recovery. Such an election would not ordi-
narily be possible at present, since each jurisdiction seems to adopt
one theory to the exclusion of the other. The problem considered in
each case should not be which rule is right and which is wrong, but
which theory will provide the fairest measure of compensation. There
is nothing to indicate that the two theories must be mutually exclusive.
More complete justice in each case would be possible if courts would re-
examine the problem, upon a procedural basis, in an effort to provide
relief under any plan which is consistent with recognized principles of
legal remedies.
The record in the Alexander case did not reveal sufficient facts
from which the court could determine whether or not the marriage in
question was void or voidable, although certain parts of the opinion
appear clearly to assume the existence of a void marriage as regards the
rule laid down. 21 Thus there is some reason to speculate whether
Virginia would recognize a right of action if the marriage were merely
voidable, rather than void.22 This point of inquiry takes on added
1
7Many cases hold that the statute of limitations does not run until the fraud
is discovered by the innocent party. Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 265 Mass. 413, 164 N. E.
609, 62 A. L. R. 525 (1929); Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 3 Atl. 829 (1895).
IsSee Evans, Property Interests Arising From Quasi-Marital Relations (1924) 9
Corn. L. Q. 246, 251.
gWoodward, The Law of Quasi-Contract (1913) §282.
'A North Carolina court employed the principle of "waiving the tort" and
allowed plaintiff to recover against the estate of her dead husband under the quasi-
contract theory. Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916). However, plain-
tiff was denied a choice of remedy in a Massachusetts case where the court remarked
that a "duty to pay damages for a tort does not imply a promise to pay them, upon
which assumpsit can be maintained." Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E.
892, 894, (1888).
21"The only question of substantive law involved is, whether or not a woman
may maintain an action against a man, who, by misrepresentation, fraud and deceit,
induced her to enter into what she thought a valid marriage, but which in fact was
void." Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 9, 63 S. E. (2d) 746, 747 (1951) [italics
supplied].
2of course, one could conclude the obvious: that the Virginia court intends that
the rule shall apply to all invalid marriages, because the court recognized a cause
of action although it stated that the record did not reveal whether the marriage was
void or voidable. However, there is sufficient ambiguity in the opinion to justify
discussion of the point.
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significance when considered with several specific references made in
the opinion to prior Virginia decisions pointing out the necessity for
observing a clear distinction between void and voidable marriages
23
and re-affirming the common law doctrine of non-liability for torts be-
tween spouses.2 4 A void marriage is a nullity and may be impeached
collaterally, after death of the parties, 25 while a voidable marriage is
valid until action is taken to avoid it, is subject to ratification by the
innocent party, and may be impeached only during the lives of the
parties thereto.20 Jurisdictions following the common law rule of non-
liability between spouses for personal torts could validly deny the
action to a wife for fraudulent inducement to marry where the marriage
is voidable only, because in such cases the parties are man and wife in
legal contemplation so long as the marriage has not been invalidated by
judicial action. However, if the ab initio doctrine is invoked, 27 the
voidable marriage is said to be void from the beginning as soon as a
decree of a court declares it invalid. It is a common principle that fic-
tions in law are used as tools to effectuate justice. Justice would clearly
be served if the ab initio doctrine were used to afford relief to defrauded
parties induced to enter voidable marriages, for the legal injury is no
different whether the marriage is void or voidable.
If the Virginia court in the principal case means only that plain-
tiff must first secure an annulment decree voiding a voidable marriage,
there is nothing to detract from the conclusion that the principal case
has far-reaching results. If, on the other hand, the proper interpretation
2Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4 S. E. (2d) 364, 127 A. L.
R. 430 (1939) cited in the principal case at 192 Va. 8, 13, 63 S. E. (2d) 746, 748).
2'Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439 (1918) (cited in the
principal case, 192 Va. 8, 12, 63 S. E. (2d) 746, 748)- It is interesting to note here that
the Virginia court in the Alexander case expressly recognized such a right of action
even though the common law rule of non-liability for torts between spouses still
obtains in Virginia, while a recent New York decision relies on a statute of New
York abrogating the common law rule as grounds for allowing the action in a similar
case. Amsterdam v. Amsterdam, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 19, 22 (1945). [See New York Do-
mestic Relations Laws (1938) §57].
-Cook v. Cook, 76 A. (2d) 593 at 597 (Vt. 1950).
-OMillar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 (1917); Keezer, Marriage And Di-
vorce (3 d ed. 1923) §§21o, 211.
-7This doctrine is not universally employed since occasionally a harsh result is
reached. In re Moncrief's Will, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550 (1923) (ab initio doctrine
used although child thereby was made illegitimate). Other courts employ the doc-
trine but limit its application on grounds of policy, stating that completed acts dur-
ing the supposed marriage may not be reopened or undone. The unstated grounds
appear to be a policy against actions ex delicto between even supposed "spouses" of
a voidable marriage. Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N. E. (2d) 637, 2 A. L. R.
(2d) 632 (1948) (denying wife of voidable marriage a cause of action for injuries by
husband in automobile accident).
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proves to be that only parties to a void marriage are given this new
remedy, the decision is a narrow one limited to a very few cases, since
the modern trend is to make virtually all defective marriages voidable
only.28 Thus, although the court's recognition of a new remedy is com-
mendable, a proper appraisal of the new rule in Virginia must await
clarification by subsequent decisions.
Ehm=Er E. TUCKER, JR.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY IN PROSECUTION FOR SEX CRIME OF EVIDENCE
OF COMMISSION BY ACCUSED OF PRIOR CRIME OF SAME NATURE.
[Montana]
It is a fundamental rule of evidence that if a defendant is being
tried for the commission of one crime, evidence cannot be introduced
to show that he at some prior time committed another crime, even
though the two offenses may be almost identical.' Evidence of different
offenses would unduly influence the jury against the defendant, and
he probably would be taken by surprise and thus would not be ade-
quately prepared to answer the charges.2 The general rule, however,
is subject to at least five standard exceptions: that the evidence may be
introduced to show (I) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of mistake
or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan, (5) the identity of the per-
son charged with the commission of the crime on trial.8
There is also much authority that the general rule does not apply
with its full affect in trials on charges of sex crimes, 4 but not all courts
"Keezer, Marriage And Divorce (3d ed. 1923) §§ 210-221; 35 Am. Jur., Marriage
§46.
'State v. Baugh, 200 Iowa 1225, 2o6 N. W. 250 (1925); Romes v. Commonwealth,
164 Ky. 334, 175 S. W. 669 (1915); People v. Than, 219 N. Y. 39, 113 N. E. 556, 3 A.
L. R. 1537 (1916); 22 C. J. C., Criminal Law §682.
-Commonwealth v. Henry Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 20 (1882): "Such evidence com-
pels the defendant to meet charges of which the indictment gives him no information,
confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of issues, and thus diverts the attention
of the jury from the one immediately before it; and by showing the defendant to
have been a knave on other occasions, creates a prejudice which may cause injustice
to be done him."
'People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39, 113 N. E. 556, 3 A. L. R. 1537 (1916). It has been
said that the exceptions are founded on as much wisdom as the rule itself. Gianotos v.
United States, 104 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). At least one court has said that the
so-called exceptions are really part of the rule. Beach v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. 348, 230
Pac. 758 (1924).
'Bracey v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 85 (App. D. C. 1944); Suber v. State, 176 Ga.
525, x68 S. E. 585 (1933); State v. Stitz, 111 Kan. 275, 2o6 Pac. 91o (1922); Common-




recognize such an exception. This divergence of opinion is exemplified
by the diverse views within the Montana Supreme Court in the recent
case of State v. Sauter.5 The defendant was charged with having com-
mitted forcible rape. It was alleged that he and his companion met the
prosecutrix, a 22 year old woman, in a barroom, bought her some
drinks, and persuaded her to get into their car for a ride to a nearby
town. It was further alleged that she was taken on a country road where
the defendant's companion first raped her, and after she had been
reduced to a state of hysteria, the defendant then raped her. In the
trial court the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence that
defendant had committed another similar act with another girl under
strikingly similar circumstances. The Supreme Court of Montana,
in a 3 to 2 decision, ruled that the admission of such evidence was
error, and reversed the decision and remanded the case to the lower
court.
The majority could see no reason for making an exception to the
general exclusionary rule, inasmuch as the showing that two distinct
crimes had been committed the same way does not show a system or
scheme. It was observed that, "sexual acts, whether rape, or no rape,
originated in barroom pickups, powered by the urge and consummated
in automobiles, are entirely too common in this day and age to have
much evidentiary value in showing a systematic scheme or plan."6 Since
the defendant admitted having intercourse with the prosecutrix and
placed his defense on the absence of force, there was no problem of
identity, and the prior crime could not be introduced to show a simi-
larity in operating technique.
The dissenting justices approved the admission of the evidence of
a previous offense,7 but whether they would have admitted the evidence
because a sex crime was involved or because it could be brought in
under one of the five standard exceptions is not entirely clear. The
opinion speaks of plan, scheme and design which would indicate a
standard exception. Yet in many of the cases cited as authority, sex
crimes are regarded as an exception to the general rule,8 and the dis-
sent refers pointedly to the fact that courts are more liberal in ad-
mitting evidence of a prior offense where a sex crime was involved.
Some courts following the general exclusionary rule applied in the
principal case have refused to list sex crimes as an exception, but
5232 P. (2d) 73, (Mont. 1951).
OState v. Sauter, 232 P. (2d) 731, 732 (Mont. 1951).7State v. Sauter, 232 P. (2d) 731, 735 (Mont. 1951).8Bracey v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 85 (App. D. C. 1944); State v. Peres, 27 Mont.
358, 71 Pac. 162 (19o3); Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A. (2d) 348 (1949).
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have nonetheless admitted evidence of prior crimes in such cases
under one of the standard exceptions. 9 Yet not a few of these rulings
are hard to justify under any of the standard exceptions, and it is sub-
mitted that there are cases 10 in which the evidence is admitted in fact
because of the sex crime and yet the courts, not recognizing this as
an exception, have let the evidence in under another name. This be.
comes more apparent where it is noticed that the evidence is quite
often admitted under the name of intent." Yet other courts have said
that in sex crimes, intent or guilty knowledge can be inferred from the
nature of the act and evidence of other crimes is not admissible to
prove intent.12 Thus, courts which admit evidence of other sex crimes
for the purpose of showing intent either refuse to recognize that intent
can be inferred from the nature of the act or else intent is being named
as the exception when there is some more fundamental reason for the
admission.
However, some courts have been quite willing to admit that the
general rule does not apply where the charge is of a sex crime.'i Ac-
cording to this view evidence of prior crimes should be admitted and
sex crimes added as another standard exception to the general rule.
The dissent in the principal case would have apparently gone this
far.
Courts adopting this view have placed great emphasis on the men-
tal attitude of the accused. It is reasoned that criminals are motivated
by an abnormal pattern of emotional maladjustments, and the evidence
of prior sex crimes is declared to be admissible to show the bent of
'State v. Martinez, 67 Ariz. 389, 198 P. (2d) 115 (1948); People v. Meraviglia, 73
Cal. App. 402, 238 Pac. 794 (1925); State v. Sheets, 127 Iowa 73, 102 N. W. 415 (1905);
State v. Gummer, 51 N. D. 445, 200 N. W. 20 (1924).
"OLee v. State, i8 S. (2d) 706 (Ala. 1944); State v. Sheets, 127 Iowa 73, 1o2 N. W.
415 (19o5); State v. Jenks, 126 Kan. 493, 268 Pac. 850 (1928); State v. Gummer, 51
N. D. 445, 2oo N. W. 20 (1924). See State v. Start, 65 Ore. 178, 132 Pac. 512, 517 (1913).
nLee v. State, 18 S. (2d) 706 (Ala. 1944); People v. Meraviglia, 73 Cal. App. 402,
238 Pac. 794 (1925); State v. Sheets, 127 Iowa 73, 102 N. W. 415 (1905). See State v.
Start, 65 Ore. 178, 132 Pac. 512, 517 (1913). In commenting on the fact that courts
do not admit evidence of prior sex crimes to show intent and yet admit such evidence
to show scheme and design it is said: "The distinction between intent, disposition
and system seems tenuous. But they afford convenient grounds for the admission in
the court's discretion .... " Note (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 879, 88o.
"State v. Weaver, 182 Iowa 92 1, 166 N. W. 379 (1918); State v. McAllister, 67 Ore.
480, 136 Pac. 354 (1913); State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 Pac. 25o (19o9).
"Suber v. State, 176 Ga. 525, 168 S. E. 585 (933); Commonwealth v. Kline, 361
Pa. 434, 65 A. (2d) 348 (1949); Proper v. State, 85 Wis 615, 55 N. W. 1035 (1893). See
Bracey v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 85 (App. D. C. 1944); State v. Sauter, 232 P. (2d)
731, 735 (Mont. 1951.
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mind,14 the lustful disposition,15 and the degenerate nature of the
defendant.'0 In a California case' 7 in which the defendant was charged
with petty larceny of women's undergarments it was said that "His
selection of the undergarments of women . . . taken with his prior
convictions of stealing similar articles, indicate a sexually perverted
nature. ... " The opinion does not make it clear that the evidence
was admitted because there was a sex aspect involved, but the comment
has been made' 9 that the only value of the evidence was to show that
defendant had such an abnormal disposition that he would be likely
to commit such a crime. The refusal of a court to receive evidence of
prior crimes of the sex criminal has been likened to a refusal by a
doctor to heed prior pains in other parts of the anatomy than the
one under present observation.2 0 Such reasoning recognizes that the
sex criminal is a degenerate who has a greater propensity than the
ordinary criminal to continue in his wrongful conduct.
Between the two extreme positions advocated by the majority
and the dissent in the Sauter case, there is a middle or compromise view
which is said to be followed in the majority of jurisdictions. 21 This
view admits evidence of prior and even subsequent crimes if these of-
fenses were committed against the same person who is the victim of
the crime presently charged. The dissent in the principal case points
out that the Montana court has commonly adhered to this position.22
It is difficult to ascertain why a prior crime committed on the same
person should have more probative value than a prior similar crime
committed on a different person. A District of Columbia case in dis-
cussing this problem has aptly observed that "The emotional predis-
position or passion involved in raping one little girl would seem to
be the same as that involved in raping another .... The better reasoned
cases in other jurisdictions also support the admission of such evidence,
within the exception to the general rule."23 However, a possible ex-
planation of this intermediate view lies in the fact that the rule is
applied most often in regard to charges of sex offenses not based on
"Suber v. State, 176 Ga. 525, x68 S. E. 585 (193).
"State v. Hammock, 18 Idaho 424, 11o Pac. 169 (191o).
'"State v. Badders, 141 Kan. 683, 42 P. (2d) 934 (1935).
"People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 231, 95 P. (2d) 169 (1939).
28 People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 231, 95 P. (2d) 169, 172 (1939).
"Note 0940) 28 Calif. L. Rev. 516, 518.
"Note (1949) 23 Temple L. Q. 133, 135.
2eState v. Stone, 74 Kan. 189, 85 Pac. 8o8 (19o6); Note (1922) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 467.
-State v. Sauter, 232 P. (2d) 731, 735 (Mont. ig5i).
"Bracey v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 85, 88 (App. D. C. 1944).
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force, such as incest, adultry, and statutory rape.2 4 In such cases prior
acts might indicate both a desire and an opportunity on the part of
the defendant to have relations with that particular person, and hence
evidence of those acts are of probative value in proving the defendant's
guilt of the alleged crime for which he is being tried.
25
It may be argued that the view of the dissent is inconsistent with
the American theory of criminal procedure26 which demands that
extensive safeguards against unfounded prejudice be accorded to every
accused.27 Undeniably the result of admitting evidence of prior crimes
would be an increase in the number of convictions of sex offenders.
It has been pointed out that "If the convicted criminals are to languish
in prison ... without ... aid of medical and psychiatric therapy, the
effect would be most undesirable to society as a whole and gravely
injurious to the individual convict." 28 However, that approach seems
to overlook the entire reasoning behind the view of the dissent that
the admission of evidence of prior crimes is justifiable because of the
propensity of the sex offender to repeat himself. 29 If the offender can
be convicted, society is protected from this propensity at least for the
period of time that he is "languishing in prison." While it is readily
admitted that this incarceration will not cure any maladjustments,
an acquittal of the sex offender has no better remedial effect, and yet
leaves him at large to prey on the public.
While the weight of authority is in accord with the majority of the
-4People v. Koller, 142 Cal. 621, 76 Pac. 5 oo (19o4) (evidence of prior and subse-
quent acts admissible as showing adulterous or incestuous inclination of parties); State
v. Stitz, iii Kan. 275, 206 Pac. 91o (1922); State v. Brown, 85 Kan. 418, 116 Pac. 508
(1911) (evidence admitted of both prior and subesquent acts to show the lustful dispo-
sition of the defendant for the same party); State v. Stone, 74 Kan. 189, 85 Pac. 8o8
(19o6) (evidence of subsequent acts between same persons admissible, it not being con-
tested as to admissibility of prior acts).
2State v. Brown, 85 Kan. 418, I16 Pac. 5o8 (1911); State v. Stone, 74 Kan. 189, 85
Pac. 8o8 (19o6).
21"The question of admissibility in criminal prosecutions of evidence of other
crimes committed by the defendant presents a conflict between the policy of ad-
mitting all relevant evidence and the policy of protecting the accused." Note (1940)
Calif. L. Rev. 516.
2Examples of procedure being in favor of the defendant. Presumption of in-
nocence: Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 151 N. E. 297, 47 A. L. R. 962
(1926); Wolf v. United States, 238 Fed. 902 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1916). No comment can be
made on defendant's failure to testify, in at least forty-two states: Reeder, Comment
Upon Failure of Accused to Testify (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 40 at 43.
2Note (1949) 23 Temple L. Q. 133, 135.
-"These sexual crimes, which are an exception to the general rule . ..may
be characterized as crimes in continuando. The law recognizes as a matter of common
knowledge that where a single act of that character arises, there is great probability
of other similar acts ...." State v. Reineke, 89 Ohio St. 390, 1o6 N. E. 52, 53 (1914) -
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court in the principal case, the dissent finds support from the state-
ment of a noted authority that, "Courts have shown altogether too
much hesitation in receiving such evidence . . . .There is room for
much more common sense than appears in the majority of the rul-
ings."3 0 Thus, while in regard to ordinary crimes, there are ample
reasons for preventing admission of evidence of prior crimes, courts
might display more wisdom if they gave greater thought to the problem
of the sex offender. It has been suggested that the problem of provid-
ing more appropriate means for dealing with sex criminals is for the
legislatures,3 ' but until the legislatures act, there is a chance for the
courts to take the initative, at least to the extent of making it possible
to convict such offenders and thus remove them from contact with
society in a greater number of cases.
S. MAYNARD TuRK
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION IN LETTER
FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE WHICH WAS INTERCEPTED BY THIRD PARTY.
[Arkansas]
Despite the importance of making all relevant evidence available for
consideration by the jury, the welfare of society and the orderly admin-
istration of justice require that testimony of certain types shall not be
admissible in the courts. Thus, in order to protect the institution of
marriage, it has been deemed desirable to exclude the confidences of the
marriage if the spouse against whom the evidence is attempted to be
used so desired.' As a consequence of this established privilege it is clear
that either husband or wife can prevent the other spouse from testify-
ing as to unfavorable confidential communications between them,2 but
there still exists a sharp diversity of opinion as to whether the privilege
enables one spouse to bar a third party into whose hands a confidential
communications between husband and wife has come from placing it
in evidence in the trial of the spouse 3
In the recent case of Batchelor v. State,4 the defendant, accused of
w- Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 267.
iNote (1948) 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 872.
18 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1935) §2332; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899)
§254; 1 Elloit, Evidence (19o4) § 628.
2Booman v. Patrick, 32 Fed. 368 (C. C. Mo. E. D. 1887); Mercer v. State, 4o Fla.
216, 24 So. 154 (1898); McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 210, 140 S. E. 625 (1927); Shelden v.
State, 74 Wis. d7l, 42 N. W. 218 (1889).
sSee Hammons v. State, 73 Ark. 495, 84 S. W. 718, 719 (195o).
1217 Ark. 340, 230 S. W. (2d) 23 (195o).
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raping his eight year old daughter, wrote a self-incriminatory letter
to his wife while he was in jail, which was intercepted by the jailer
and admitted in evidence at defendant's trial. On appeal from a con-
viction, the Arkansas Supreme Court, recognizing that some courts
have taken a contrary view, held that the incriminatory letter in the
hands of a third person was admissible. Though the court offered no
reasoning to support its action, the case apparently aligns Arkansas with
the view that once the letter leaves the control of husband or wife and
falls into the hands of a third person the communication is admissible, 5
though the spouse may still be incompetent to testify as to its contents.
The rationale advanced in some decisions seems to be that it is not then
the spouse who is violating the confidential relationship, but rather the
third party interloper. In State v. Hoyt, the Connecticut court, upon
admitting such letters in evidence and thus holding them not privi-
leged, observed: "The question was not whether the husband or wife
could have been compelled to produce this evidence, but whether,
when the letters fell into the hands of a third person, the sacred shield
of privilege went with them. We think not."6
Although a respectable number of the courts have adhered to the
view of the principal case, about as many states have adopted a directly
contrary position. The basis of this latter point of view is well expressed
in Mercer v. State in which letters from one spouse to another were
declared to be privileged regardless of whose custody the letter was in
when offered in evidence: " . . . the policy of the law . . . is far more
strongly upheld and subserved by those authorities that recognize and
declare certain classes of communications to be privileged from the
inherent character of the communication itself, and ... protect it from
exposure in evidence, wheresoever or in whosesoever hands it may be."
7
Further support for the exclusion of the evidence may be rested on
analogy to the privileged communications between lawyer and client,
In discussing the basis of that type of privilege, a federal court has
"Hendrix v. State, 2oo Ark. 973, 141 S. W. (2d) 852 (1940); McNeill v. State, 117
Ark. 8, 173 S. W. 826 (1915); Hammons v. State 73 Ark. 495, 84 S. W. 718 (i9o5); State
v. Buffington, 20 Kan. 599, 27 Am. Rep. 193 (1878); People v. Dunningham, 163 Mich.
349, 128 N. W. 18o (191o); O'Toole v. Ohio German Fire Ins. Co., 159 Mich. 187, 123
N. W. 795 (909); People v. Hayes, 14o N. Y. 484, 35 N. E. 951 (1894); State v. Wallace,
162 N. C. 622, 78 S. E. 1 (1913); State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. 101, 23 Atl. 590 (1892); Under-
hill, Criminal Evidence (4 th ed. 1935) 68o.
647 Conn. 518, 540 (880).
74o Fla. 216, 24 So. 154, 158 (1898). Also: Bowman v. Patrick, 32 Fed. 368 (C. C.
E. D. Mo. 1887); McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 21o, 140 S. E. 625 (1927); Wilkerson v. State,
91 Ga. 729, 17 S. E. 99o (1893); Scott v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 511, 23 S. WV. 219
(1893); Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 42 N. W. 218 (1889).
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observed: "To fairly carry out the real purpose of the rule, it must be
held that privileged communications are, in and of themselves, incom-
petent, regardless of the mere manner in which it is sought to put them
in evidence . . . . The admissibility of the communication . . .is not
dependent upon the manner in which control thereof is obtained from
the counsel, but upon the inherent character of the communication
itself." s The same reasoning should apply with greater force to com-
munications between husband and wife, which are so necessary to
maintain the stability of the home and to encourage unrestrained dis-
closures between the spouses.
Even the Arkansas court has seen fit in the past to restrict the rule
now applied in the principal case that the evidence is admissible if
the communication falls under the control of a third party. Where a
letter written by the husband was forcibly taken from a wife, the con-
clusion was reached that even though the letter was offered in evidence
by a third person, since he had acquired it by force, the communication
retained its privileged character.9 It is difficult to understand wherein
any difference in principle exists between a forcible taking of a letter
from the person of the addressee and the interception of the letter by
the jailor, as in the Batchelor case. In both situations a third party has
gained control, without the authorization of either spouse, of what
would otherwise have been a privileged communication. 10 If the policy
which supports the privilege applies to one case it should apply with
'Liggett v. Glenn 51 Fed. 381, 396 (C. C. A. 8th, 1892). In attorney-client cases,
evidence which would otherwise be privileged may be rendered admissible by
"waiver" of the privilege, effected by the client making a confidential disclosure to
the attorney in the presence of a third party. The latter is then permitted to testify
as to the information disclosed. Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172 (1859). It might
be argued that the accused in the principal case had waived his privilege by volun-
tarily putting the letter into the hands of a law enforcement officer who might
naturally be interested in this conviction. However, since there was probably no
other practicable means by which the prisoner could get a letter mailed, his action
was reasonable, and to hold that it constituted a waiver of privilege would in effect
deny him the right to communicate with his wife while in jail.
DWard v. State, 70 Ark. 204, 66 S.,W. 926 (1902).
"Hammons v. State, 73 Ark. 495, 84 S. W. 718, 720 (19o5) the dissent argued that:
"This court held in'Ward v. State ... that a letter written by a husband while in
jail, to his wife and taken fromi her person, could not be used as evidence against
him. The facts of that case were different from the facts here only in that the letter
in this .case was intercepted before it reached the wife and in the Ward case the
letter was taken from the wife after it had reached her. I cannot see, however, that
this difference alters the application of the principle or changes the rule ....
In either case it is a communication made by the husband to the wife, and intended
for her only, and by the policy of the law is privileged. It is unimportant and im-
material how the letter comes into the possession of the prosecution, so that it is
not with the consent of the husband who wrote it and against whom it is sought to
be used."
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equal force in the other. The scope of the privilege has been further
confused in at least one jurisdiction by the ruling that a confidential
letter from husband to wife is admissible against the husband even
though it had come into the possession of a third party by the voluntary
relinquishment of the wife." Dean Wigmore has pointed out the fallacy
of such a view in advocating that the privilege prevents a third person
from producting a confidential document of one spouse obtained by vol-
untary delivery of the other spouse; otherwise, collusion could nullify
the privilege. 12 If the confidential character of a written communication
between husband wife could be removed by the act of one of the parties
alone, then the privilege rests on a very precarious and uncertain
basis. To hold that all either spouse has to do is surrender the letter
to a third party would provide an obvious means for evading the
policy of the law.
Since the privilege given to confidential communications between
husband and wife is intended to secure freedom of the mind of the
communicating party, whether husband or wife, the privilege should
belong exclusively to the addressor spouse, allowing that spouse to
invoke or waive the privilege according to his best interests.13 The
fact that the letter finds its way into the hands of a third person should
not affect the privileged status of the letter. However, Dean Wigmore
has declared that the privilege applies only to the spouses themselves.
Hence a third person overhearing is not prevented from testifying nor
producing a document obtained surreptitiously.' 4 This reference
suggests the "eavesdropper" cases in which the courts regularly admit
testimony from third persons who have overheard confidential conver-
sations between husband and wife,15 thus supporting the position of
the principal decision.
This position seems to be that the policy of preserving marriage
stability is adequately served so long as the spouse is not the actual
divulger of confidential communication in the court.16 It is a matter
"State v. Buffington, 20 Kan. 599, 27 Am. Rep. 193 (1878).
128 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §2339.
188 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) §2340.
148 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) §2339.
15 Hudson v. State, 153 Ga. 695, 113 S. E. 519 (1922); Gannon v. People, 127 Ill.
507, 21 N. E. 525 (1889); State Bank of Chatham v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9, 61 Pac. 443
(19oo); Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 3o3, 96 S. W. 460 (19o6).
16This .interpretation is supported by Wigmore's rule that if spouses voluntarily
pass confidential communications on to a third party, it cannot be admitted. In
such case, it is in fact the spouse who is the divulger, though the instrumentality of
a third party.
However, the two rules stated by Wigmore, while consistent on their face,
could lead to very difficult problems for a court as to whether the third party ob-
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of protecting the martial harmony by preventing either spouse from
testifying in the role of informer against the other. However, this is
an unduly narrow view of the basis of the privilege. An important aim
of the policy involved could be the promotion of a better understanding
between husband and wife by encouraging them to confide in each
other in all matters of mutual concern.1 7 If so, a rule which allows the
confidences thus expressed to be spread before the public by a third
party, who has in some way gained knowledge of them, defeats the
policy of the privilege, for such a rule serves a warning on all married
persons that any confidential communications can be made only under
the threat of later divulgence.
Further, the view of the principal case allowing a third party to
produce the surreptitiously obtained communication, would set a
premium upon theft, fraud, trickery or other artifice to gain possession
of a man's letters to his wife. Under such a rule the admissibility in
evidence of a husband's letter to his wife will be determined by the
vigilance or the ability of the husband to follow the letter up and pre-
vent its being acquired by a third party by some illegal means.' 8 The
application of mechanical rules as to control, who has control and how
was it obtained, does little toward achieving the fundamental aim of
protecting the family status.19
ROBERT C. LOUTHIAN, JR.
tamined the communication by his own devices or by the cooperation of a spouse.
If the latter desired that the communication be used against the other party to the
marriage, it would be a very simple matter for him or her to collude with a third
party to set up an appearance of unauthorized acquisition of the communication by
the third party so as to cover up an actual voluntary relinquishment of it. Thus,
Wigmore's rule for admissibility through an independent third party will tend to
defeat his rule against admissibility through voluntary disclosure by the spouse to
a colluding third party.
"This basis of the privilege is well stated in People v. Hayes, 14o N. Y. 484, 495, 35,
N. E. 951, 954 (1894): "The rule which protects confidential communications of this
nature was founded upon a wise public policy, adopted and pursued for the purpose
of encouraging to the utmost that mutual confidence between husband and wife,
which is the strongest guaranty of a happy marriage . .. .The general evil of in-
fusing reserve and dissimulation between parties occupying such relation. to- each
other would be too great a price to pay for the chance of obtaining and establishing
truth in regard to some matter under legal investigation." However, the court per-
mitted the communications in question to be admitted because the defendant, the
recepient of the communication, had given the letters to a third party so that, they
were no longer c6nfidential as to him.
"E. g., State v. Btiffington, 20 Ran. 599, 27 Am. Rep. 193 (1878).
"'In the Batchelor case the parties separated after the alleged rape, but the
opinion does not state whether the parties remained separated to the time of the com-
munication. If they were separated at the time, it could be argued that the communi-
cation was properly admitted because the family relationship no longer existed to be
1952]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP OF MULTISTATE
CORPORATION FOR PURPOSES OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION. [Federal]
A corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state of its incorpor-
ation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.' This
status results from the principle that an action in the federal courts by
or against a corporation is an action by or against the members of the
corporation, 2 and from the rule that it will be conclusively presumed
that all members of a corporation are citizens of the state under whose
laws the corporation was created.3
Serviceable though this fiction 4 of corporate status may be in solv-
ing the problem of diversity jurisdiction as regards a corporation
created under the laws of one state,5 it aids little in the cases of corpor-
ations doing business by authority of, or incorporated under, the laws
protected. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) §2335; Holyoke v. Holyoke's Estate, 11o
Me. 469, 87 Atl. 40 (1913) (where parties were legally separated). Likewise it might be
argued that the atrocious act of the defendant had so destroyed the family relation-
ship as to prevent him from invoking the privilege because there no longer was a
family relationship to protect.
'Railway Company v. Whitton's Administrator, 13 Wall. 270, 2o L. ed. 571 (1871);
Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, i9 L. ed. 86 (1868); Ohio and Mississippi
Railroad Company v. Wheeler, i Black 286 ,17 L. ed. i3o (186); Rojas-Adam Cor-
poration of Delaware v. Young, 13 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1926).
2Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, i Black 286, 17 L. ed. 13o (1861).
3St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 16 S. Ct.
621, 40 L. ed. 802 (1896); Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 24 L. ed. 207 (1876); Ohio
and Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, i Black 286, 17 L. ed. 130 (1861).
'"Fictitious that personality [of a corporation] may be, in the sense that the
fact the corporation is composed of a plurality of individuals, themselves legal per-
sons, is disregarded, but 'it is a fiction created by law with intent that it should be
acted on as if true.'" Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476, 479, 53 S. Ct. 447,
448, 77 L. ed. 903, 907 (1933). It was said in Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 445, 24 L.
ed. 207, 207 (1876) that acorporation cannot be a citizen of any state in the sense
in which that word is used in the Constitution.
5The product of a series of decisions beginning with Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux,
5 Cranch 61, 3 L. ed. 38 (1809), this fictional corporate status handily circumvents
the result of the more logical-if less expeditious-application of the requirement
,of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L. ed. 435 (1806), that in the event of joint
plaintiffs and joint defendants, each party-plaintiff must diverse to each party-
defendant to establish diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts. Also, the general
rule of "deeming" a corporation a citizen, unlike a decision that a corporation is
a citizen, will not "embarrass both the States and the Federal Government in dealing
with corporate problems." See i Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 491. After the dif-
ficulty encountered from the xule in Commercial and Railroad Bank of Vicksburg
v. Slocumb, Richards, and Co., 14 Pet. 60, io L. ed. 354 (1840), the Court realized
that a strict application of the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss would not be feasible
in dealing with suits by or against corporations, and the fictional presumption was
-the result. A history of the development of the doctrine of indisputable citizenship
is to be found in St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545,
16 S. Ct, 621, 40 L. ed. 802 (1896).
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of more than one state. 6 When a corporation, incorporated in one
state, carries on business in another state "by virtue of a license, per-
mission, or authority, granted by the laws of the latter state to act in
that state under its charter from the former state," 7 no new corporation
exists in the licensing state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.8
However, when the corporation carries on business in the second state
by virtue of having been created a corporation under the laws of the
second state, a new corporation exists for diversity purposes.9 It is a
question of interpretation, to be decided by the federal courts, 10 whether
the legislation of the second state has granted authority to act therein
or has created a new corporation."
Even if it is found that a domestic corporation has been created
under the laws of the second state, the question remains as to whether
the status as a domestic corporation in the second state has been ac-
cepted voluntarily or only "under compulsion."12 If it is found that the
OSee Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts (1928) 13 Corn. L. Q. 499, 523; Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 90.
7Martin's Administrator v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 151 U. S. 637, 677,
14 S. Ct. 533, 535, 38 L. ed. 311, 313 (1894).
8Martin's Administrator v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 151 U. S. 673, 14 S.
Ct. 533, 38 L. ed. 311 (1894); Railroad Company v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed. 643
(1881).
DMemphis and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 2 S. Ct. 432,
27 L. ed. 518 (1883); Petersborough R. R. v. Boston & M. R. R., 239 Fed. 97 (C. C. A.
1st, 1917); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Goodwin
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 124 Fed. 358 (D. C. Mass. 19o3).
"Railroad Company v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 12, 26 L. ed. 643, 645 (1881), it was
said: "With a long line of authorities in this court to the same effect before us, we
cannot hesitate to say, with all due respect for the Court of Appeals of Virginia, that
the Maryland corporation ... did not make itself a corporation of Virginia ......
The Virginia court had said earlier that the effect of the Virginia Enabling Act was to
make the corporation of Virginia as to its road in Virginia. See Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. Co. v. Gallahue's Adm'rs, 12 Gratt. 655, 659 (Va. 1855).
".... the Supreme Court has held that an organization may for some purposes
be incorporated in a given state, and yet may not be a corporation of that state for
purposes of [diversity] jurisdiction." Goodwin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 124
Fed. 358, 359 (C. C. D. Mass. 19o3).
UMartin's Administrator v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 151 U. S. 673, 14
S. Ct. 533, 38 L. ed. 311 (1894); Goodlett v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 122 U. S.
391, 7 S. Ct. 1254, 3o L. ed. 1230 (1887); Memphis & Charleston Railroad Co. v.
Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 2 S. Ct. 432, 27 L. Ed. 711 (1882).
'2This distinction was first announced by Justice Holmes, in Patch v. Wabash
Railroad Co. 207 U. S. 277, 283, 28 S. Ct. 80, 82, 52 L. ed. 204, 208 (19o7), when he
distinguished the facts in the Patch case from those in St. Louis and San Francisco
Railway Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 16 S. Ct. 621, 4o L. ed. 802 (1896) and Southern
Railway Co. v. Allison, 19o U. S. 326, 23 S. Ct. 713, 47 L. ed. 1078 (19o3) on the basis
that there was compulsory incorporation in the second state in those cases, as opposed
to the voluntary incorporation which he found in the Patch case. The Court in
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acceptance of the charter was voluntary, the corporation is deemed to be
a citizen of the second state;13 but if the acceptance was under com-
pulsion, no new corporation exists for diversity purposes. 14 It has been
said that this distinction is controlling whether the corporation is a
plaintiff or a defendant. 15
When it has been decided that a corporation has voluntarily ac-
cepted incorporation in a state other than the state of the original in-
corporation, the principle that the corporation is considered a citizen
only of the state of suit is applied. 16 In accordance with this principle,
the Allison case had said, on the basis of the James decision, that the chronological
order of incorporation is determinative: The corporation is deemed a citizen of
the state of original incorporation. Did "compulsory" incorporation in the second
state depend, not upon acts at the time of incorportation and acceptance of the
charter, but rather upon the pleadings? See St. Louis and San Francisco Railway
Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 556, 16 S. Ct. 621, 629, 40 L. ed 8o2, 8og (1896): "The
[corporate] defendant was not content to leave the question [its citizenship] to be
decided by the plaintiff's allegations, but pleaded that it was in law a corporation of
the State of Missouri, and that, therefore, an action could not be maintained against
it, in the Federal court, by a citizen of that State. In other words, the defendant
company claimed that, while it bad voluntarily subjected itself to the laws of
Arkansas, as interpreted and enforced by the courts of that State, it still remained a
corporation of the State of Missouri, disabled from suing or being sued by a citizen
of that State in a Federal court, and that such disability was not and could not be
removed by state legislation." The pleadings certainly do not determine today. See
Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 81 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1936).
"Patch v. Wabash Railroad Co., 207 U. S. 277, 28 S. Ct. 8o, 52 L. ed. 204 (1907).
1St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 16 S. Ct. 621,
40 L. ed. 802 (1896). At least this is the interpretation given the James case since the
Patch decision. See Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 81 F. (2d) 6o, 65
(C. C. A. 4th, 1936); and Geoffroy v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 13 F. (2d) 947, 948
(D. C. R. I. 1926).
"For a full treatment of the rule, see Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 81 F. (2d) 6o (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
"This theory that the federal courts, either on questions of removal or original
jurisdiction, would recognize only the incorporation of the state in which the court
is located seems the general principle underlying the cases since the case of The
Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, i Black 286, 17 L. ed. 13o (861).
This case decided that a federal court in Indiana did not have original jurisdiction
when the plaintiff declared as a corporation chartered by Ohio and Indiana, and
the defendant was a citizen of Indiana. The Court showed that while there was
one operating company, there were two legal entities, one created by Ohio, and the
other by Indiana. The declaration was thus tantamount to showing a joinder of two
plaintiffs, one of which was not diverse to the defendant. The rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss would therefore defeat diversity jurisdiction. Railway Company v. Whitton's
Administrator, 13 Wall. 27o, L. ed. 571 (1871), affirmed the theory and decided
that a federal court in Wisconsin had jurisdiction over an action in which the plain-
tiff was a citizen of Illinois and the defendant corporation was incorporated in
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan. "In Wisconsin the laws of Illinois have no opera-
tion. The defendant is a corporation, and as such a citizen of Wisconsin by the laws
of that State. It is not there a corporation or a citizen of any other State. Being
there sued it can only be brought into court as a citizen of that State. whatever its
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it has been held that in an action brought against the multistate corp-
oration by a citizen of one of the states of incorporation, in a federal
court of another state of incorporation, the federal court has jurisdic-
tion if the jurisdictional amount is satisfied.17 The principle has been
followed also in decisions holding that in an action brought against
the multistate corporation by a citizen of one of the states of incorpor-
ation in a federal court of the plaintiff's own state, the federal court
does not have jurisdiction.' s Similarly, in an action brought against the
corporation by a citizen of one of the states of incorporation in a state
court of his own state, the right of removal to the federal courts by
the corporation does not exist.19
It has been urged that to uphold diversity jurisdiction in the situa-
tion in which the corporation is sued in a federal court in a state of
incorporation other than that of the plaintiff in effect ignores the cor-
poration's additional citizenship which is identical with the plaintiff's.
Commenting upon this argument, in Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v.
Eder2o a lower federal court said that a corporation incorporated in
more than one state is not considered an entity for all purposes, and
that a court will observe only the citizenship of the state of suit when a
question of diversity jurisdiction arises since the corporation exists, so
far as that court in concerned, only by virtue of the laws of that state.
21
Generally, the principle that a corporation is considered a citizen
only of the state of suit applies in cases in which the corporation is
plaintiff, in spite of the Supreme Court's inconsistent decision in
Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corp. v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Corp.,22
that a corporation of both New Hampshire and Massachusetts could
sue a Massachusetts defendant in the federal courts in Massachusetts.
This result was said to be necessary since the Massachusetts defendant
could have sued the multistate corporate plaintiff in New Hamp-
status or citizenship may be elsewhere." 13 Wall. 270, 283, 2o L. ed. 571, 576 (1871).
The principle has been observed by a state court. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v.
Auditor General, 53 Mich. 79, x8 N. W. 588 (1884).
7 Mfuller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 24 L. ed. 207 (1876).
18Geoffroy v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 16 F. (2d) 1Ol7
(C. C. A. Ist, 1927), aff'g 13 F. (2d) 947 (D. C. R. I. 1926); Petersborough R. R. v.
Boston & M. R. R., 239 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Meeh, 69
Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Goodwin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 124 Fed.
(C. C. D. Mass. 19o3). Contra: Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co., 185 F. (2d)
104 (C. A. 3 d, x95o).
21Memphis and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 2 S. Ct. 432,
27 L. ed. 518 (1883).
D 1 7 4 Fed. 944 (C. C. A. 6th, 9og).
11174 Fed. 944, 945 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o9).
=i36 U. S. 356, 10 S. Ct. 1004, 34 L. ed. 363 (189o).
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shire in the federal courts. 23 In 1936, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit observed that the Nashua decision had not been
followed and purported to distinguish it in Town of Bethel v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 24 a case in which certiorari was refused by the
Supreme Court. It was there decided that a corporation incorporated
in both North Carolina and Virginia could not maintain an action in
the federal courts in North Carolina against a North Carolina defen-
dant, even though the plaintiff had declared in its capacity as a Vir-
ginia corporation as the plaintiff in the Nashua case had declared in
its capacity as a New Hampshire corporation. 25 The result in the
Bethel case was based on the reasoning that the corporation became a
citizen of North Carolina voluntarily for its own purposes, and there-
fore had no occasion to appeal to the federal courts for protection of
its interest. 26 The court thought that there was no inconsistency in
holding that the multistate corporation could not sue in the North
Carolina federal court even though the North Carolina defendant
could have sued the plaintiff in the federal courts in Virginia, since it
could not be said of the North Carolina defendant that it became a
citizen of another state voluntarily for its own purposes. Other de-
cisions from the lower federal courts have not recognized the deviation
from the general principle made by the Nashua case,27 until the latest
case to deal with the problem, Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co.2 8
In this case four citizens of the state of New Jersey brought an action
in a federal district court in New Jersey against a corporation that was
incorporated in both New Jersey and New York. The plaintiffs de-
clared against the multiple incorporated defendant as a New York
corporation, but the district court dismissed the action. On appeal,
the court of appeals held that the district court had jurisdiction over
the case. The problem of voluntary or compulsory incorporation was
not before the court, and the corporate defendant was treated simply
as a corporation of two states.29 To the appellate court the question
presented was one demanding merely a rule of certainty, and it was
21 36 U. S. 356 at 382, 10 S. Ct. 1oo4 at 1oo, 34 L. ed. 363 at 370 (1890).
1181 F. (2d) 6o (C. C. A. 4th, 1956).n5Cf. Nashua & Lowell Railroad Corp. v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Corp., 136
U. S. 356 at 365, 10 S. Ct. 1004, 34 L. ed. 363 at 364 (s8go) with Town of Bethel v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 81 F. (2d) 6o (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
"081 F. (2d) 6o at 69 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936). The court said of the Nashua case:
... it has not influenced the definite course which the courts have followed in con-
sidering suits against a corporation of two or more states."
2-See Goodwin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 124 Fed. 358, 366 (C. C. D.
Mass. 193o).
2s185 F. (2d) 1o4 (C. A. 3d, 1950).
2185 F. (2d) 104, 107 (C. A. 3 d, 195o).
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reasoned that because the plaintiffs could have instituted the action
successfully in a federal court in New York, they should be allowed to
bring the action in a federal court in New Jersey. A rule requiring
"useless ritual in instituting a suit away from home . . ."0 should not
be announced. The court purported to take a realistic approach that a
corporation functions as one operating unit, no matter in how many
states it has been chartered.31
It would appear that such a view omits a consideration of the
basic purpose of diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. This basis
for federal jurisdiction was originally designed to protect the out-of-
state party from the prejudice that he might receive at the hands of
a state court of the home state of his adversary. 32 The New Jersey
plaintiffs in the Gavin case could hardly be said to be the victims of
provincial prejudice if they were to institute an action in the state
courts of their own state. The court did not treat the question as one
of venue, but proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiffs were
entitled to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
3
The logical consequences of the Gavin decision would be to permit
the multistate corporation to institute an action in the federal courts
in one of the states of incorporation against a citizen of that state. 34
Also, since the traditional principle that a court will observe only the
citizenship of the corporation of the state where suit is brought was
dispensed with in the Gavin case, it might be possible for the multistate
corporate defendant to remove to the federal courts an action brought
against it in the state courts of a state of incorporation by a citizen of
that state.35 Thus, a corporation that voluntary consents to incorpor-
ation in a second state would be permitted access to the federal courts
in cases involving disputes arising within the state in which the cor-
poration has incorporated and chosen to do business. No reason is
apparent for allowing the corporation the federal forum in such cases.
There would be no more chance for local prejudice in a state court
of the re-incorporating state than in a state court of the state of origi-
nal incorporation. One authority has argued that diversity jurisdiction
should not extend to corporations doing business across state lines
3D185 F. (2d) 104, 107 (C. A. 3d, 1950).
1185 F. (2d) 104, 1o5 (C. A. 3d, 195o).
2See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
(1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 at 83.
8 185 F. (2d) 104, io8 (C. A. 3d, 1950): "We think it goes to the legal right of
a plaintiff to get into a United States Court in New Jersey."
-"This would be contrary to the decision in the Bethel case.
'*This would be contrary to the rule in the case of Memphis and Charleston
Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 2 S. Ct. 432, 27 L. ed. 518 (1883).
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because the recognition of such jurisdiction withdraws from the state
courts the power to settle local disputes.36 The consequences of the
Gavin decision would extend these objections.
While the court's effort to clarify the rules in cases involving the
multistate corporation are laudable, it would appear that the approach
employed ignored the most important element in the entire field: a
consideration of why federal courts exercise diversity jurisdiction in
the first place.
Between the functional view of a corporation and its consequent
expansion of federal jurisdiction expressed by the Gavin case, and the
suggestion that diversity jurisdiction be withheld altogether from a
corporation doing business across state lines, lies the middle course
that rests upon the principle that a multistate corporation will be
deemed a citizen only of the state where suit is brought. This middle
course weaves through a tortuous maze of fictions and legislative
intrepretations only to arrive at an archaic legal conception of the
modern corporation.
37
In view of the confusion by such decisions as those of the Gavin and
Nashua cases, it seems that Congress should attempt to give a con-
clusive expression to the status of a modern corporation that operates
across state lines. Such a declaration as to corporate citizenship could
set up a positive directive to the federal courts to replace the present
illogical presumption of corporate citizenship that has to be bent or
circumvented to fit the particular demands of practicality as each
court views them.
One such declaration was presented during the last session of Con-
gress, in a proposal that Congress amend Title 28, United States Code,
Section 133238 so that a corporation would be deemed a citizen of any
state in which it is doing business.3 9 This, of course, would limit di-
versity jurisdiction. However, in the view of those who maintain that
a free flow of capital between different sections of the country de-
pends upon the guaranty of a federal forum unfettered by local pre-
-'See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between the United States
and State Courts (1928) 13 Corn. L. Q. 499 at 523; Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 at 9o .
'The principle is ultimately based on the theory that a corporation cannot
migrate from the incorporating state. See the reasoning in Railway Company v.
Whitton's Administrator, 13 Wall. 27o at 284, 2o L. ed. 571 at 576 (1871).
IsThis section grants original jurisdiction to the federal district courts over
controversies between citizens of different states if the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds $3,ooo.




judices against the out-of-state creditor and "foreign business" the
proposal would be detrimental to national commerce.4 0
The report of the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the
Judicial Conference has recommended that the proposal not be
adopted.41 As a substitute measure, the Committee would have Con-
gress amend Section 1332 of Title 28 by adding a subsection that would
make a corporation a citizen of any state of incorporation and, in
addition, a citizen of a state in which it was doing business and in
which it had received over 5o% of its gross income for the fiscal year
preceding the commencement of the action, or for the fiscal year pre-
ceding the petition for removal if the action was begun in a state
court42 This proposal of the Committee would appear to have two
effects: (i) It seemingly abandons the principle that a federal court will
consider citizenship of the corporation only of the state of suit;43 and
(2) it would diminish diversity jurisdiction in some cases since it is pos-
sible for the corporation to be deemed a citizen of a state other than
one of incorporation.
4°See Brown, The Jurisdiction of The Federal Courts Based on Diversity of
Citizenship (1929) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 179, 188: ". . it is common knowledge that
interstate business is done very largely by corporations. Considered from the economic
standpoint, a corporation is a device often valuable in small business but abso-
lutely necessary in business operating on a large scale and over wide territory. It
may be that we ought to discourage such business, but, if we are going to do so,
we must submit to a great decrease, if not a practical cessation, in the development
of the more remote parts of our country, and to a very considerable check on the
volume of interstate business .... Corporations are certainly as subject to local
and sectional prejudice as are individuals .... But see Frankfurter, Distribution
of Judicial Power Between The United States and State Courts (1928) 13 Corn. L.
Q. 499, 522: "Such considerations [increase in western and southern development by
local capital] no longer allow the easy assumption that in the west and in the
south, state jurors and judges are economic Ishmaelites."
'"Report of Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of The Judicial Conference,
March 12, 1951, p. 13: "The effect of this [the proposed amendment before the House]
however, would be to deny to business corporations doing business over a wide
territory the sort of protection which they need against local prejudice and the
benefit of the salutary rules and practice of the Federal courts." The Report indi-
cates that if the proposed amendment had been in effect in 1950, it would have
meant that of the 13,124 diversity cases in the federal courts (including removal
cases) in the fiscal year, 7, 520 (57%) could not have been maintained in the federal
courts. Another 5% would have depended upon an interpretation of the phrase,
"doing business." No figures were presented for the effect of the Committee's
proposed amendment.
,'Report of Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the Judicial Conference,
March 12, 1951, Appendix B.
"It is to be noted that Judge John J. Parker, Chief Judge of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, was the Chairman of the Committee on Jurisdiction
and Venue and also joined in the opinion in Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 81 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1936)-
19521
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The Committee's proposed measure is a compromise, but unlike
the judicial compromises on the subject to date, it has simplicity to
recommend it. The Committee has considered the primary question
of the extent to which the modern corporation that operates away
from home needs the federal courts, and the proposal provides a
logical answer to that question.
JOHN C. CALHOUN
INSURANCE-ESTOPPEL OF LIABILITY INSURER TO DENY LIABILITY UNDER
POLICY AFTER DEFENDING ACTION AGAINST INSURED. [Virginia]
When a liability insurer defends an action by the injured person
against the insured, in the absence of notice of intent to disclaim or
of a non-waiver agreement, the insurer is generally thereafter precluded,
or "estopped," as against the insured to deny liability under the policy.'
The basis of the rule is said to be that the assumption of the defense is
prejudicial to the right of the insured to conduct his own defense.
2
In those jurisdictions which strictly demand the elements of estoppel
for the preclusion of the insurer to deny liability, a presumption of
prejudice to the insured based on the insurer's having defended is re-
buttable by a showing that there was, in fact, no prejudice.3 Other
decisions, however, make this presumption conclusive. 4 It is sometimes
reasoned that when the insurer defends the action with full knowledge
of the facts he "waives" his right to disclaim liability, but it is to be
noted that even when the term "waiver" is used the courts generally
require prejudice to the insured. 5 Thus, it would seem that equitable
estoppel, whether based upon the conclusive presumption or upon
'Atlantic Lighterage Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 75 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935); Meyers v. Continental Casualty Co.. 12 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Oehme
v. Johnson, 181 Minn. 138, 231 N. W. 817, 81 A. L. R. 13o8 (1930); Ford Hospital v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., io6 Neb. 311, 183 N. W. 656 (1921); Caiola v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 13 N. J. Misc. 845, 181 At. 524 (1935). Cases collected in Note (1932) 81 A.
L. R. 1326.
2Myers v. Continental Casualty Co., 223 Mo. App. 781, 22 S. W. (2d) 867 (1929). See
Malley v. American Idem. Corp., 297 Pa. 216, 146 Atl. 571, 573 ,1929).
3Sweeney v. Frew, 318 Mass. 595, 63 N. E. (2d) 350 (1945); Lunt v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 261 Mass. 469, 159 N. E. 461 (1928). Cases collected in Note (1932) 81 A. L. R.
1361.
4Snedker v. Derby Oil Co., 164 Kan. 64o, 192 P. (2d) 135 (1948); Royle Mining Co.
v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 S. W. 438 (1912). Cases collected in
Note (1932) St A. L. R. 1358.
'McDanels v. General Ins. Co. of America, i Cal. App. (2d) 454, 36 P. (2d) 829
(1934); Salonen v. Paanenen, 32o Mass. 568, 71 N. E. (2d) 227 (1947).
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the proof of prejudice, rather than "waiver," is the essential considera-
tion in applying the rule.0
In a case of first impression, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Aetna Cas-
ualty and Surety Co.,7 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was re-
cently called upon to apply the doctrine of estoppel out of its usual con-
text to a controversy between the insurers of the same risk. An employer
was covered by a general liability policy issued by Aetna, and by a stand-
ard automobile policy issued by Maryland. Attached to the latter policy
was a non-ownership endorsement stipulating that it was "excess insur-
ance over any other valid and collectible insurance available to the in-
sured." An employee of the insured, while driving his own car in the ser-
vice of the insured, struck a pedestrian. The employer notified the local
insurance agent, who was the mutual agent for both companies and had
written both policies. The agent notified Maryland, and investigations
of the accident and an attempt to settle with the injured party were car-
ried out by that company. Shortly before the trial of the action between
the injured person and the insured, Maryland, being informed by the
agent that Aetna also covered the insured, asked Aetna to bear the
expense of the trial. Aetna refused, and Maryland continued to defend,
but a judgment was rendered in favor of the injured party. Thereafter,
the two companies agreed that failure to appeal and payment of the
judgment would not prejudice Maryland's position, and that the re-
spective positions of the companies were to be preserved as they were
prior to the satisfaction of the judgment. In the principal case, Mary-
land sued Aetna for the amount of the judgment, on the theory that
under the Aetna policy the employer was protected against any loss
resulting from the accident, and that Maryland was liable only in the
event that there was no other valid and collectible insurance covering
such liability.
The trial court denied recovery, and this result was sustained by
the sharply divided Supreme Court of Appeals. The court's opinion,
representing the view of only two justices, maintained that because
Maryland assumed defense of the action, construed its policy to cover
the accident, and so informed the Virginia Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles,$ it is now estopped to deny liability. Thus, estoppel was ap-
6See Note 0950) 2 Stanford L. Rev. 383.
7191 Va. 225, 6o S. E. (2d) 876 (1950).
87 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 46-346 requires proof of financial responsibility
of person involved in an accident which has resulted in damage of $5o.oo or more.
The penalty for not supplying such proof or security is suspension of the person's
operating license and registration certificate. In the instant case, Maryland had
notified the Commissioner that its policy covered the employee, and the employee's
license had therefore not been suspended.
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plied in favor of Aetna when reliance by and detriment to the Com-
missioner, the employee-driver, and the insured are to be inferred from
the facts.
Two concurring justices based their approach on the factor of
notice. A condition precedent to Aetna's coverage was notification by
the insured, and since the view was taken that when the insured dealt
with the agent of both companies it dealt with him as agent of Mary-
land, no notice was given to Aetna. Therefore, Aetna's policy did not
cover the accident, and there was no "valid and collectible insurance"
other than Maryland's. 9
A dissent by two justices answered the concurring opinion by saying
that when the companies' mutual agent made the error of not forward-
ing notice to Aetna, he was acting as the agent of Aetna, not as the
agent of Maryland. Thus, notice had been given Aetna, and the con-
dition precedent of its policy had been fulfilled.10 As to the question
of estoppel, the dissent pointed out that the reliance by the driver, by
the employer, and by the Commissioner was not material here. "Were
this a suit by the [employer or employee] against Maryland Casualty
Company, these might be sufficient reasons for holding that Maryland
was estopped to deny coverage for the claim,"lbut this being a suit
between two insurance companies, Aetna must show detriment or
prejudice to itself by reason of its reliance upon the acts of Maryland.
In Virginia, as elsewhere, the elements of equitable estoppel are
essentially misrepresentation by words or conduct of a material fact that
leads another to rely reasonably upon such misrepresentations to his
detriment.12 When the person who would take advantage of the rule
has knowledge of the true state of facts, the estoppel will not operate.1
And actual knowledge is not required; it is enough that the means of
knowledge were equally available to both parties, 14 or that the person
attempting to prove equitable estoppel in his favor was bound to know
the true facts. 15
OSee 191 Va. 225, 235, 6o S. E. (2d). 876, 881 (195o).
"See 191 Va. 225, 239, 6o S. E. (2d) 876, 882 (1950).
"191 Va. 225, 239, 6o S. E. (2d) 876, 882 (ig5o).
1Aibemarle County v. Massey, 183 Va. 31o, 32 S. E. (ad) 228 (1944); Heath v.
Valentine, 177 Va. 731, 15 S. E. (2d) 98 (1941). It is to be noted that in the instant
case, the opinion cited two Virginia cases for substantially the same definition of
estoppel. See 191 Va. 225, 234, 6o S. E. (2d) 876, 88o (ig5o).
"Smith v. Plaster, 151 Va. 252, 144 S. E. 417 (1928); Cary v. Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 127 Va. 236, 1o3 S. E. 580 (1920); Luck Construction Co. v. Russell
County, 115 Va. 335, 79 S. E. 393 (1913); Southwest Virginia Mineral Land Co. v.
Chase, 95 Va. 50, 27 S. E. 826 (1897).
"1Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861 (1897).
"Newport News & 0. P. Ry. Co. v. Lake, ioi Va. 334, 43 S. E. 566 (19o3).
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The burden of proof is upon the misled party to show the estoppel by
affirmative evidence, 16 but in the principal case it does not appear that
Aetna could sufficiently prove either the requisite prejudice or lack
of knowledge of the true situation. Maryland's conduct of the pro-!
ceedings apparently was prudent and conscientious. The law firm that
generally represented Aetna was retained by Maryland as local counsel
in the litigation and doubtless would have been employed by Aetna had
Aetna defended the action. "Everyone knows that as a practical matter
these lawyers would have defended the case in the same manner, re-
gardless of which insurance company it was representing."'17 There
was no showing that Maryland's investigation and defense were not
thorough, and no real possibility of settlement out of court existed.' 8
The general rule that the insurer is estopped after defending an
action against the insured has been extended to work in favor of a third
person in at least two other instances in other jurisdictions. In both
situations, however, there were especial considerations which dictated
that the insurer not be allowed to deny its liability. In Patterson v.
Aden,19 the Minnesota court held that after the indemnity insurer had
defended an action against the insured, the injured third party could
reach the insurer directly in garnishment proceedings, and the insurer
was estopped to deny coverage against the injured person. The amount
of the judgment in the action against the insured fixed the liability of
the insurer. This rule made it possible for the injured party to collect
the judgment from the indemnity insurer even when the insured was
insolvent and had not paid, and even when the policy contained a
"no-action" clause stipulating that the insurer would not be liable
unless the insured had actually paid a judgment. Obviously, there is a
cogent reason for the adoption of such a rule in the case in which the
indemnity insurer could escape paying the judgment when the insured
was insolvent and had not actually paid the injured party.20 Even
"-Heath v. Valentine, 177 Va. 731, 15 S. E. (2d) 98 (1941); Newport News & 0. P.
Ry. Co. v. Lake, iol Va. 334, 43 S. E. 566 (19o3).
27Naryland Casualty Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 191 Va. 225, 6o S. E.
(2d) 876, 883 (1950).
sImmediately upon receipt of the notification of the accident from the agent,
a claims investigator for Maryland came to Danville, the scene of the accident, and
investigated the facts and attempted a settlement with the injured party out of court.
The attempt at settlement was unsuccessful, and the injured party brought suit for
$25,ooo. The judgment in the suit against the insured was $3,ooo.
I119 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 281, 48 L. R: A. (N. S.) 184 (1912).
nSee Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930) §178.
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though other courts 21 have adopted the rule of the Patterson case, it
has been criticized 22 and called the minority view.
23
In the case of Miller v. Motor Club Insurance Co.,24 it was held that
an insurer who had defended an action against its insured and his
employee could not buy up the judgment of the injured party and
then, as the assignee of the judgment, try to reach another insurer who
had covered the employee's father with a policy that might have covered
the employee. The court allowed the defendant-insurer to be substituted
in the position of the employee in order that the estoppel established by
the plaintiff-insurer's defense of the action would operate in favor of the
defendant. 25 Such a result was necessary to avoid the unfairness of
permitting one insurance company to defend an action against its
insured, become the assignee of the judgment by a fictitious name,
and then bring an action against the insurer of the party who was not
involved in the accident, when the latter insurer had had no oppor-
tunity to intervene in the defense.
In the principal case, though no direct notice of the claim was
received at the Aetna Company offices, yet in legal contemplation
knowledge could be imputed to it. The general rule that the knowledge
of an agent acquired in the scope of his agency is imputed to his
principal is well established. 26 Where the agent represents two prin-
cipals with their consent, and the principals are interested in the same
subject matter, and the agent is under a duty to communicate to each,
both of the principals are bound by the agent's knowledge, in the
absence of adverse interest on the part of the agent.27
nAmerican Indemnity Co. v. Fellbaum, 225 S. W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 192o, aff'd
114 Tex. 127, 263 S. W. 908, 37 A. L. R. 633 (1924). See Brassil v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 21o N. Y. 235, 104 N. E. 622, L. R. A. 1915A 629 (1914). The rule is well settled
in Minnesota. Powers v. Wilson, 139 Minn. 3o9, 166 N. W. 401 (1918).
2See Elliott v. Belt Automobile Ass'n, 87 Fla. 545, 100 So. 797, 799 (1924);
Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 173 S. W. 507, 31o, L. R. A. 19 17F
924, 927 (1915).
'Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 193o) 685.
2U1 17 N. J. Law 480, 189 Atl. 636 (1937).
"Contra: Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 173 S. W. 307, L. R. A.
1917F, 924 (1915). The New Jersey court in the Miller case cited Fiorentino v. Adkins,
9 N. J. Misc. 446, 154 Atl. 429 (1931), which held that an insurer, after defending
an action against the insured and his employee, could not sue the employee because
of the rule that there is no right of contribution among joint tort-feasors.
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 132 F. (2d) 688 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943), cert.
denied 319 U. S. 749, 63 S. Ct. 1158, 87 L. ed. 1704 (1943); Sullivan v. Alabama Power
Co., 246 Ala. 262, 20 S. (2d) 224 (1944); Leclerc v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 93
N. H. 234, 39 At. (2d) 736 (1944); Hurley v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
247 App. Div. 547, 288 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1936).
'Sullivan County R. R. v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 76 Conn. 464, 57 Ad.
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Thus, from Aetna's admission that its policy covered the accident,
the mutual agent was under a duty to notify Aetna when the accident
occurred. The agent received notice as the writer of both policies, and
since there was no indication of adverse interest or collusion on his
part as agent of both companies, Aetna should be hound by the
knowledge of the agent. The case for estoppel is thereby further weak-
ened inasmuch as Aetna could not have been misled by Maryland's
conduct, 28 and the two concurring justices' view of the issue of notice,
which was decisive to them, becomes doubtful.
Because "waiver" is the voluntary relinquishment of a known
right,20 the decision could hardly have been placed on that basis in
view of the fact that Maryland was not cognizant of the other insur-
ance when it committed itself to a defense of the action. When it did
become aware of Aetna's coverage, it immediately informed Aetna and
demanded that Aetna bear the costs of the defense.
It would appear that Aetna was unjustly enriched at the expense of
Maryland by reason of the fact that Maryland paid a judgment that
Aetna, by its own admission, had contracted to pay. It is submitted
that the decision is unfortunate, because it would seem to extend the
general rule of estoppel of the insurer who defended an action against
the insured to a case where neither the essential bases of estoppel, nor
the requirement for waiver, nor the compelling necessities of policy
were present.
JOHN C. CALHOUN
LABOR LAw-AvAILABILITY FOR WORK AS PREREQUISITE FOR BENEFITS
UNDER UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACTs. [Virginia]
Unemployment insurance legislation has been enacted in the
interest of public welfare for the purpose of providing a limited income
for workers temporarily unemployed due to adverse business and in-
dustrial conditions.' Since this legislation was not designed to provide
287, 291 (1904); 2 Mecham, Agency (2d ed. 1914) §1837. Cf. Giraud Fire and Marine
Ins. Co. v. Gunn, 221 Ala. 654, 130 So. 18o (1930); Johnson v. Blumer, 183 Wis. 369,
198 N. W. 277 (1924).
Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342, 26 S. E. 861 (1897). It may be argued that the
presence of Aetna's agent at the investigation of the accident gave Aetna an equal
opportunity to know the facts.
"Albemarle County v. Massey, 183 Va. 310, 32 S. E. (2d) 228 (1944); Covington
Virginian, Inc. v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 29 S. E. (2d) 406 (1944).
1See Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 5o6, 56 N. E. (2d) 832, 835 (1944); Krisman v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission, 351 Mo. 18, 171 S. W. (2d) 575, 578 (1943);
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economic security for those willfully idle or physically disabled, it seeks
to limit the payment of benefits to persons who want employment, not
those who want unemployment-that is, those whose record indicates
they are normally attached to some labor force, and have in the past
secured a reasonable amount of work.2 However, the unconditional pay-
ment of benefits to an individual while he is idle may seriously weaken
his willingness to provide for himself through employment. Thus, in
order to keep the period of idleness at a minimum and to restrict pay-
ments to those involuntarily unemployed, certain limitations are im,
posed which must be complied with before the unemployed person is
eligible to receive benefits. One such safeguard found in all the statutes
is the provision in some form that the unemployed individual must be
"available for work."3The eligibility of many claims has depended on
the interpretation given this provision in the statutes, and there has
been a notable lack of uniformity in the decisions reached.
4
This issue was before the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
the recent case of Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Tom-
ko.,5 involving the claim of several hundred miners to receive unem-
ployment benefits. A decrease in the demand for coal had necessitated
a reduction in the number of workers at some of the mines and a tem-
porary shutdown at others. Claimants were thus out of work because
of economic conditions over which they had no control. While there
was no dispute as to why these miners were unemployed, the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission found as a matter of fact that the
men were willing to work in the mines only three days a week, pursuant
Department of Labor and Industry v. New Enterprise Rural Electric Co-op., Inc., 352
Pa. 413, 43 A. (2d) 90, 92 (1945). The Federal Social Security Act which contemplated
a coordinated system of state and federal unemployment insurance was passed in 1935,
and was sufficient inducement to cause all the state legislatures to set up the state
part of the system within a period of two years. For a full account of the enactment of
Unemployment Compensation legislation see Witte, Development of Unemployment
Compensation (1945) 55 Yale L. J. 21.
2See Rivers v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 323 Mass. 339, 82 N.
E. (2d) 1, 2 (1948); W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d)
22, 24 1936).
'Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work (1945) 55 Yale L. J. 123, 124.
The New Hampshire Court said recently that "the purpose of the availability re-
quirement is to test the claimant's attachment to the labor market. It is to determine
if he is unemployed because of lack of suitable job opportunities or for some other
reason such as physical incapacity or unwillingness to work." Roukey v. Riley, 77 A.
(2d) 30, 31 (N. H. 1950).
4AIthough the exact wording of the availability requirement is not identical
in all the statutes, the lack of uniformity in the decisions reached seems to be the re-
sult of the different meanings the general term "available for work" has acquired
through judicial and administrative interpretation.
1192 Va. 463, 65 S. E. (2d) 524 (1950.
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to a directive issued by the International Union, United Mine Workers
of America, of which they were members. Therefore, the Commission
denied claimants benefits on the ground that since the miners were
only willing to work a restricted period of three days per week, they
were not "available for work" under the terms of the Virginia statute.6
On appeal to the appropriate state circuit courts, the Commission's find-
ings were sustained in two instances, but were reversed in three others
on the theory that the unemployment was due to a shortage of work at
the mines, and not to the lack of availability of the miners for work.
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed
the ruling of the Commission, by reasoning that one "who undertakes
to limit or restrict his willingness to work to certain hours, types of
work, or conditions, not usual and customary in the trade, is not
'available for work' .... Here... these claimants, in obedience to the
[union] directive, were willing to work only three days per week in-
stead of five days per week, as is usual and customary in the industry." 7
The court was of the opinion that the principal involved in the
instant case was the same as considered by the Michigan Supreme Court
in the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Appeal Board of Michigan Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission.8 There a woman was denied benefits
because she was willing to accept employment only on the afternoon
shift since it was necessary for her to be at home in the morning to get
her two small sons off to school. It was ruled that "There is nothing in
the [Michigan] statute to justify the conclusion that the legislature
intended a claimant might limit his employment to certain hours of
the day where the work he is qualified to perform is not likewise
limited."9 It is submitted that there is one substantial difference in the
two cases which the Virginia court failed to consider. In the Ford
Motor Company case the employee's self-imposed restriction itself
could easily have bean the reason for the continued unemployment.
Since she could not be considered as a potential employee on but one
of the three daily shifts, her usability to the Ford Motor Company
was substantially limited, and therefore her chances of securing work
were not as good as a person who was willing to accept employment
6rhe availability requirement of the Virginia statute reads as follows: "An un-
employed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week
only if the Commission finds that: . . . (c) He is able to work, and is available for
work." 9 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §60-46.
7Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 468, 65 S. E.
(2d) 524, 527 (1951)-
8316 Mich. 468, 25 N. W. (2d) 586 (1947).
TFord Motor Co. v. Appeal Board of Mich. Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission, 316 Mich. 468, 25 N. W. (2d) 586, 588 (1947).
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on any shift. In the Tomko case, however, the three day per week limi-
tation would not have prevented the miners' working as much as
three days per week if sufficient work had been available to require
their services. Considering the fact that the regularly employed miners
were only willing and ready to work three days per week, it might be
argued that the union restriction was a "usual" and "customary" con-
dition in the mining field at the particular time.'0
The term "available for work" must be construed with reference to
the general purpose of the Act, and should reflect the major function
the system is expected to perform."1 It has been suggested that economic
factors, domestic circumstances, and working conditions are all pos-
sible variables which must be weighed in each individual case. 12 Yet,
if the payment of benefits is to be a nondiscretionary method of pro-
viding benefits to the involuntarily unemployed who qualify under
the Act, it is necessary to adopt board general principles as guideposts
for determining when a person is or is not to be regarded as "available
for work."
Logically there is little room for doubt that unemployment benefits
should be denied to a person who is out on strike, is physically unable
to work, is enrolled as a regular student in school, is of necessity de-
voting full time to caring for small children or attending a sick member
of the family, or has consistently refused to accept suitable jobs offered
him.' 3 In such clear cut cases, claimant has effectively removed himself
from the labor market and is unquestionably not an active job seeker.
Of considerable more difficulty is the case involving limited availability
where the claimant's willingness and readiness to accept employment
"The Virginia court said that in addition to be unemployed, claimant "must be
ready and willing to accept work without attaching to his willingness to work
restrictions or conditions not usual or customary in the occupation, and this is so
even though there be no work at hand or available to him." Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 469, 65 S. E. (2d) 524, 528 (1951).
"See Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn.647,
46 A. (2d) 844, 845 (1946); Leonard v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
148 Ohio 419, 75 N. E. (2d) 567, 569 (1947).
1-Altman and Lewis, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion of
Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation (1944) 28 Minn. L. Rev. 387, 409, and 22
N. C. L. Rev. 189, 2o8. Also see Hunter v. Miller, 148 Neb. 402, 27 N. W. (2d) 638, 640
(1947); Leonard v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Ohio 419,
75 N. E. (2d) 567, 568 (1947); Jacobs v. Office of Unemployment Compensation and
Placement, 27 Wash. (2d) 641, 179 P. (2d) 7o7, 713 (1947).
13Under such circumstances claimants have been denied benefits. Welch v. Review
Board of Employment Security Division of Indiana, 115 Ind. App. 23o, 58 N. E. (2d)
363 (1944); Wolpers v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353 Mo. i067,
186 S. W. (2d) 440 (1945); Wasyluk v. Mack Mfg. Corporation, 4 N. J. Super. 559, 68
A. (2d) 264 (1949); Keen v. Texas Unemployment Compensation Commission, 148 S.
W. (2d) 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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is subjected to certain voluntary or involuntary restrictions as to hours,
location, type of work, or other conditions.
14
Certainly a person can impose some restrictions upon his em-
ployability without detaching himself from the labor market. The term
"available for work" must not require total, absolute availability in the
sense of complete readiness to accept any work during any and all
hours. One factor limiting the harshness of the term is the statutory
provision disqualifying only those who refuse or are unwilling to
accept suitable work-that is, employment which is substantially con-
sistent with the unemployed's previous training, experience, and wage
scale. 1' The problem of availability is thus essentially one of degree,
and since the Act is clearly remedial, the rule requiring liberal con-
struction in favor of the beneficiary would seem applicable.16 Never-
theless, many courts have reasoned that the statutory requirement can
be satisfied only by a willingness on the part of the idle worker to
accept suitable work at all hours on any shift-that is, unrestricted
availability for that type of work.'7 In the instant case the Virginia
court indicated its adherence to this doctrine by saying that a claimant
in order to receive benefits must "show that he has met the benefit
eligibility conditions, which in this case is unrestricted availability
... ,,18 Some courts have permitted a somewhat broader disbursement
of benefits by adopting the rule that the availability requirement is
satisfied when claimant is willing to accept all suitable work which he
"'See Altman and Lewis, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion
of Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation (1944) 28 Minn. L. Rev. 387, and 22
N. C. L. Rev. 189.
IuIf claimant refuses to apply for or accept work offered him, then question arises
as to whether or not the rejected work was suitable. The Virginia statute reads: "In
determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the Commission
shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and morals, his physical
fitness and prior training, his experience, his length of unemployment and the
accessibility of the available work from his residence." 9 Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
1950) §60-47.
"See Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158
Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. (2d) 898, 904 (1946); Unemployment Compensation Commission
of Virginia v. Collins, 182 Va. 426, 438, 29 S. E. (2d) 388, 393 (1944).
'7 Bedwell v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 88 N. E.
(2d) 916 (Ind. App. 1949); Romiski v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 169 Pa. Super. io6, 82 A. (2d) 565 (1951); Mills v. South Carolina Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission, 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. (2d) 535 (1944). Also see
Altman & Lewis, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion of Eligibility
for Unemployment Compensation (1944) 28 Minn. L. Rev. 387, and 22 N. C. L. Rev.
189.
""Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 468, 65 S. E.
(2d) 524, 527 (1951). [Italics supplied].
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does not have a good cause to reject, 19 and in at least one instance it
was held the claimant was available for employment so long as he "is
ready, willing and able to accept some substantial and suitable
work . ... 2o
In the instant case the unemployed miners were willing to work
the same number of hours per week in the mining industry that the
regular miners in other areas were then working, and were evidently
unrestrictively available for suitable work in other industries. Hence,
the union order limiting members to a three-day work week did not
impair their usability in the labor market, or lessen their chances of
obtaining employment, and evidences no desire on the part of the
claimants to remain unemployed. Under these circumstances it is
difficult to believe the framers of the Virginia Act, by including the
"available for work" provision as one of the requirements for benefits,
had in mind the barring of such claims as were asserted by the unem-
ployed Virginia miners.
This qualification in the Act has perhaps been more burdsome and
complex than the legislators ever foresaw. A strict, rigid interpretation
renders the system practically ineffectual in relieving the distress of the
unemployed in many instances. 21 One solution would be the adoption
by the court of the following suggested rule: "No limitations upon
employability should be deemed to render a claimant unavailable for
work unless the limitation is such as to show that the claimant is either
unwilling or unable to accept a substantial amount of suitable work
'Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 46
A. (2d) 844 (1946); Roukey v. Riley, 77 A. (2d) 3o (N. H. 1950); Leonard v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Ohio 419, 75 N. E. (2d) 567 (1947). For a
meaning of the term "good cause," see Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A. (2d) 336, 340 (1947)-
'*Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa.
Super. 548, 45 A. (2d) 898, 905 (1946). It has also been suggested, without clarification,
that the test as to one's availability should be subjective rather than objective. See
Reger v. Administration, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.
(2d) 844, 846 (1946). Also see Note (1948) 17 Fordham L. Rev. 1So.
21"Statutory requirements of ability to work and availability for work are stated
in such general terms that only by interpretation are they given meaning. Whether
the protection which workers have in an unemployment compensation law is more
than illusory depends on the character of such interpretations. Only if it is understood
that an unemployment compensation law is a broad public measure, designed by
the payment of benefits to check and ameliorate the effects of unemployment among
workers who are able, willing, and ready to work will workers be assured the
reasonable protection which the states have provided for them. To paraphrase a
statement by Justice Cardozo, an unemployment compensation law interpreted in
such a way that the unemployed who look to it will be deprived of reasonable pro-
tection is one in name and nothing more." Freeman, Able to Work and Available for
Work (1945) 55 Yale L. J. 123, 134.
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or unless it is such as to show that he is not substantially usable in
the labor market which is available to him."
22
The total availability requirement as adopted in the Tomko case
may be sound from the standpoint of strict rules of statutory con-
struction because the term "available" is not expressly qualified in
the statute, but it breaks down when examined from the social and
economic point of view. In view of the reluctance of courts in many
jurisdictions to read exceptions into the statute, the legislatures should
further clarify the term so as to prevent it from being applied in a
manner which defeats the very purpose for which the Act was passed.
JAMEs C. Tum
LABOR LAWV-RIGHT OF EMPLOYER TO PROVIDE FOR SENIORITY RIGHTS FOR
WORKERS REPLACING STRIKERS. [Federal]
Though the National Labor Relations Board has ruled that strikers
returning from an "unfair labor practice" strike are entitled to rein-
statement to their old jobs, even though new employees hired during the
strike are thereby displaced,' the Supreme Court of the United States
dearly implied in 1938 in N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph
Co.2 that no right to reinstatement existed after an "economic" strike,
except insofar as reinstatement could be made without displacing men
hired during the strike.
The principle of the Mackay case was recently extended by a
federal Court of Appeals in N. L. R. B. v. Potlatch Forests, Inc.,3
wherein it was decided that since an employer was not obligated to
discharge "replacements" hired during the strike to provide jobs for
returning strikers at the time the strike terminated, then the employer
might further provide job security for the "replacements" during
any future curtailment of operations by providing that former strikers
should be laid off first. In the dispute which led to the litigation, all
of Potlatch's 2,60o employees in the bargaining unit involved went out
on strike for higher wages. During the strike some new employees
were hired, and a large number of former strikers crossed the picket
lines to return to work. The court refers to the members of this group
2Altman and Lewis, Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion of
Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation (1944) 28 Minn. L. Rev. 387, 412, and
22 N. C. L. Rev. 189, 211.
IMatter of Western Felt Works, so N. L. R. B. 407 (1938)
"3o4 U. S. 333 at 347, 58 S. Ct. 904 at 911, 82 L. ed. 1381 at 1391 (1938).
3189 F. (2d) 82 (C. A. 9 th, 1951).
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as "replacements," regardless of whether they were new workers or
former strikers who crossed the picket line. When the strike was finally
settled, the group of "replacements'" totalled 1,750 men, but the em-
ployer reinstated all remaining strikers who returned to work within
a specified io-day period. On the first day after the strike was settled,
the management secretly promulgated a "strike seniority policy,"
under which the employees were divided into two groups: the "re-
placements," who were either initially hired or returned to work during
the strike, and the "strikers," who returned to work during the spe-
cified io-day period after the strike. In the event of future curtailment
in plant operations, all "strikers" were to be laid off before any of the
"replacements," irrespective of seniority rights held before the strike.
All employees retained their pre-strike seniority rights for all purposes
other than layoffs.
4
More than a year later Potlatch invoked the policy to justify the
discharging of two former "strikers." The union filed its complaint
with the Board, which decided that maintaining the policy was an
unfair labor practice and issued a cease and desist order against Pot-
latch. 5 In a proceeding by the Board to enforce its order, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the charge against
Potlatch was limited to Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, which provides that it "shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ...."6 The Trial Examiner had found that Potlatch had
4Matter of Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N. L. R. B. 1193 at 12o (1949). In his find-
ings of fact, the Trial Examiner clearly states that the policy was not made known
to the employees for some time, although the court failed to stress this fact or to
question any of the facts as found by the Trial Examiner. The court did point out
that the extra seniority rights need not have been used to induce "replacements" to
work in order that the policy be justified. The court did not attempt to explain the
employer's motive in secreting from returning strikers a condition of their rein-
statement.
Matter of Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N. L. R. B. 1193 (1949). This decision was in
accord with three previous decisions by the Board. Matter of General Electric Co.,
8o N. L. R. B. 510 (1948) held that "tolling" seniority rights of strikers during the
period of a strike was an unfair labor practice. Matter of Precision Castings Co., Inc.,
48 N. L. R. B. 870 (1943) held that an employer violated Section 8 (a) (i) of the Act
by causing strikers' seniority to run from the time they returned to work after the
strike. Matter of Paper, Calemson and Co., 26 N. L. R. B. 55 (1940), held that an
employer committed an unfair labor practice when he notified strikers that they
would lose seniority rights unless they crossed the picket lines to return to work. In
all of these cases the employers obeyed the orders of the Board, and no actions for en-
forcement were brought in the courts.
661 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §158 (a) (3) (Supp. 1950). The problems pre-
sented by the Potlatch case grew out of portions of the National Labor Relations Act
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not only violated Section 8 (a) (3), but also Section 8 (a) (1), which
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7. ' 7 Section 7 guarantees the so-called
"right to strike" by providing that employees shall have the right to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid and pro-
tection.3 However, attorneys for the Board had admitted at the hearing
before the Trial Examiner that Section 8 (a) (i) was involved only to the
extent that the alleged violation of Section 8 (a) (3) would itself con-
stitute a violation of the previous subsection. This may have been a
tactical blunder on the part of the general counsel's office, since the
court stresses the exact language of Section 8 (a) (3) in its opinion, and
is careful to hold that the "strike seniority policy," though it may be
said to "discriminate," does not discriminate so as to discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization within the purview of the Act.
Whether the court would have found a violation of Sections 8 (a) (i)
had the question been squarely presented, it is impossible to say. The
"strike seniority policy" at most has only an indirect effect on union
membership, but it is undeniable that the direct effect of the policy
squarely falls on those who exercise their "right to strike" protected by
Section 8 (a) (i).
In addition to the doubts cast upon the decision by the apparent
applicability of Section 8 (a) (i), other considerations argue for a
different result. The decision seems to run contrary to the doctrine
that the employment relation is not severed by a strike. In earlier times
a strike was thought to be a severance of employment; 9 however with
the rise of organized labor the rule was changed by judicial decision
and by both federal o and state"l statutes. Section 2 (3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act provides that "the term 'employee' shall
include ... any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment .... ,,12 The Mackay case held that
which were unchanged by the 1947"amendments. See 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
§158 (3) (1947).
'6i Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §158 ( Supp . 1950).1161 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §157 (Supp. 1950) .
OBrown v. Central West Coal Co., 200 Mich. 174, x66 N. W. 850 (1918).
261 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §152 (3) (Supp. 1950).
11E. g. 4A Mass Laws Ann. (Michie, 1950) c. 15oA §2 (3); 6 N. Y. Cons. Laws
Serv. (Baker, Voorhis, 1951) Labor Law § 7o (3); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit.
43, c. 7, § 211.3 (d).
261 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. 152 (3) (Supp. 195o).
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this employment relation was not severed, although the striker's job
had been taken by a "replacement."' 3 The Potlatch case is not compli-
cated by having some of the strikers "left over" after all jobs were
filled; all of them were reinstated. Since the strike itself did not sever
the strikers' employment, and since no replacement prevented the
reinstatement of any striker, there is no factor to disrupt the con-
tinuity of employment, which was the basis of seniority among Potlatch
employees before the "strike seniority policy" was adopted. Therefore,
it could be argued that Potlatch had no normal justification for de-
priving the "strikers" of their seniority status.
Relying on the principle laid down in the Mackay case, the court
maintained that the justification for the policy lay in the employer's
legitimate concern for providing the "replacements" with permanent
employment. This legitimate concern was justified, according to the
court, although the effect would be to "discriminate" between em-
ployees so as to discourage union membership. 14 The facts of the
Mackay case did not require the Supreme Court to decide how long
after a strike the "replacements" remain in a protected class. There,
the "replacements" were only protected from being discharged at the
time the strike terminated to make room for the strikers they actually
replaced, whereas the Potlatch decision protects them from displace-
ment by all strikers and protects them for all future time. This may
be regarded as merely a logical extension of the Mackay doctrine; but
it must be noted that the Potlatch rule gives to a new employee, hired
during a strike, much greater job security than a worker would receive
when hired at a time when no strike was in progress. A new employee
would normally have a seniority status lower than other employees,
not higher. The Supreme Court intended that the existence of a labor
dispute should not prejudice a new employee, but it seems doubtful
that it intended to provide him with rights he could not expect to ob-
tain in accepting new employment under normal conditions.
The Potlatch decision extends the Mackay doctrine in still another
important particular. Only new employees were afforded the protective
cloak of "replacements" in the Mackay case, but the "strike seniority
131t is implicit in Board and court decisions that the employer is under a duty to
prefer former strikers over other job applicants to fill future job vacancies at his
plant. See Matter of Container Manufacturing Co., 75 N. L. R. B. io82 (1948).
'IN. L. R. B. v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F. (2d) 82 at 86 (1951). This statement
seems to conflict with the court's holding on Page 85 that Potlach's activities did
not "discriminate" against union members. Probably the court intended to present
an alternative finding to emphasize that, although there was some discrimination
which had the effect of discouraging union membership, the action of the employer
was not a violation of Section 8 (a) (3), because such action was privileged.
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policy" defined "replacements" to include both new employees and
strikers who returned to work before the termination of the strike, and
this classification was accepted by the court as legitimate. To allow one
"worker to improve his seniority status to the detriment of his co-
workers by defying a picket line, puts a premium on anti-union activity.
It has been held an unfair labor practice to offer bonuses to strikers
who cross the picket lines to return to work.15 To offer a seniority
"bonus" would logically be a greater discrimination, since those who
remained on strike would suffer a corresponding loss of seniority. Ad-
mittedly, the "replacements" should be entitled to accumulate seniority
referable to the time they were at work while the strikers were not.
It should be noted, however, that the "strike seniority policy" does not
merely toll the accumulation of seniority during the time a striker
remains away from the plant, but creates new categories of seniority
which have no relation to length or continuity of service.
However, "new" replacements were given lower seniority rights
than strikers who crossed the picket lines, and this was true although
the new workers may have been hired before the strikers returned to
work.16 It was the "new" replacement group which the Mackay doctrine
originally sought to protect. Although the "strike seniority policy"
affords the new men a large measure of protection, those who crossed
the picket lines are benefitted most. This may have influenced the
Board's finding that the motive behind the policy was to discourage
union activity. The court, however, found no such motive.
Both the contention of the Board and the decision of the court
are backed by persuasive arguments. The problem presented was one
of first impression in the courts, and a decision against Potlatch would
have had the effect of broadening the protection afforded strikers by the
Act. It is the opinion of some writers that the Taft-Hartley Act, though
not applicable by its terms, has nevertheless influenced the courts in
recent cases to look less favorably upon strikes as a means of resolving
labor disputes.17 The Potlatch case lends support to that interpretation
of recent decisions. RAYMOND W. HAMAN
" Matter of Aronsson Printing Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 799 at 8io (1939). Note that the
giving of extra pay was found to violate Section 8 (a) (i), and so the court in the
Potlatch case was technically not concerned with rulings of this sort, since it was
considering only whether the policy violated Section 8 (a) (3).
GThis anomalous situation was created by the portion of the policy which pro-
vided that employees retained their pre-strike seniority with respect to other members
of the same group. The new men, of course, had no pre-strike seniority and were
therefore in a less favorable position than the former strikers who returned to work
during the strike. Matter of Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N.,L. R. B. 1193 at 1200 (1949).
17Blinn, Rights and Obligations of Strikers Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 13 Mo.
L. Rev. i at 1o (1948).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-VALIDITY OF ZONING ORDINANCE PERMIT-
TING RECLASSIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL TRACT WITHIN DISTRICT ON
APPLICATION OF OWNER. [New York]
Zoning is a relatively new concept in the field of municipal law,
the first comprehensive zoning ordinance having been enacted in
New York in 1916.1 The primary object of zoning is the protection of
the value and usefulness of urban land as a whole and the assurance of
such orderliness in municipal growth as will facilitate the execution of
the city plan and the economical provision of public services. 2 The
state enabling acts3 frequently contain the provision that the ordinance
must be in accord with a well-considered and comprehensive plan to
bring about an orderly development of the area.4 An integral part of
any comprehensive zoning plan is the division of the city into dearly
designated districts and the designation of particular uses of real estate
in each district. 5 It has been frequently stated that comprehensive
zoning contemplates fixed areas within defined boundaries. 6
'Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 834. Zoning has
been made necessary by the realization that as the population of the country in-
creased and the activities of life became more concentrated and integrated in urban
communities, there could be no sense of security in the ownership and use of land,
nor adequate protection of the public interest, if individual owners had complete
freedom to use their property as they pleased. Thus it has been observed that zoning
"is predicated upon a basic principle of urban land economics, that a certain con-
formity in use stablizes and insures the value of land." Landels, Zoning: An Analy-
sis of Its Purpose and Its Legal Sanctions (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 163, 165. The supreme
Court of the United States, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S.
365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303 (1926) first upheld a zoning ordinance as a valid
exercise of the police power.
2Landels, Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its Legal Sanctions (1931) 17 A.
B. A. J. 163.
3A municipality has no inherent power to establish zoning regulations. Bassett,
Zoning (1940) 13. Any zoning ordinance that a municipality does enact is confined
by the limitations placed in the enabling statute. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, io 5
Utah 111, 141 P. (2d) 704 (1943), wherein it was said that the clearly expressed and
mandatory provisions of a zoning enabling statute may not be abrogated, ignored,
or relaxed to meet the real or supposed practical needs of a municipality.
4See Chapman v. City of Troy, 241 Ala. 637, 4 S. (2d) 1, 3 (1941); City of Utica v.
Hanna, 2o2 App. Div. 61o, 195 N. Y. Supp. 225, 226 (1922); City of Texarkana v.
Mabry, 94 S. W. (2d) 871, 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
558 Am. Jur., Zoning §i. "The very essence of zoning is territorial division ac-
cording to the character of the land and the buildings, their peculiar suitability for
particular uses, and conformity of use within the zone." Heath v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 49 A. (2d) 799, 804 (1946).
'Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. (2d) 332, 175 P. (2d) 542 (1946); Bishop
v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of New Haven, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A. (2d) 659
(1947); State v. Harris, 158 La. 974, 105 So. 33 (1925); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
26o Mass. 441, 157 N. E. 618 (1927); Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N. Y. 221,
177 N. E. 427 (1931); In re Kensington-Davis Corp., 239 N. Y. 54, 145 N. E. 738 (1924).
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Though these principles are dearly established as a part of the
law of zoning, the Court of Appeals of New York, in Rodgers v. Village
of Tarrytown,7 recently ruled that a municipality could amend its gen-
eral zoning ordinance to allow the creation of a "district" which would
have no definite boundaries until an application for the newly created
classification was filed by an individual property owner. In 1947 the
Board of Trustees for the Village of Tarrytown added to their General
Zoning Ordinance8 an amendment which created a new district known
as "Residence B-B," in which, besides one and two-family dwellings,
buildings for multiple occupancy of fifteen or fewer families were
permitted. The boundaries of the new type districts were not delineated
in the amendment but were to be fixed by further amendment of the
official village building map at such times in the future as such district
or class of zone was applied to properties in the village by the approval
of an application by some land owner possessing a tract of at least
ten acres. The amendment gave the Village Planning Board the power
to approve such an application, with the right of appeal to the Board
of Trustees and then to the courts if the application was denied. In
1948, on application of the defendant and after a favorable report by
the Planning Board, the Board of Trustees passed a second amend-
ment applying the "Residence B-B" classification to the property of the
defendant. Plaintiff Rodgers, an owner of property in the one-family
dwelling district within which defendant's reclassified land was located,
brought an action to have these two amendments declared invalid
and to enjoin the defendant from constructing a multiple dwelling
in that zone. In a 5 to 2 decision, the Court of Appeals of New York
upheld the validity of both amendments and refused to issue the in-
junction.9
See Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning (1934) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 834 to the effect
that zoning is the regulation by districts and not by individual pieces of property.
The necessity of definite districts is further shown by the frequent requirement that
a map be annexed to the ordinance and be made a part thereof. Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303 (1926); Katz v. Higson,
113 Conn. 776, 155 At. 507 (1931); Town of West Springfield v. Mayo, 265 Mass. 41,
163 N. E. 653 (1928); Capital Homes Inc. v. Dandrow, 123 N. J. L. 362, 8 A. (2d)
325 (1939); Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N. Y. 167, 18 N. E. (2d) iS (1938);
Fierst v. William Penn. Memorial Corp., 311 Pa. 263, 166 Ad. 761 (1933).
73o2 N. Y. 11., 96 N. E. (2d) 731 (1951).
8The General Zoning Ordinance of Tarrytown divides the Village into seven
districts-Residence A, for the single-family dwelling; Residence B, for two-family
dwellings; Residence C, for multiple-family and apartment dwellings; three busi-
ness districts and an industrial district.
'The essence of the dissenting judges' argument was that the Board of Trustees
did not have the statutory power to create a new classification without first establish-
ing definite boundaries, that the amendment was not enacted in pursuance of a
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The majority of the court reasoned that the Village of Tarrytown
had two possible methods by which it could have amended the General
Zoning Ordinance so as to create the desired "Residence B-B" classifi-
cation. First, it could have amended the general ordinance so as to
permit apartments for fifteen or fewer families on any plot of ten
acres or more in the one and two-family dwelling zones or any other
designated zone; such action would merely add another permitted use
to the uses already authorized in definite areas, and if taken for the
general welfare of the village, this action would clearly be a valid
exercise of the power to amend the original ordinance. 10 Second, it
could achieve the same result by amending the ordinance so as to invite
owners of ten or more acres to apply for the new classification within
the one and two-family dwelling zones. The court declared that the
choice as to how to effectuate local zoning policy should be left to
the local legislative body,1 that this decision would not be interfered
with unless shown to be unreasonable or arbitrary, and that the plain-
tiff in this case had failed to prove that the Village's action was of that
character. In response to the argument that no definite boundaries
were prescribed, the court asserted that the Board of Trustees did not
create an additional zone, but only provided the means whereby an
additional zone could be created in the future, at which time the
boundaries would be delineated on the official village map.
A municipality which has the power to set up a zoning system also
has the power to amend the zoning ordinances it has enacted 12 as
long as the power is not exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably, and the
unorthodox amendatory process adopted by the Board of Trustees
in the principal case would seem to have much to commend it. Since
the application is to be made to a municipal planning board, the
comprehensive plan, and that it consitituted spot zoning. Rodgers v. Village of
Tarrytown, 302 N. Y. 115, 96 N. E. (2d) 731, 736 (1951).
1'Following this method, the zoning board would not be creating an additional
zone without definite boundaries but would merely create an additional use in a
definite zone. There would seem to be no question that the planning board could,
in a valid exercise of its police powers, find that changing conditions require a change
in the uses allowed in a particular zone.
uVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed.
303 (1926); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925);
Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Berry v. Houghton, 164
Minn. 146, 204 N. W. 569 (1925); Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278
N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. (2d) 587 (1938).
"Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 53 S. Ct. 177, 77 L. ed. 331 (1932);
Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931);
Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 6o Ohio App. 443, 21 N. E. (2d) 993
(1938); Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N. W. (2d) 84 (1941).
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village has not surrendered its zoning powers to the individual property
owners, but has merely provided a method whereby an administrative
agency, which would be more fully aware of the needs and physical
characteristics of the various zones, could determine the most desirable
location for the multiple dwellings. Before granting the application,
the planning board could determine the financial and moral respon-
sibility of the applicant-whether the particular piece of land was
suited for multiple dwellings, whether the existing public facilities
could support the increased burden, and whether the application
would in fact fulfill the purposes of the original amendment. The
whole method gives the village a complete and specific control over
the number and kind of multiple dwellings that could be erected
within the city.13 If the application is denied by the planning board,
the applicant may protest against any arbitrary action through the
right of appeal to the Board of Trustees and then to the courts.
Despite the administrative advantages of this system and the fact
that the same result could have been attained simply by increasing
the uses permitted in the more restricted zones, it is urged that the
Board of Trustees does not have the power to create a new classifica-
tion without establishing definite boundaries. Both the enabling act
of the state of New York14 and a long line of decisions of the New
York courts15 require that a zoning district have definite boundaries.
"The amendment was enacted to prevent young families from being forced
to move elsewhere because of a shortage of living accommodations in the village; to
attract business to the community; to lighten the tax load of the small home owners,
who were heavily burdened by the shrinkage of tax returns from the depreciated
value of large estates and the transfer of many such estates to tax-exempt insti-
tutions; and for the development of otherwise unmarketable and decaying property.
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 3o2 N. Y. 115, 96 N. E. (2d) 73, (1951).
"'Section III of the 1947 Amendment provides: "The boundaries of the said
newly created district or class of zone will be fixed by amendment of the official
village zoning map, at such time in the future as such district or class of zone is
applied to properties in this village." To be compared with this is the provision
in the enabling act, 7 N. Y. Cons. Laws Ann. (Baldwin, 1938) Village Law, Art. 6-A,
§176, that the Board of Trustees "may divide the village into districts of such
number, shape and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of
this act...." The intention of the legislature that the districts decided upon must
have definite boundaries is clearly indicated by the further provision, 7 N. Y. Cons.
Laws Ann. (Baldwin, 1938) Village Law, Art. 6-A, §179-a, that the Board of Trustees
"shall appoint a commission to be known as the zoning commission to recommend the
boundaries of the various original districts .... " Throughout the provisions of the
enabling act will be found references to "districts" and "boundaries," all of which
seemingly indicate that ascertainable districts are to be established whenever a
municipality enacts a zoning ordinance.
"Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N. Y. 221, 177 N. E. 427 (1931); In re
Kensington-Davis Corp., 239 N. Y. 54, 145 N. E. 738 (1924); City of Olean v.
Conkling, 157 Misc. 63, 283 N. Y. Supp. 66 (1935); Langley v. Rumsey, 130 Misc. 492,
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In failing to provide for these boundaries, the 1947 amendment has
failed to establish a new zoning district as the word "district" is under-
stood in this branch of the law. Although purporting to create a new
district, it merely succeeded in inviting the owner of the prescribed
quantity of land to apply for the new classification.
If a new district was not created, the provisions of the old zoning
ordinance are still in effect, and the granting of such an application
constituted the granting of a non-conforming use within the districts
zoned for one and two-family dwellings. While it is within the power
of a municipality to grant such a variance,16 certain requirements must
be met, one of the fundamental of which is that the petitioner must
show that he will suffer unnecessary hardship unless his request is grant-
ed.17 As a general rule, to which New York adheres,' 8 financial hardship
alone will not constitute that degree of hardship prerequisite to
obtaining a variance.' 9 However, as was brought out in the testimony
of the principal case, the only reason the applicant wanted to erect
the apartment was that she was unable to sell the land and felt she
might make it more profitable by erecting an apartment.20 Most en-
224 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1927); City of Glens Falls v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,
127 Misc. 104, 215 N. Y. Supp. 354 (1926); Wertheimer v. Schwab, 124 Misc. 822, 210
N. Y. Supp. 312 (1925).
' 6The usual zoning enabling act provides for variances from the strict appli-
cation of the ordinances if it is found that special hardship would otherwise result.
Reps, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Conditional Zoning Variances and
Exceptions (1950) 2 Syracuse L. Rev. 54. The New York provision to this effect can
be found in 7 N. Y. Cons. Laws Ann. (Baldwin, 1938) Village Law, Art. 6-A, § 179-b.
"7Real Properties v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 319 Mass. 18o, 65 N. E. (2d) igg
(1946); Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. (2d) 587
(1938); Lee v. Board of Adjustment of City of Rocky Mount, 226 N. C. 107, 37 S. E.
(2d) 128 (1946). See Note (1951) 29 N. C. L. Rev. 245, for a discussion of the various
considerations.
"8Young Women's Hebrew Association v. Board of Standards and Appeals of
the City of New York, 266 N. Y. 270, 194 N. E. 751 (1935); Joyce v. Dobson, 225
App. Div. 348, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 768 (1938); Ward v. Murdock, 247 App. Div. 8o8
286 N. Y. Supp. 28o (1936).
"Thayer v. Board of Appeals of City of Hartford, 114 Conn. 15, 157 Ad. 273
(1931); Phillips v. Board of Appeals of Building Department, 286 Mass. 469, 19o
N. E. 6oi (1934); Joyce v. Dobson, 255 App. Div. 348, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 768 (1938).
Nor is the fact that the proposed non-conforming use would be financially more
advantageous a sufficient basis for a claim of unnecessary hardship. Benson v. Zoning
Board of Appeals, 125 Conn. 280, 27 A. (2d) 389 (1942); National Lumber Products
Co. v. Ponzio, 133 N. J. L. 95, 42 A. (2d) 753 (1945); Hopkins v. Board of Appeals,
178 Misc. i86, ..g N. Y. S. (2d) .96 (1942).
2OThe applicant had a number of brokers attempting to sell the land. When it
became evident that they would be unable to sell on the terms desired, the ap-
plicant thought of having the land reclassified so as to get a F. H. A. loan to build
the apartment. Brief of The Regional Plan Association, Inc., Amicus Curiae, in
Support of Appellant, 22.
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abling acts provide that a board of appeals or adjustment be set up to
grant a variance, 21 and under the Village Law of New York this power
is given to the Board of Appeals and cannot be retained by the local
legislative body.22 Nevertheless, in the principal case the Board of
Trustees and not the Board of Appeals attempted to grant permission
for construction which would amount to granting a variance. Thus,
since the applicant did not establish the necessary hardship and did
not present her claim to the proper municipal body, the 1948 amend-
ment failed to create a proper variance.
Since the zoning power must be administered largely upon the
discretion of the municipal officials, it has always been especially sub-
jected to abuse. To overcome the danger of this abuse, one of the fun-
damental principles of zoning requires that the land within a munici-
pality be divided into districts and that there be uniform regulations
throughout each district.23 By abandoning these traditional safeguards,
the decision in the principal case gives great power to the planning
board and could, in the future, easily result in individual favoritism and
discrimination. While a person whose application has been refused can'
appeal, the courts are loathe to declare the decision of the planning
board unreasonable or arbitrary.2 4 The board could easily grant an
application where an apartment was not needed, or under circum-
stances in which, considering the then existing public facilities, it could
be more economically located in some other section of the village. One
of the primary benefits of comprehensive zoning is that it will enable
the municipality to plan for the future provision of public facilities
such as sewage disposal, street requirements, public transportation,
police and fire protection, and public school systems. If the planning
board can grant permission to erect an apartment dwelling anywhere
within the one and two-family zones, it is impossible for municipal
agencies to anticipate in advance even approximately where such a
dwelling would be located and there could certainly be no accurate
planning.
Since it is doubtful that the more restricted zones now have ade-
quate public facilities to care for a substantial increase in population,
2'Bassett, Zoning (1940) 117.
=7 N. Y. Cons. Laws Ann. (Baldwin, 1938) Village Law, Art. 6-A, §175 and
179 -b. The members of the Board of Appeals are appointed by the Board of Trustees.
:aBassett, Zoning (1940) 50.
2'Wilcox v. City of Pittsburg, 121 F. (2d) 835 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Zadworny v. City
of Chicago, 38o Ill 470, 44 N. E. (2d) 426 (1942); Scott v. Davis, 94 N. H. 35, 45 A.
(2d) 654 (1946); Kraft v. Village of Hastings-On-Hudson, 258 App. Div. io6o, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 630 0940).
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it is suggested that a more feasible plan would be the selection of
definite areas within these zones for the construction of multiple
dwellings. This would fulfill the basic requirement of definite boun-
daries, would enable the municipality to know within reasonable
approximation where additional public facilities would be needed,
and would give more stability to the property within the zones.
ANDREW D. OWENS
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-PROPRIETY OF DOMINANT INTENTION RULE
PLACING Loss ON DRAWER OF INSTRUMENT IN IMPOSTOR CASES. [Mas-
sachusetts]
The loss arising from a forged or unauthorized indorsement on a
negotiable instrument is generally placed on a collecting or drawee
bank rather than on the drawer,' but where an impostor has obtained
the instrument from the drawer, indorsed it, and successfully passed
it to another, most courts place the loss on the drawer,2 under the opera-
tion of the so-called "dominant intention rule.'" 3 The drawer is said to
"'The implied contract between the bank and its depositor is that the bank will
pay out the funds of the depositor only upon order from the depositor to that
effect. It follows then, that if the bank pays out funds upon an instrument purporting
to be the check of its depositor, the signature upon which turns out to be a forgery,
no right exists in the bank to charge the amount of the item against the account of
the depositor, since the payment was wholly without any authority from him. This
is elementary, and needs the citation of no authorities. The only exception is where
the depositor, by his course of conduct, negligence, or laches, has created a condition
which estops him." Denbigh v. First Nat. Bank of Seattle, so2 Wash. 546, 174 Pac.
475, 478 (1958). Britton, Bills and Notes (1943) 592.
2United States v. Liberty Insurance Bank, 26 F. (2d) 493 (W. D. Ky. 1928); Ryan v.
Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n., io6 Cal. App. 690, 289 Pac. 863 (193o);
Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank, 56 Cobo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914); Land-Title &
Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (19oo). Britton, Bills
and Notes (1943) 715.
In every true impostor situation there are always two victims of the imposter.
The impostor must convince the first victim, the drawer of the check, that he is
the person to whom the check is due, and then the impostor must convince the second
victim, the person to whom he negotiates the check, that he is the owner of the
check. Considering which of the dual victims has most often borne the loss resulting
from the impersonation, Abel, The Impostor Payee [1940] Wis. L. Rev. 161, 170 states:
"Just over a hundred years have passed since the advent of the impostor in the
reported decisions in the field of negotiable instruments. In that span of a century
there have been slightly over forty opinions dealing with the problems created by
successive impersonation .... In about three-fourths the first victim of the impostor
was made to bear the loss,in the other fourth it was fastened on the second victim."
'A clear expression of the dominant intention rule is set forth in Montgomery
Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co., 94 N. J. L. 152, 1o9 At. 296, 297, 22
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have a dual intent: (i) to pay the person whom the negotiable instru-
ment is physically delivered, and (2) to pay the person whom the im-
postor represents himself to be and who appears as payee or indorsee on
the instrument; and the former intention is said to be dominant. Thus,
since it is concluded that the drawer primarily intended that payment
should be made to the person who turns out to be the defrauder, his
responsibility for making the fraud possible is sufficiently great that
the loss is placed on Him rather than on the party who takes the in-
strument from the impostor.
4
Though it is widely accepted, the unsatisfactory nature of the
dominant intention rule continues to be manifested in the decisions of
the courts, as in the recent case of Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank &
Banking Co.5 Plaintiff, a dealer in used automobiles, was induced,
upon presentation of a driver's license and automobile registration
certificate in the name of Heinz Rettig, to purchase an automobile
from an impostor who represented himself to be the owner, Heinz
Rettig. Plaintiff made out a check for $i,45o payable to Heinz Rettig
and delivered it to the impostor, who cashed it at defendant drawee-
bank. When plaintiff discovered the fraud, he turned the automobile
over to the police arfd brought suit to force defendant bank to re-
credit his account in the amount of the check.
The trial judge, holding for the plaintiff, found "'that the plaintiff
intended said check to be paid by the defendant to Heinz Rettig, or
order, only'"." This finding was reversed by the Appellate Division,
and on further appeal, the Supreme Judical Court of Massachusetts,
following the dominant intention rule,7 held that the drawer intended
A. L. R. 1224, 1227 (192o). There the court held the drawer liable for the loss caused
by an impostor, saying: "In other cases of fraudulent impersonation the drawer is
sometimes said to have a double intent: First, to make the check payable to the
person before him; and, secondly, to make it payable to the person whom he believes
the stranger to be. But the courts have almost unanimously held that the first is the
controlling intent . . ." Also, see Abel, The Impostor Payee [1940] Wis L. Rev.
161, 200, for discussion of the prominence of this and other rules in placing the
incidence of loss on the drawer.
'A summary of impostor cases appearing in Note (19o0) 5o L. R. A. 75, 84 con-
cludes: ". . . it as apparent from the foregoing cases that the drawer of check, draft,
or bill of exchange, who delivers it to an impostor, supposing him to be the person
whose name he has assumed, must, as against the drawee or a bona fide holder, bear
the loss where the impostor obtains payment of, or negotiates, the same." This state-
ment has been approved in the typical impostor situation in North Philadelphia
Trust Co. v. Kensington Nat. Bank, 328 Pa. 298, 196 At. 14, 15 (1938).
r95 N. E. (2d) 176 (Mass. 1950).
"95 N. E. (2d) 176, 177 (Mass. 1950).
7As established in Massachusetts in Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E.
619 (1886).
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the check to be payable to the person to whom it was physically de-
livered. The court further concluded that there was no factual evi-
dence to support the trial judge's finding of intent.
As is generally true of cases decided on this basis, the opinion fails
to reveal whether the court purported to find the actual intent of the
drawer by some sort of objective standard, or was merely applying
a fixed rule of law concerning intent to get the desired result of placing
the loss on the drawer. On this question, the Supreme Judical Court
observed inconclusively: "The Appellate Division determined that, if
this finding [by the trial court] was a finding of fact, there was nothing
in the report in the way of evidence or other facts found which would
warrantably support such a finding. We agree with this conclusion.
If it was a ruling of law, it was erroneous...."s Such confusion as to
the basis of application of the dominant intention rule is indicative of
its questionable validity.
If it be assumed that the courts in applying the rule are trying to
establish the actual intent of the drawer, it is doubtful that any such
intent can be established. In the principal decision it was argued that
physical presence is the controlling element in determining the
drawer's actual intent, on the reasoning that "'The name of a person
is the verbal designation by which he is known, but the visible pres-
ence of the person affords surer means of identifying him than his
name'." 9 Doubt is cast on the materiality of the element of direct
contact, however, by the general rule that the drawer of a negotiable
instrument passes good title to an impostor even when the negotiations
are carried on by correspondence.1 0 The correspondence cases hold
that the drawer intended payment to the impostor even though no
physical presence is involved.". Furthermore, it is noted that in the
cases where the impostor has been physically before the drawer but
"Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank & Banking Co., 95 N. E. (2d) 176, 1So (Mass.
1950).
'Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank & Banking Co., 95 N. E. (2d) 176, 178
(Mass. ig5o), quoting Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E. 619, 620 (1886).
""Where the impersonator operates by means of the telegraph or by use of the
mails there is some conflict in the cases on the question whether the impersonator
acquires title or not, but the majority of the cases hold that, here also, the imperson-
ator gets title." Britton, Bills and Notes (1943) 720.
"A clear statement of the immateriality of physical presence in the correspon-
dence cases is set forth in Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac.
764, 767 (i9s4). There, where Nichols, the drawer of a draft, had dealt by mail with
the impostor, Warren, the court said: ". . . it appears that the money was paid to
the very person to whom Nichols actually intended it should be, the one through
whose agency the transaction was brouglht about. It is idle to say, as does plaintiff,
that Nichols never in fact dealt with Warren, the impostor; this contention only
goes to show that the deception was complete."
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has represented himself to be the agent of another, it is said that the
drawer did not intend payment to the impostor and therefore should
not be made to bear the risk of loss.1 2 The correspondence cases and
the agency cases clearly indicate that the element of physical presence
relied upon the Massachusetts court cannot be regarded as deter-
minative of the drawer's actual intent.
As further support for the dominant intention rule, the court
added that "A similar rule exists in the law of sales."' 3 It is true that
the sales rule, while recognizing a dual intention on the part of the
vendor, states that the vendor's intent to pass the property to the party
appearing physically before him is operative, even though delivery is
fraudulently induced.14 Nevertheless, the analogy to the sales rule is
not complete, because in the sales cases there is nothing about the goods
which are the subject of the transaction to give a warning to the vendee
that the impostor might not have good title. On the other hand the
word "order" on the face of a negotiable instrument should constitute
a warning to all takers that the signatures in the chain of title must be
valid before good title to the instrument passes.15 The adoption of the
-'One theory underlying the agency cases is set out in the dissenting opinion
of Judge Hotchkiss in Holub-Dusha Co. v. Germania Bank, 164 App. Div. 279, 149
N. Y. Supp. 775, 783 (i9l4):"I think it is quite impossible to say that the drawer~of
the check meant that it should be paid to Hodges [who purported to be an agent].
It seems to me that was the very opposite of the drawer's intention. The evidence is
uncontradicted that Hodges did not pretend to be Birchard [principal], but repre-
sented himself as having authority to act for Birchard as broker." Beutel, Brannan's
Negotiable Instruments Law (7th ed. 1948) 474 states that "The dissenting opinion
seems the sounder view. X's principal [Birchard] and not X [Hodges] was intended
to be the indorsee." Other agency cases hold that where the impostor merely assumes
to be the agent of the person named as the payee, and not the payee himself, the
drawer, by delivering the check to such a person, may be regarded as vouching for
him as the agent of the payee but he does not vouch for his right to indorse the
payee's name. Russell.v. First National Bank of Hartselle, 2 Ala. App. 342, 56 So. 868
(igi); Goodfellow v. First National Bank, 71 Wash. 554, L29 Pac. 90 (1913). Other
cases holding the one who takes a negotiable instrument from the impostor liable
where the impostor represents himself to be the agent of another in obtaining the
instrument: Bennett v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Cal. App- 45o , 19o Pac. 831 (192o); Dana
v. Old Colony Trust Co., 245 Mass. 347, 139 N. E. 541 (1923).
"Santa Maria v. Industrial City Band & Banking Co., 95 N. E. (2d) 176, 179
(Mass. 1950).
uIn Martin v. Green, 117 Me. 138, 1o2 Ad. 977, 978 (1918), where a horse dealer
sold a horse to an impostor, the court said: "All the elements of a sale were present
and the minds of the parties met. They agreed upon the article to be sold, and the
price and the terms of payment. Nor was there any doubt as to who was the vendor
and who was the vendee. Green [vendor] intended to sell to the identical man before
him, with whom he was dealing, whatever his name might be, and to take back a
mortgage from that man. That actual intent governs." Also Hickey v. McDonald
Bros., 151 Ala. 497, 44 So. 201 (0o7); Vold, Sales (1931) 375-
nMcDowell, Ambiguous Payees of Negotiable Paper (19'9) 2 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
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sales rule in the impostor cases destroys the protection that the word
"order" customerly gives the drawer, and seems in no way to aid in
the search for the actual intent of the drawer. In citing the sales law
analogy, the court apparently failed to notice also another point of
difference: that an impostor takes title to goods only when he is
physically dealing with the vendor, and not when the transaction is
carried on by correspondence; in the latter type of transaction, it is
usually held that the predominant or controlling intention of the ven-
dor is to deal with the person whom he independently supposes the
writer to be.'(
Any attempt to ascertain the actual intent of the drawer in the
impostor situation seems highly ineffectual. The drawer may have any
of many intents, such as (i) an intent to pay the person physically before
him, (2) an intent to pay the payee whose name appears on the face of
the instrument, or (3) an intent to deal with the person who possesses
the proper business status or relation to those goods which are the
subject matter necessary to complete the transaction. The last of these
suggested intents would be the most logical, inasmuch as the drawer
would not care whether the person before him bore the name he as-
sumed so long as he was in fact the owner of the goods for which the
check had been delivered. 17 It is probable that the dominant intention
of the drawer as found by most courts is not more than a legal fiction for
facilitating a quick disposal of the impostor-payee cases without the re-
quirement of a careful examination of the surrounding factual cir-
cumstances.
A suggestion has been advanced that the dominant intention
rule be replaced by a test of relative care of the two victims of the
impostor.' 8 If the basis of this relative care test is to be normal business
practice, then the test is worthy of consideration for, though difficult
in application, it has two distinct advantages: (i) it promotes better
44, 51: "The sales cases involving ordinary personal property bear no warning as to
the requisite of any endorsement, whereas the very word 'order' on negotiable paper
should be a warning to the purchaser that he cannot rely on possession alone, but
must be sure the order payee's authentic endorsement is on the instrument."
"'Newberry v. Norfolk & Southern Ry. Co., 133 N. C. 45, 45 S. E. 356, 358 (1903):
"It appears that there was in the neighborhood one person whose real name was
Arthur B. Alexander, and another whose real name was Alfred Alexander. Conceding
that Arthur ordered the goods in the name of A. Alexander, and the Fairbanks
Company shipped them supposing that they were ordered by Alfred Alexander, and
intending to sell and ship to him, and not to Arthur, no title passed to the latter."
In the correspondence type of transaction in sales, no property is held to pass from
the seller, for lack of a buyer assented to by the seller. Vold, Sales (1931) 375-
2'Abel, The Impostor Payee [1940 Wis. L. Rev. 161, 230.
IBNote (195o) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 94, 98.
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business practice by rewarding the party who has been more careful
in his business relations, and (2) it would be in conformity with past
decisions in impostor cases.19 Upon consideration of the factual cir-
cumstances of the American impostor cases, it may be concluded the
courts have generally held for the party exercising the greatest degree
of care.2 0 Since the courts have in actuality been giving great weight
to the element of care exercised by the victim of the impostor, it would
be better for them to make clear the importance of that factor rather
than to cloak their decisions in the confusion of an illusive dominant
intent.
Another solution to the problem has been provided in the leading
minority case of Tolman v. American National Bank,21 wherein Chief
Justice Stiness, one of the Commissioners who framed the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, expressed the opinion that Section 23 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law was applicable to the impostor situa-
tion.22 Under the view of the Tolman case, the indorsement of the
impostor is considered "a typical case of forgery" so that no title to
the instrument would pass under Section 23. There would then be no
need for courts to seek an illusive actual intent of the drawer, for the
loss would regularly be imposed on the second victim of the imposter.
Also a desirable uniformity would be achieved in the impostor deci-
sions, and the current illogical distinctions between the direct-impostor
and the agent-impostor cases and between the face-to-face impostor
cases and the correspondence-impostor cases would be eliminated.
"Abel, The Impostor Payee [1940] Wis. L. Rev. 362, 388: "It is not due care
nor reasonable care nor comparative care with which the cases have concerned them-
selves in distributing the loss arising from imposture in commercial paper cases,
but simple business care. It is that which will conditionally relieve the first victim
from the consequences of the impersonation under the rule of the Tolman case;
and its exercise by the second victim will effectually protect him from harm and cast
the loss back on his predecessor."
-OAbel, The Impostor Payee [194o] Wis. L. Rev. 161, 193, considers all the
American impostor cases through 1940 and states: "There remains the situation where
the first victim has exercised some care, the second none. Here the picture is
quite reversed. Not only is there no unanimity in the opinions; but more than that,
here decisions relieving the first victim of the loss and imposing it on the second pre-
ponderate."
-n22 R. I. 462, 48 AtI. 480 (190).
--"Tolman v. American Nat. Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48 Atl. 480, 482 (igoi) states
Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law as follows: "'Where a signature is
forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to
be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a dis-
charge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against a party thereto, can be
acquired through or under such signature, when the party against whom it is sought
to enforce such right is precluded from setting up forgery or want of authority'."
It further states that "The statute covers this case."
1952]
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This suggested remedy for removing conflicts in the present domi-
nant intention rule by uniformly placing the loss on the second victim
of the impostor may seem harsh to innocent parties who take from
the impostor. But it should be remembered that frequently in forgery
cases innocent parties are made to bear the loss resulting from the
forgery, where forgery is a real defense. Since the innocent second
victims of the impostor are often banks, they would be better able to
bear the loss through insurance protection,23 whereas the cost of in-
surance to an individual, usually the first victim of the impostor, would
be prohibitive.
The dominant intention rule is a majority rule and the Commer-
cial Code has adopted it in the new codification.2 4 But it is doubtful
whether justice is facilitated by the ready adoption of a rule that is
productive of the ambiguous reasoning of the principal case.
VIRGIL S. GORE, JR.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-RIGHT OF DRAWEE BANK TO CHARGE BACK
PAYEE'S ACCOUNT AFTER CHECK OF DRAWER Is DISHONORED FOR
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. [Colorado]
When a drawee bank honors a check drawn by one depositor in
favor of another, and subsequently discovers that the drawer's account
is insufficient to cover the check, the question arises as to whether the
bank or the payee must bear the burden of pursuing the drawer for a
settlement of his obligation. The payee argues that the bank, in accept-
ing a check, assumes the responsibility of the sufficiency of its deposi-
tor's account, and must seek its remedy in recovering the amount of
the overdraft from the drawer. The bank contends that its dealings
with the payee are conditional upon the drawer's deposits covering
the check, and that when this condition is not fulfilled, the payee has
no right to the sum paid out or credited to him for the check, and must
call upon the drawer for payment of his obligation by some other
.... . if the consideration be the relative ability to bear the loss it seems that the
burden should be put on the bank. The bank may then shift the burden by insur-
ance which the individual drawer would find impossibly expensive." Note (1930)
18 Calif. L. Rev. 693, 696.
2Uniform Commercial Code (1950) §3-4o 5 -1:"With respect to a holder in due
course or a person paying the instrument in good faith an indorsement is effective
when made in the name of the specified payee by any of the following persons, or
their agents or confederates: (a) an impostor who through the mails or otherwise
has induced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate
in the name of the payee .... "
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means. As the law has developed through successive decisions of many
courts, no simple answer to the question has evolved, although certain
principles are generally agreed upon.
The bank will prevail in its contention unless it has unconditionally
accepted the check, and there can be no such acceptance unless or
until the bank has taken some positive action towards the check or
the payee.' Thus, where a depositor laid a check drawn upon his own
bank on the counter and said, "Place this to my account," the bank
clerk not seeing the check until after the depositor left, and not taking
any action toward the check or the accounts of the parties, it was held
that the bank was not liable for the amount of the check since there
was no promise to pay it or to allow the payee credit for it.2 On the
other hand, it is said that the bank has an election when the check is
presented to accept, reject, or accept qualifiedly,3 and where it has
taken such an affimative action as charging the drawer's account and
cancelling the depositor's note, it may not subsequently charge back
the payee's account.4 In such case the bank is held to have accepted the
check unconditionally in payment of the note.5
The question is closer in the typical case in which the drawee bank
takes no affirmative action except to credit the payee's account in the
amount of the check, but such action alone is generally ruled to be an
acceptance which precludes the bank from charging back against
the payee's deposit when the drawer's account proves to be insufficient. 6
"National Gold Bank and Trust Company v. McDonald, 51 Cal. 64, 21 Am. Rep.
697 (1875); Oddie v. The National City Bank of New York, 45 N. Y. 735, 6 Am.
Rep. 16o (1871); Boyd v. Emmerson, 2 A. & E. 184, 111 Eng. Rep. 71 (1834).
'Boyd v. Emmerson, 2 A. 8, E. 184, 111 Eng. Rep. 71 (1834).
8See National Bank v. Burkhardt, 1oo U. S. 686, 689, 25 L. ed. 766, 768 (188o); City
National Bank of Selma v. Bums, 68 Ala. 267, 44 Am. Rep. 138, 142 (188o); Cohen
v. First National Bank of Nogales, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122, 124, 15 A. L. R. 701, 705
(1921); First Nat. Bank at Paris v. McKeen, 197 Ark. io6o, 127 S. W. (2d) 142, 143
0939); National Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Ohio Oil Co., 250 Ky. 288, 62 S. W.
(2d) 1048, 1050 (1933); 7 Am. Jur., Banks §457.
'Pratt v. Foote, 9 N. Y. 463 (1854).
';Security Nat. Bank v. Old Nat. Bank, 241 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Pratt v.
Foote, 9 N. Y. 463 (1854).
0National Bank v. Burkhardt, io U. S. 686, 25 L. ed. 766 (188o); Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third Nat. Bank in Nashville, 173 F. (2d) 192 (C. A. 6th,
1949); City National Bank of Selma v. Bums, 68 Ala. 267, 44 Am. Rep. 138 (1880);
Cohen v. First National Bank of Nogales, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122, 15 A. L. R.
701 (1921); First Nat. Bank at Paris v. McKeen, 197 Ark. 1060, 127 S. W. (2d) 142
(1939); American Exchange National Bank v. Gregg, 138 Ill. 596, 28 N. E. 839, 32
Am. St. Rep. 171 (1891); National Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Ohio Oil Co.,
250 Ky. 288, 62 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1933); Bryan v. First Nat. Bank of McKees
Rocks, 2o5 Pa. 7, 54 Ad. 480 (19o3). See Citizens' Bank of Norfolk v. Schwarzschild
& Sulzberger Co., 109 Va. 539, 543, 64 S. E. 954, 955, 23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1o92, 1095
(19o9); 9 C. J. S., Banks and Banking §284.
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This rule is subject to the qualification that the chargeback will be
allowed if the depositor of the check is regarded as not having acted in
"good faith," as where he presented the check for deposit knowing that
the drawer had not sufficient funds on deposit to satisfy itJ
In normal banking transactions there is very little said to ex-
press the meaning and intent of the actions of each party, though the
true nature of the agreement between the parties must be interpreted
by the court from these routine actions.8 The usual holding against
the bank is generally supported on the grounds that the giving of credit
is the legal equivalent of giving the depositor cash for the check and
receiving it back again as a deposit. 9 However, since it must be admitted
that even the giving of cash could conceivably be done with the intent
to make only a qualified acceptance,10 this reason does not appear
to be wholly conclusive of the parties' true intent. Among the argu-
ments advanced in support of the majority rule" is that public policy
'Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Third Nat. Bank in Nashville, 173 F. (2d)
192 (C. A. 6th, 1949); City National Bank of Selma v. Burns, 68 Ala. 267, 44 Am.
Rep. 138 (188o); National Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Ohio Oil Co., 250 Ky.,
288, 62 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1933); Peterson v. Union National Bank, 52 Pa. 2o6, 91
Am. Dec. 146 (1886); 9 C. J. S., Banks and Banking §284.
'National Bank v. Burkhardt, ioo U. S. 686, 25 L. ed. 766 (i88o); Pollack v.
National Bank of Commerce In St. Louis, 168 Mo. App. 368, 151 S. W. 774 (1912). See
Arkansas Trust and Banking Company v. Bishop, 119 Ark. 373, 178 S. W. 422, 423
(1915); Oddie v. The National City Bank of New York, 45 N. Y. 735, 6 Am. Rep.
16o, 162 (1871).
'See Federal Savings & Loan Corp. v. Third Nat. Bank in Nashville, 173 F. (2d)
192, 199 (C. A. 6th, 1949); City National Bank of Selma v. Burns, 68 Ala. 267, 44
Am. Rep. 138, 141 (i88o); Pollack v. National Bank of Commerce In St. Louis, 168
Mo. App. 368, 151 S. W. 774, 775 (1912); Oddie v. The National City Bank of New
York, 45 N. Y. 735, 6 Am. Rep. 16o, 163 (1871); Bryan v. First National Bank of
McKees Rocks, 205 Pa. 7, 54 At. 480, 482 (1903); Union State Bank of Lancaster v.
People's State Bank of Lancaster, 192 Wis. 28, 211 N. W. 932, 933 (1927).
"OSee First National Bank of Owenton v. Sidebottom, 147 Ky. 69o, 145 S. W. 404,
405 (1912)-
""While the reasoning of the courts ... is not altogether satisfactory, the con-
clusion reached by them is sustained by the great current of authority." Citizens'
Bank of Norfolk v. Schwarzchild & Sulzberger Co., iog Va. 539, 545, 64 S. E. 945,
956, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092, io96 (igog). The reasons given for the rule include:
(i)The Bank is responsible for knowing the status of the drawer's account and
therefore as between the bank and payee, the bank must bear the loss. See Manufac-
turers' Nat. Bank v. Swift, 70 Md. 515, 17 AtI. 336 (1889). (2) Once the bank has
given credit to the payee and the payee has relied thereon, the bank is estopped
to deny that it has unconditionally accepted the check. See Oddie v. National City
Bank of New York, 45 N. Y. 735, 742, 6 Am. Rep. 16o, 164 (1871). (3) Public policy
demands that the transaction should be regarded as completed when credit is
given. See Spokane & Eastern Trust, Co. v. Huff, 63 Wash. 225, 115 Pac. 8o, 82 (1911).
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demands certainty in commercial transactions, and that there must
be some point at which the depositor can regard the transaction as
complete; therefore, when the bank gives credit to the depositor the
issue should be settled. 2 Strong as this argument may be, there exists
a contrasting policy adopted in a minority of jurisdictions that a bank
should be given a reasonable time in which to examine the status of
a drawer's account, and that in order to prevent unnecessary delays dur-
ing banking hours, this examination should be allowed after hours
during the same or following business day.13
Even in jurisdictions where the view adverse to the bank is firmly
entrenched in the law, some courts, apparently perceiving that its effect
is to work a hardship on banks, seek to avoid the result by relaxing the
established tests of whether there has been an unqualified acceptance.'
4
""But, while the courts are uniform in holding that a bank cannot recover
under the circumstances cited, they are not agreed upon the principle upon which
the rule prohibiting a recovery rests. Some of them, it will be observed, put it on
the grounds of want of privity between the holder of the check and the bank; others
upon the ground that the payment is not a payment by mistake within the mean-
ing of the rule that permits a recovery; others again on the ground that to permit the
bank to repudiate the payment would destroy the certainty that must pertain to
commercial transactions of this sort if they are to remain useful to the business
public. To our minds the latter reason is the most satisfactory. If, for example, a
merchant conducting a retail business must hold the money he receives from the
bank in payment of checks and drafts, taken in by him from his customers in pay-
ment for the purchase of goods, until such reasonable time as the bank has to de-
termine whether or not it will call upon him for a return of the money, it is manifest
that he must discard the use of checks and drafts in the conduct of his business and
require his customers to bring him cash. The uncertainty, delay, and annoyance
such rule would cause him would forbid their use in his business." Spokane &
Eastern Trust Co. v. Huff, 63 Wash. 225, 115 Pac. 80, 82 (1911).
13Ocean Park Bank v. Rodgers, 6 Cal. App. 678, 92 Pac. 879 (19o7); National
Gold Bank and Trust Co. v. McDonald, 51 Cal. 64, 21 Am. Rep. 697 (1875). The
California Rule has been codified in Deering's General Laws, Act 652, §s6c. Hansen
v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass'n, 1o Cal. App. (2d) 300, 225 P.
(ad) 665 (1950). See W. A. White Brokerage Co. v. Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239, 290 N.
W. 790, 794 (1940); Stankey v. Citizen's Nat. Bank of Laurel, 64 Mont. 309, 209 Pac.
1054 (1922). And see Justice Holt's dissent in First Nat. Bank at Paris v. McKeen,
197 Ark. 1o6o, 127 S. W. (ad) 142, 145 (1939): "The effect of this decision is that
when customers, such as large department stores in the larger cities of this state, that
accept literally hundreds of checks daily, go to make their deposits, the bank teller,
before crediting the grand total of these checks on the passbook of this depositor,
must leave his cage, go back to the bookkeeper and ascertain whether each one of
these hundreds of checks is good. This might conceivably take hours while the
line of customers waited. Such a rule would, in my opinion, paralyze banking and
is not the law of this state."
"First National Bank at Paris v. Ihle, 202 Ark. 46, 149 S. W. (2d) 548 (1941);
Walnut Hill Bank v. National Reserve Bank, 141 App. Div. 475, 126 N. Y. Supp.
430 (1910).
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Thus, there has developed what is in effect a disguised retreat from the
majority doctrine, and while it may still be said that "giving credit" or
"receiving as a deposit" constitutes an unqualified acceptance, it is im-
possible to determine in many instances what amounts to "giving
credit" or "receiving as a deposit." For example, one court held that a
notice mailed to the payee that credit had been given completed the
transaction, precluding the bank from making a charge back,15 while
another court held a similar notice to be a mere erroneous statement
not amounting to the giving of credit, and allowed the bank to pre-
vail.16
Despite this confusion there appear to be two ways in which the
parties can make sure of the manner in which the courts will interpret
their acts. One method is to express in a deposit contract the bank's
right to charge back the depositor's account upon discovery of in-
sufficient funds subsequent to crediting the depositor's account. This
procedure dearly makes the giving of credit a qualified acceptance,
since the intent is expressed by the contract rather than left to be
inferred from routine actions.17 The other method is to have the bank
",Cohen v. First National Bank of Nogales, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122, 126, 15
A. L. R. 701, 708 (1921). This court construed the dilemma as one in which the de-
mands of justice were in open conflict with the demands of our economy, and
avoided the confusion by reluctantly deciding in favor of the economic demand
and refusing to allow a charge back. "We have reached the conclusions stated in
this decision with a great deal of reluctance. It seems to be one of those cases where
a party has the right to stand upon his legal rights no matter how selfish and harsh
such conduct may appear to be. While we may not condemn the conduct of the
plaintiff, we are not compelled to approve it. The case is decided as it is because we
think it would be an extremely pernicious thing to throw doubt upon the scope
of the doctrine covering negotiable paper. These doctrines are of immense value
to every form of industry. To seek too readily for exceptions from the well settled
rule of this branch of law in pursuit of a supposed equity would tend to impair the
value of the principles of commercial law which depend largely upon their certainty."
"0Walnut Hill Bank v. National Reserve Bank, 141 App. Div. 475, 126 N. Y. Supp.
430 (1910).
"'Hardee v. George H. Price Co., 89 F. (2d) 497 (App. D. C. 1937); Adams County
v. Meadows Valley Bank, 27 Idaho 646, 277 Pac. 575 (1929); Canal Bank and Trust Co.
v. Denny, 172 La. 840, 135 So. 376 (1931); E. S. Macomber & Co. v. Commercial Bank,
166 S. C. 236, 164 S E. 596 (1932); Lebanon Bank and Trust Co. v. Grandstaff, 24
Tenn. App. 162, 141 S. W. (2d) 924 (1940). A like result has been obtained where
a prevailing banking custom of giving only conditional credit was proved. Pollack
v. National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis, 168 Mo. App. 368, 151 S. W. 774 (1912).
But see First National Bank at Paris v. Ihle, 202 Ark. 46, 149 S. W. (2d) 548 (1941),
where it was held a custom had been established, and First National Bank at Paris
v. McKeen, 197 Ark. io6o, 127 S. W. (2d) 142 (1939), where, in a controversy arising




pay the depositor in cash, which action seems always to have been re-
garded as an unqualified acceptance of the check by the bank.'8
A situation involving a conflict between these two extremes was
recently presented in the Supreme Court of Colorado, in Citizens State
Bank of Cortez v. Pritchett.9 Defendant bank took from plaintiffunder
a deposit contract which provided that all deposits for credit were con-
ditional upon final payment, a check drawn on itself, giving in return
half cash and half credit. The account of the drawer being insufficient,
the bank charged back plaintiff's account with the entire amount
of the check. In suit for that amount, plaintiff's judgment at the
trial was reversed on appeal, the Supreme Court stating that in the
absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the entire transaction
was a qualified acceptance, subject to the terms of the deposit contract.
20
Two judges, in dissent, argued that the unusual half cash (indicating
unqualified acceptance), half credit (indicating qualified acceptance
under the contract) situation raised a question of fact as to what the
parties actually intended, for determination at the trial level.
2'
At some points in the majority opinion, reliance appears to be
placed solely upon the terms of the depositor's contract as making the
receiving of all checks, for cash or credit, qualified acceptances. 22 How-
ever, in summarizing the basis for the decision, the opinion in its
1 See Bryan v. First National Bank of McKees Rocks, 205 Pa. 7, 54 At. 480, 482
(19o3). " .. . it cannot be pretended that, if an actual cash payment had been
made to Bryan by the bank, there could be a recovery from him, if unwilling to
pay it." Citizens' Bank of Norfolk v. Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 1o9 Va. 539,
544, 64 S. E. 954, 956, 23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1092, 1o96 (19o9); Ocean Park Bank v.
Rodgers, 6 Cal. App. 678, 92 Pac. 879, 880 (19o7). Britton, Bills and Notes (1945) 638.
"231 P. (2d) 462 (Colo. 1951).
21 Citizens State Bank of Cortez v. Pritchett, 231 P. (2d) 462 at 465 (Colo. 1951).
The applicable language of the deposit contract was: The bank "may charge back
any item at any time before final payment, whether returned or not, also any
item drawn on this bank not good at close of business on day deposited." 231 P. (2d)
462, 464 (Colo. 1951).
The check was 65 days old and there was slight evidence that the plaintiff
did not present the check in good faith. It is possible that the court was influenced
by the suspicion of bad faith, for although it stated at page 463 that "There is no
suggestion of fraud in the acts of the plaintiff in the receiving, holding and present-
ment of the check," it later declared at page 465 that "when plaintiff failed to use
reasonable promptness, he should not, in fairness and equity, be allowed to recover
from the bank for a loss which it did not occasion." However, bad faith is clearly
not the basis of the decision.
"Citizens State Bank of Cortez v. Pritchett, 231 P. (2d) 462, 465 (Colo. 1951).
-"Under the contract here prevailing, checks were received subject to credit at
close of the business day. We find no indication that there was an intention on the
part of the bank to handle the check in question in any other manner." Citizens
State Bank of Cortez v. Pritchett, 231 P. (2d) 462, 464 (Colo. 1951).
19521
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final paragraph asserts: "In the absence of any clear and unmistakable
intention to do otherwise, in equity and good conscience, we must,
and do, hold and determine that this was a deposit without absolute
acceptance of the check by the bank, and is to be governed by the
existing agreement relative to deposits." 23 Since this statement without
the last twelve words would have led to the same decision as was reached
in the case, it is logical to conclude that even without the deposit con-
tract, the acceptance would have been ruled conditional unless there
had been an express agreement that it be unconditional. Thus the
court strongly implies that all such half-cash, half-credit transactions
should be treated as conditional acceptances, absent agreement to
the contrary.
The court clearly has indicated its support of the minority view
regarding deposits of checks for credit in the full amount,24 although
this revelation was not essential to the decision of the issues here in-
volved. Further, the court has extended the minority view to include
not only deposits for credit in the full amount, but transactions involv-
ing receipt by the bank of items for partial credit and partial cash
payment. These transactions it also designates "deposits," thus bring-
ing the entire transaction under the terms of the deposit contract and
allowing chargebacks in the full amount.
Such an extension of the scope of the term "deposit" seems unwar-
ranted since it requires overlooking the cash portion of the transaction.
It seems clear that the transaction was not in its entirety a deposit, but
was only a deposit of that amount for which credit rather than cash was
received. This being the case, the chargeback should only have been
allowed for the credit amount.
WILLIAM H. HOGELAND, JR.
PROCEDURE-CONSTRUCTION OF NEW APPELLATE RULES OF VIRGINIA TO
REQUIRE STRICT COMPLIANCE. [Virginia]
The new appellate rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia have now been in effect for nearly two years, and while only
eight cases have reached the Supreme Court of Appeals on matters
calling for interpretation of the rules, preliminary indications are
=Citizens State Bank of Cortez v. Pritchett, 231 P. (2d) 462, 464 (Colo. 1951)
[italics supplied].
2 'The court expresses the policy behind the minority view in these words: "To
hold otherwise would be to leave the business of commercial banking in a state of




already giving promise that the intended procedural reform will
be successful in curing some of the defects of the old rules. When the
rules were promulgated it was intended that they should bring about
a simplification in making up the record and presenting it to the
Court of Appeals, that issues involved in the appeal should be clari-
fied, and that the expense of the appeal should be reduced.1 It would
appear that if these objectives are attained, an important incidental
benefit will also be conferred in that the Court of Appeals will be
saved a considerable amount of time and labor by being relieved of
the burden of reading through a mass of irrelevant testimony, plead-
ings and motions.2 With a simplified record, the court will be able to
give greater attention to the true issues of the appeal from a standpoint
of substantive law.
Even though these objectives have been advocated for many years3
they were unobtainable under the old procedure because of the dif-
ficulty in limiting the record to material supporting the specific issues
involved in the appeal. The source of the difficulty lay in the fact
that no deletion of the record could be made safely without the consent
of both parties litigant,4 and the instances in which the appellee
would give consent were rare.5 Two major reasons have been asisgned
to explain the appellee's unwillingness to give his consent to any
such abbreviation. First, he did not want to lighten the burden of
the appellant in prosecuting an appeal. It was only natural that the
appellee should want to frustrate any appeal which might upset the
judgment that had been rendered in his favor. This refusal to agree
to an abbreviation of the record was a very effective method of har-
assing the efforts of the appellant, for by that means the appellee could
cause the appellant added expense and labor, thus making the appeal
process difficult and unattractive. Second, the appellee usually refused
'Skeens v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 2oo, 64 S. E. (2d) 764 (1951). Also see The
Judicial Council for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and Procedure
(1949) S6.
2The Judicial Council for Virginia fails to mention this incidental benefit in
its report on the proposed modifications of Virginia procedure. The Judicial Coun-
cil for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and Procedure (1949) 37.
'These objectives have been desired since 1887. The judicial Council for Vir-
ginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and Procedure (1949) 36.
42 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §8-470.
rSee The Judicial Council for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and
Procedure (1949) 36.
GThe Judicial Council for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and
Procedure (1949) 36.
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to agree to any shortening of the record, because he did not want to
prepare a legal defense that would not be needed if the appeal was
denied. Before any intelligent deletion could be made from the record,
appellee would have to know what defenses he was going to make to
the appeal and what parts of the record he would need to rely on to
support his defense in the event that the appeal was allowed.
7
Without the consent of the appellee, the appellant could not, with
any degree of assurance, omit any parts of the record.8 If the appellant
did not bring up all the evidence, it could be argued by the appellee
that the omitted part supported him; and if the appellant failed to
bring up instructions, it would be contended that they were against
him. Further, it was possible for the appellee to insist that any omitted
parts of the record cured the error alleged on appeal.9 Therefore,
even if the appellant may have desired to shorten the record, as a matter
of prudence it became necessary for him to use the complete record.
In order to remedy this situation it was necessary to formulate rules that
did not require the consent of the appellee and did not permit omitted
parts of the record to be used as the basis for arguments against the
appellant. The new appellate rules were meant to effect such change.
The interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Appeals to Rule
5:110 of the new rules demonstrates how their purposes have been
achieved in actual practice. From the language of Vick v. Siegel" it
appeared that the court was going to deviate from the true policy of
the rules, for there, in ruling that the appellant's attempt to bring an
appeal was adequate, the court stated: "There has been, we think, a
substantial compliance with the rule."'12 The intimation was thus raised
that the standard governing appellant's conformity would be one of
merely substantial compliance. However, it appears that this language
is limited to the facts of that case, since the later case of Avery v. County
'The record must accompany the petition for appeal, but at the time of the
petitioning it is not known whether the court will allow the appeal or not.
"See The Judicial Council for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and
Procedure (1949) 41.
'See Bowen v. Bowen, 122 Va. 122 Va. _, 94 S. E. 166 (1917), where, under the old
rules, a question was raised over omitted parts of the record. Also The Judicial
Council for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and Procedure (1949) 36, 37.
"°Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Rule 5: 1. This rule deals
with the form and contents of the record, and sets the time limits for the various
acts that are to be performed before an appeal can be perfected.
"191 Va. 731, 62 S. E. (2d) 899 (1951). The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal
on the grounds that the appellant had not designated for printing as required by
Rule 5:1 §6 (d) and had failed to print any assignment of error.
'"Vick v. Siegel, 191 Va. 731, 737, 62 S. E. (2d) 899, 9o (1951).
[Vol. 1X
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School Board's held that nothing less than strict compliance with Rule
5:1 will be acceptable.
14
Though it would seem that the language of the two decisions is in
conflict, the cases are distinguishable. The Vick case 15 arose under
Section 6 (d) of Rule 5:1, whereas the Avery case 16 arose under Section
6(a) of Rule 5:1. Section 6 (a) provides that: "Not less than twenty
days before the record is transmitted, counsel for appellant shall file
with the clerk a designation of the parts of the record that he wishes
printed."
This section proposes that the appellant shall, after deciding what
parts of the record he desires to use in support of the appeal, designate
such parts so that they may be printed and those parts not so designated
may be omitted. The choosing of the part of the record to be printed
is an act that can be done only by the appellant's counsel, and if he
fails to make this designation no one can do it for him. Therefore,
ruled the Avery case, if the appellant fails to designate within the
allotted time period, his case must fail. Thus, a strict construction of
the rule was made. However, the court thought that the act (designa-
tion of the assignment of error to be printed) omitted in the Vick
case was one required to be performed by the clerk of the trial court.
17
This act was purely ministerial in nature and demanded no exercise of
discretion as to what should be included. In order not to defeat a right
because of the failure of a public official to perform a ministerial act,'8
the court placed a liberal construction on the rules to hold that in
this particular situation substantial compliance would be satisfactory.
231 9 2 Va. 329, 64 S. E. (2d) 767 (1951). This case arose on a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that appellant had failed to designate parts of the record to be
printed within the time required by Rule 5:1. The appellant admitted that he had
been late in making the designation, but contended that, notwithstanding this, the
rules were merely directory and not mandatory.
"Hall v. Hall, 66 S. E. (2d) 595 (Va. 1951) further substantiates this view. In
this case the appellant admitted that he failed to comply with Rule 5:1, §4 but he
contended that he had substantially complied with the rule by giving notice of
intention to apply for a transcript of the record (the procedure followed under..the
old rules). The court disallowed this contention.
5192 Va. 731, 62 S. E. (2d) 899 (1951).
10192 Va. 329, 64 S. E. (2d) 767 (1951).
qIt is true that appellant designates the material required by Section 6 (d) along
with other parts of the record that are covered by section 6 (a), but this is only
for convenience so that the clerk can hand the form guide which contains a desig-
nation of all parts of the record that are to be printed over to the printer, without
having the burden of checking it.
""He [the appellant] should not be denied a review simply because of an error
by a ministerial officer of the court." Leigh v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 583, 66 S. E.
(2°d) 586 (1950-
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The court, in finding the language of Section 6 (a) was mandatory,
acknowledged the fact this was a very technical ruling but justified it
on the basis that an orderly administration of justice requires that
procedural rules be strictly complied with, especially in the case of
time limits. It was only proper that such a stand be taken in the Avery
case because to hold otherwise, first, would raise the highly speculative
problem of just how far the appellant could stray from the specifically
stated provisions of the rules, and second, would, if there be no time
limit, leave the appellee in the uncomfortable position of never know-
ing when a final determination had been reached in the case.19
After placing the foregoing construction on the rules, the court
continued to elaborate on this technical ruling by outlining the pro-
cedural steps under the new rules, with particular attention devoted
to those dealing with time limits. The appellant has four months
20
in which to perfect his appeal, but in the first sixty days he must do
three things: file notice of appeal,21 present transcribed oral evidence
to the trial judge to be signed by him, 22 and file assignments of error.
23
The reason for requiring the assignments of error to be filed before
more than half of the time for perfecting the appeal has elapsed is that
until such assignment of error is made, the issues are not defined and the
appellee does not know how to defend. The court did not ascribe any
reason for requiring that presentation of the transcribed testimony
and notice of appeal should be made within the same period as that
provided for the making of the assignment of error, but it would
seem that the close relationship the three factors bear to defining the
issues and notifying the appellee of them would be reason enough.
After receiving the notice of appeal and assignment of error, it
is the duty of the clerk to make up the record.2 4 But if the appellant
"See Skeens v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 200, 64 S. E. (2d) 764 (1951) for further
support of the point of view that there should be a definite time limit.
-ORules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Rule 5:4 by incorporation
2 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §8-463 allows four months to perfect the appeal. In
no case will this time be extended. Cousins v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 506, 47 S. E.
(2d) 391 (1948); Johnson v. Merritt, 125 Va. 162, 99 S. E. 985 (1919).
aRules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Rule 5:1, §4.
-Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Rule 5: 1, §3 (f). After the
sixty day period has elapsed, the judge still has another ten days to sign the trans-
script.
ORules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgina, Rule 5:1, §4-
Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Rule 5:1, §5. No time limit
is fixed as to when the clerk must make up the record after receiving assignment
of error and notice of appeal. The only thing said in that respect is that the clerk
shall make up the record "promptly" after receiving such notice. The court in
the Avery case refused to place a construction upon the word "promptly."
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has failed to file his notice of appeal and assignment of error within
the sixty day limit, the clerk has no authority to make up the record,
because such acts are of a jurisdictional nature, and as such constitute
a condition precedent to the clerk's authority to proceed. A failure
of the appellant to present the transcribed testimony within sixty
days does not preclude the exercise of the clerk's power to make up the
record, but the practical effect of such a failure could be that the
appeal would be defeated because where such transcribed testimony
is not presented to the judge within sixty days, the judge has no
authority to sign the transcription and so it cannot become part of
the record. Consequently, the appellant would have nothing in the
record to support any assignment of error that is based on the oral
testimony-for example, the admission of some objectional evidence.
Between the time of the preparation of the record and the expira-
tion of the four month period given to perfect the appeal, the appel-
lant must designate the parts of the record to be printed,25 and only
such parts that are germane to the appeal should be so designated.
The court regards this as a very important consideration, in that such
a clause encourages the reduction of the size of the record,26 thus ac-
complishing one of the basic reforms intended by the new rules. A
failure to make such designation within the given time limit will be
fatal to the appeal since this action has been made a condition precedent
to the clerk's power to transmit the record to the Supreme Court of
Appeals.
Notwithstanding the fact that Section 8-463 of the Virginia Code
as incorporated into Rule 5:4 allows four months for the perfecting
of the appeal, Rule 5:1, Section 6 (a) and Section 7 provide that after
appellant makes his designation of the parts of the record to be printed
there must be a twenty day waiting period to give the appellee, as a
matter of right, an opportunity to examine the record and designate
any additional parts that he may wished printed.2 7 In order that the ap-
pellee may be accorded this right and the appead still perfected within
four months, the time actually available to appellant for preparing
his appeal is twenty days less than four months.28
=Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Rule 5:1, §6 (a).
26The rules also place much favor on this consideration by imposing a penalty
for designating parts not germane to the record: Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia, Rules 5:1 §6 (e).
"Since this provision is for the benefit of the appellee, it would appear that it
may be waived by him. Query: Do the new rules force appellee to define his defenses
before the appeal is actually granted?
"Any designation of what is to be printed must be made in the trial court.
Avery v. County School Board, 192 Va. 329, 64 S. E. (2d) 767 (1951).
1952]
144 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX
The Avery case carried the new rules a long way toward the achieve-
ment of procedual reform. But the decision in Babbit v. Miller 9 made
it appear that the attempt to reduce costs and wastefulness might not
be entirely successful. In that case the court was not willing to say that
where the appellee had a transcript made of oral testimony, he was
under a duty to grant access to it to the appellant. 0 The waste en-
tailed by such a holding is obvious. Under this ruling, if either party
in the trial court has any intention of appealing in the event that he
loses, he must hire a court reporter to transcribe the testimony, and
this could in many cases mean that there would be two court reporters
doing the job that one might just as easily accomplish. However, the
question was mooted by an amendment to the new rules31 which pro-
vides that where one party has had oral testimony transcribed he must
provide access to it to the other party.
There has not yet been sufficient case material to afford an oppor-
tunity for a comprehensive examination of the operation of the rules,
and undoubtedly many weak places in their structure must go unde-
tected until tested in the heat of litigation. Nevertheless, the future
policy for interpreting the problems that may arise appears to be well
established by the few cases that have been decided on the subject.
From the strict application that the court has made of Rule 5: 1, it
would seem safe to predict that the same technique will be adopted
when the other rules come under scrutiny. The one exception to this
strict approach thus far indicated would seem to arise where a court
officer fails to perform a ministerial duty.
32
JACKSON L. KISER*
"192 Va. 372, 64 S. E. (2d) 718 (1951).
'*It was so held even though the court in Matthews v. W. T. Freeman Co., Inc.,
191 Va. 385, 6o S. E. (2d) 909 (195o) had determined that it is a duty of the litigants
not to increase the cost of appeal.
. "Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Rule i:io as adopted June
21, 1951.
"In Vick v. Siegel, 191 Va. 731, 62 S. E. (2d) 899 (1951), appellant was the cause
of the failure. However, in Leigh v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 583, 66 S. E. (2d) 586
(ig~i), the fault was solely that of the clerk because appellant had in fact filed
irotice of appeal and assignment of error within the sixty day period, but the
clerk had negligently failed to note it until after the sixty days had elapsed.
*Acknowledgement is made of the contribution of Emory Widener, Law Class of
1952, now on active duty with the United States Navy, in the research for this
comment.
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PROPERTY-CREATION OF TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES BY CONVEYANCE TO
HUSBAND AND WIFE AND THIRD PARTY. [Pennsylvania]
The type of concurrent ownership of real property which reflected
the common law concept of the unity of person of a husband and wife
was the estate by the entirety.' Any conveyance which to other grantees
would have created a joint tenancy was held to create an estate by
entireties where the grantees were husband and wife.2 This was so
even though the grantor expressly indicated a different intent, since
husband and wife, being one person in law, could not take the estate
by moieties.3 Thus, in the concept of entireties, a fifth unity, that of
person, was added to the four requisites of a joint tenacy-unity of
time, title, interest, and possession.
4
The Married Women's Acts, passed in varying form in all of the
states, have done away with the common law unity of person. The wife
is acknowledged to be a separate legal person, and as such is given the
right to sue, execute contracts, hold property, and carry on business.5
In England and some of the American states, courts construe these
Acts as having abolished estates by the entireties.6 In other states
tenancies by the entirety have been expressly abolished by statute.7
However, in a majority of jurisdictions the existence of this type of
interest in reality is still recognized, and a conveyance to two grantees
who are husband and wife creates an estate by the entirety, unless an
intent to the contrary is indicated.8
'Burby, Real Property (1943) §204. See Note (1896) 3o L. R. A. 3o6: "An estate
by entireties is an estate held by husband and wife together so long as both live,
and, after the death of either, by the survivor so long as the estate lasts."
-See Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728, 733 (186o).
". .. if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither
properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife being con-
sidered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are
seized of the entirety, per tout et non per my: the consequence of which is, that
neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the assent of
the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor." 2 Blackstone, Commentaries
on The Laws of England (i8o7) 181. "Being but one person, they cannot be joint
tenants or tenants in common as these tenancies require more than one tenant."
30 C. J. 556
"13 R. C. L. 1O98.
Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) 110-121.
6Swan v. Swan, 156 Cal. 195, io3 Pac. 931 (igog); Semper v. Coates, 93 Minn.
76, 1o N. W. 662 (19o4); Kerner v. McDonald, 6o Neb. 663, 84 N. W. 92 (1900).
Also see 13 R. C. L. 11O1.
Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) 124.
'Commissioner of International Revenue v. Hart, 76 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 6th,
1935); Dixon v. Becker, 134 Fla. 547, 184 So. 144 (1938); Young v. Cockman, 182 Md.
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The problem of whether such an estate is created when a convey-
ance is made to three persons, two of whom are husband and wife, was
raised before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the first time in
the recent case of Heatter v. Lucas.0 The granting clause of the deed
read "to Francis Lucas, a single man, and Joseph Lucas and Matilda
Lucas, his wife,"'10 but the proportionate share the grantor intended
each to take was not expressly mentioned in the conveyance. Action for
a declaratory judgment was brought by creditors of Joseph Lucas,
now deceased, to determine his interest in the property for attachment
purposes. In Pennyslvania, the general common law rule is followed
that creditors of a tenant by the entireties cannot levy on their debtor's
interest in the estate, because in legal contemplation he owns nothing
independently of the other tenant, and the interests of the latter are
disturbed if any part of the property is taken to satisfy the debts of
one tenant." Furthermore, survivorship being one of the distinctive
characteristics of an estate by the entireties, the death of one spouse
vests the entire estate in the surviving spouse.' 2 However, if the estate
is held by a tenancy in common, the debtor's interest can be subjected to
the payment of his debts,' 3 and this is true whether the action is
commenced before or after the debtor's death.
14
The court cited the rule in Pennsylvania to be that where a con-
veyance of land is made to three grantees, two of whom are husband
246, 34 A. (2d) 428 (1943); Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 199 N. E. 383 (1935); Baker
v. Lamar, 140 S. W. (2d) 31 (Mo. 1940); Kennedy v. Rutter, 110 Vt. 332, 6 A. (2d)
17 (1940). Also see Burby, Real Property (1943) §204.
0367 Pa. 296, So A. (2d) 749 (1951).
"Heatter v. Lucas, 367 Pa. 296, So A. (2d) 749, 750 (1951).
"In re Meyer's Estate, 232 Pa. 89, 81 At. 145 (1911); McCurdy and Stevenson v.
Canning, 64 Pa. 39 (1870). In any jurisdiction where the separate legal entity theory
is followed the creditors of either spouse cannot subject the land belonging to both
by the entireties to the payment of the debts. Such an estate can only be reached to
satisfy debts that are owed jointly by husband and wife. However, in states following
the statutory modified "unity of persons" theory, the property interest of one spouse
may be reached to satisfy individual debts, so long as they do not prejudice the
survivorship rights of the other spouse. See Burby, Real Property (1943) §207.
'-"Each is seized of the whole, and each owns the whole. If one dies, the estate
continues in the survivor, the same as if one of several corporators dies. It does not
descend upon the death of either, but the longest liver, being already seized of the
entire estate, is the owner of it." Town of Corinth v. Emory, 63 Vt. 505, 22 Ad.
618 (i8gi). This right of survivorship is all the more important when it is remem-
bered that a tenancy by the entirety cannot be terminated without the consent of
both husband and wife. See 30 C. J. 567.
"349 C. J. S. 914.
"Upon the death of one tenant his undivided interest will pass to his heirs or
devisees, since there is no right of survivorship connected with a tenancy in common,
Burby, Real Property (1943) §21o.
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and wife, but not designated as such, each grantee will take one-third
as tenant in common with the other two, unless a contrary intention
is expressed. The court was of the opinion that the intention of the
grantor should be the controlling factor, and in regard to the grant
involved in the instant case, it thought that mention of the marital sta-
tus of each grantee, the use of the conjunction, "and," between the name
of the son and the names of the husband and wife, and the fact that the
first grantee was the son of the other two, was sufficient evidence to
show that the grantor intended the husband and wife together to take
only an undivided one-half interest as tenants by entirety.
As was pointed out in the opinion of the principal case, there were
at least three possible interpretations of the granting clause of the
deed in question: first, each grantee may have taken an undivided one-
third interest as a tenant in common; second, the son may have taken
an undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common with his mother
and father, who hold the other one-half interest as tenants by the
entireties; or third, the son may have taken an undivided one-third
interest as tenant in common with the other two grantees who hold
the remaining two-thirds interest as tenants by the entireties. Clearly
the second construction would be the proper one under the strict
common law rule, and the majority of the courts reach that result,
absent a contrary expressed intention of the grantor.15 Thus, in the
New York case of Bartholomew v. Marshall,I G it was held that a
conveyance to husband and wife and a third person which failed to
mention the marital relationship and said nothing as to the nature of
the estate conveyed, entitled the husband and wife to one moiety as
tenants by the entirety, and the third grantee held the other moiety as
a tenant in common with them. However, the Pennsylvania court was
unwilling to follow the strict common law principle, which has been
termed an "ancient absurdity"' 7 and has been severely criticized in the
light of the Married Women's Acts;' s and this court would not even
'2Dennis v. Dennis, 152 Ark. 187, 238 S. W. 15 (1922); West Chicago Park Com-
missioners v. Coleman, 1o8 Ill. 591 (1884); Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670, 27 Am.
Rep. 3o02 (1877); Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 1o N. J. L. 42, 18 Am. Dec. 371
(1828); Johnson v. Hart, 6 Watts & S. 319, 4o Am. Dec. 565 (Pa. 1843). Also see 2
Tiffany, Real Property (3 d. 1939) 222.
'13 N. Y. S. (2d) 568 (1939).
""One peculiarity incident to this estate [by the entireties] is that, if an estate
be given to A., B., and C., and A. and B. are man and wife, they, being one person,
will take half interest, and C. will take the other half. This ancient absurdity seems
to be the law in this state now." Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N. C.
118, 100 S. E. 269, 272 (1919).
"See Kerner v. McDonald, 6o Neb. 663, 84 N. W. 92 (1900).
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give effect to the modern presumption favoring entireties. It will rule
the husband and wife to be tenants by the entirety when there are
three grantees, only if there is some affirmative evidence that the gran-
tor intended to create such an interest.
The test' as announced in the instant case is a welcome move away
from the strict common law rule, and is certainly in keeping with the
purpose of the Married Women's Act. In view of these Acts, there is
no justification for a rule today which holds that in a conveyance
to three parties without any reference to marital ties, the fact that two
of them are married completely changes the effect of the deed as to the
shares and types of estates taken by the grantees. Obviously, the intent
of the grantor should control here as in other situations.
However, courts have not hesitated to hold that a conveyance to
the husband and wife creates a tenancy by entireties, even though there
is strong indication that the grantor intended the grantees to take
some other estate.19 In an earlier Pennsylvania case, In re Rhodes'
Estate,20 it was held that a tenancy by entireties had been created
although the deed stated the shares of the grantees were to be appor-
tioned. The grantor conveyed land to his daughter and her husband,
and stated in the deed that the consideration was $6,ooo of which
$ ,7oo represented the daughter's share. It was held that this was not
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of a tenancy by
entireties. The Missouri court in the case of Welch v. Harvey2' reasoned
that the grantors intended to create a tenancy by entireties in spite of
the express declaration in the deed that grantors do "'hereby convey
and sell to said Fannie and William [wife and husband] . . . two
hundred and fifty acres ... most eastern fifty acres is the land sold to
William Finley and the other two hundred acres we give to
Fannie.'. . .. 22
In the instant case, though the grantor did not name the type of
estate intended for the grantees, the granting clause of the deed strictly
conformed to the conventional wording used at common law to create
"In the following cases the conveyance was to husband and wife expressly as
tenants in common, but tenancies by entireties wer held to have been created: Martin
v. Jackson, 27 Pa. 504 (1856); Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397 (1856). Also see Russell
v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 S. W. 677 (1894). Conveyances to husband and wife ex-
pressly as joint tenants made them tenants by entireties in the following cases: Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Hart, 76 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935); Strauss v.
Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 S. (2d) 727 (1941). Also see In re Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa.
628, 27 Atl. 405, 408 (1893).
20232 Pa. 489, 81 At. 643 (1911).
1281 Mo. 684, 219 S. W. 897 (1920).
-"Welch v. Harvey, 281 Mo. 684, 219 S. W. 897, 898 (192o).
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an estate by the entireties, and this alone is strong evidence that the
grantor intended husband and wife to take such an estate. Stress was
also put on the grantees' relationship as parents and child as some
indication that the grantor intended to convey a one-half interest to
the son, and the other half to the parents. However, it might well be
that such a close relationship would be more indicative of the grantor's
desire that the three members of the same family should share in
the estate equally. Relationship alone would seem to be no indica-
tion that the grantor intended the son to hold as much singly as his
parents took together.
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania court has definitely taken the sound
position that the expressed intent of the grantor is to be given effect,
and that no presumption in favor of an estate by the entireties is to
be applied. The ruling concerned only a grant to three parties, and
the court did not say whether it was willing to go one step farther
than this case requires and apply the same rule to grants to husband
and wife alone. Referring to such a grant, it is stated in the opinion
that the court "has been content to allow the construction that, in
the absence of an intention otherwise, the quality of the estate should be
deemed one of the entireties." 23 This peculiar form of expression does
not seem to denote a strong conviction of the propriety of the present
rule, and the same considerations which recommended change in three-
grantee cases apply with equal force in two-grantee cases. It may be,
therefore, that the Lucas decision will prepare the way for a later
transition to the view that where only husband and wife are involved,
they take by entireties only if affirmative intention of the grantor to give
them such interest is indicated.
EmvARD L. OAsr, JR.
PROPERTY-DISPOSITION OF ESTATE HELD AS TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES
AFTER ONE TENANT FELONIOUSLY KILLS OTHER. [Delaware]
Disagreement and confusion exist among the courts in regard to
the legal rules and principles controlling the disposition of an estate
held as a tenancy by the entireties after one spouse has feloniously
killed the other. The outcome of the decisions on this and similar
questions arising in wills, intestacy, or insurance cases1 has been along
uHeatter v. Lucas, 367 Pa. 296, 8o A. (2d) 749, 751 (1951) [italics supplied].
'The testacy, intestacy, and insurance cases involving a beneficiary under a
will or policy, who has slain the testator, ancestor, or insured, present very similar
issues.
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three general lines:2 (1) the wrongdoer is entirely excluded from any
interest in the property; 3 (2) the wrongdoer takes and keeps the entire
estate;4 (3) the wrongdoer takes the property but holds it under a
constructive trust, the extent of the trust varying among the jurisdic-
tions employing this technique.5 Though the issue is complicated by
a number of properly applicable but somewhat conflicting legal and
equitable doctrines, a condition of law offering such diversity in results
upon the same facts is manifestly undesirable.
The foundation of the minority view barring the criminal from
any interest in the property is the fundamental maxim that no one
2 T-hese possible answers were suggested in Ames, Can A Murderer Acquire Title
By His Crime and Keep It? (1897) 36 Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 225, 227, reprinting in Ames,
Lectures on Legal History (1913) 310, 311, and it is significant that all subsequent
"acquisition of property by murder" cases fall within one of the three catagories. 3
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees( 1946) §478; 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) §492. Professor Ames
advocated the use of the constructive trust device and, as the issue had only arisen
very few times at this early date, the present uncertainty would have been avoided
to a great extent if the courts had followed his suggestion.
3Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. ro5, 165 Atl. 470 (1933) (intestacy); Garwols v.
Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239 (193o) (intestacy); Perry v. Straw-
bridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (19o8) (intestacy); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 1o3
Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918) (tenancy by entireties); Riggs v. Palmer, 115
N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889) (testacy); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W.
1042 (1904) (insurance); In re Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456, 51 A. L. R.
1O88 (1926) (statute authorizing property to be set over in lieu of homestead and
exemptions); In re Wilkins' Estate, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N. W. 652 (1927) (will). It has
been said the Van Alstyne case purports to apply the constructive trust view. Reppy,
The Slayer's Bounty-In New York (1945) 20 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 424, 425; and some
writers have cited it in support of that theory, 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) §492 n. 3; Note
(1931) 11 B. U. L. Rev. i29, 13o; Note (1Q27) 5 N. C. L. Rev. 373, 374; however, the
case makes no reference to constructive trust terminology and may very properly
be classed as falling under the first class. Because the case holding absolutely
and completely deprives the slayer and all those claiming through him of any bene-
ficial interest in the property, to argue which theory the case follows is, in all
practical aspects, really to beg the question. Irrespective of the technique em-
ployed to reach this result, substantially the same legal issues are presented.
'Crumley v. Hall, 202 Ga. 588, 43 S. E. (2d) 646 (1947) (inhertance); Welsh v.
James, 408 I1. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1950) (joint tenants); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265
Il1. i8o, so6 N. E. 785 (1914) (inheritance); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112
(1906) (inheritance); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W. 487 (1916) (dower
and inheritance); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894), rev'g
31 Neb. 6s, 47 N. W. 700 (1891) (interstacy); Owens v. Owens, soo N. C. 240, 6 S. E.
794 (1888) (dower); Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935) (joint
bank account); Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn, 39, 1oo S. W. io8 (1907)
(tenants by entireties).
5Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (193
o) (estate by en-
tirety); Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933) (estate by entirety);
Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896) (will); Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188, 51 A. L. R. 1100 (1.27) (estate by entirety).
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may acquire property by his own wrong.6 Well illustrating the weight
and effect given to this principle is the leading New York case of
Van Alstyne v. Tuffy 7 in which the court enjoined the malfeasor's
administrator and heirs from asserting any claim of ownership to the
estate held by the entireties. In refusing even to permit the killer-
husband a life estate in one-half of the profits, the court declared that
"where the natural and direct consequence of a criminal act is to
vest property in the criminal ... the thought of his being allowed to
enjoy it is to abhorrent for the courts... to countenance .... And
equity will restrain in such a case though contract, testament, or
statute be thereby nullified."8 The doctrine has stood, even in the face
of the Statutes of Wills and Distribution and of severe accusations of
unjustifiable judicial legislation, on the grounds that "the reason of
the law prevails over its letter"9 and that the legislature must have
intended to exclude such a wrongdoer from taking under the statute.10
These cases attain the purpose of preventing the killer from obtaining
any practical benefits, but their method completely ignores the very
nature of an estate by the entirety with its characteristics of survivor-
ship, the four unities, and the legal fiction that the husband and wife,
as a unity, own the title.
Most jurisdictions, however, in the absence of specific statutory
provisions, have permitted the slayer to acquire and retain complete
ownership in the property." These cases dismiss the maxim that one
should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong, as having no appli-
cation because in theory of law the wrongdoer owned the entire parcel
from the time of the grant and thus has acquired nothing by his crime.
Exemplifying the reasoning behind this theory is Welsh v. James,12 an
Illinois case involving property held in joint tenancy where the court
stated that survivorship was an essential characteristic of such an estate
and to hold that the killer got naked legal title only as a trustee would
be contrary to constitutional provisions against corruption of blood and
OThis is one of the forms of the maxim: "Nullus commodum capere potest de
injuria propria." Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 5o6, 22 N. E. 188, 19o (1889); Box v.
Lanier, 12 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042, 1045 (1904).
71o3 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918).
8103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173, 175 (1918).
OPerry v. Strawbridge, 290 Mo. 621, io8 S. W. 641, 648 (1908).
'0 Ganvols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239, 241 (193o); Perry
v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 1o8 S. W. 641, 643 (igog); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y.
506, 22 N. E. 188, 189 (1889).
uWade, Acquisition of Property By Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory
Solution 0936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715.
14o8 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1950).
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forfeiture of estate by one convicted of crime. Admitting that this is
probably the sounder view from a strictly technical, legal standpoint,
the practical result is obviously repugnant to all sense of morality and
justice. There is no morally justifiable reason why the killer or those
claiming through him should be allowed to retain the property and
enjoy its full benefits.
In the recent case of Colton v. Wade,13 the Delaware court, recog-
nizing the fallacies of the other two theories, chose a third and more
logical method of disposing of the issue by applying the equitable
doctrine of constructive trust. Here, William and Beatrice Wade,
husband and wife, had taken title as tenants by the entireties to certain
real estate. Thereafter, the defendant wife shot and killed her husband
and was convicted of manslaughter. Suit was brought by the heirs
and next of kin of William Wade asking that a constructive trust be
declared in their favor on the whole of the real estate. The court held
that under such circumstances the survivor does possess the whole
legal interest in the property but would be required to hold it under
a constructive trust for the successors of the deceased co-tenant. The
extent of the trust declared was in effect on the whole parcel, except-
ing for the survivor the equivalent of a life estate in one-half the net
income of the property.
14
The court, conceding that many of the principles advanced to
support the majority view and relied upon here by the defendant were
still the law in the state, refused "to close its eyes to the defendant's
mode ofacquiring sole possession"' 5 of the realty and to permit one
principle to override other equally important ones. Chancellor Seitz
argued that his "conclusion pays full homage to the legal consequences
under the common law rule of the death of one of two tenants by the
entirety .... yet .... gives powerful recognition to the deeply imbedded
138o A. (2d) 923 (Del. Ch. 1951).
"'The actual case holding was "the entire interest upon a constructive trust for
those other than the defendant entitled to the estate ... except that the survivor
is entitled to receive the commuted value of the net income of one-half of the prop-
erty for the number of years of his expectancy of life." Colton v. Wade, 8o A. (2d) 923,
925 (Del. Ch. 1951). If the killer is given the present money value of the interest vested
in him prior to his crime, the successors of the deceased are permitted immediate and
absolute enjoyment of the fee. Though such a result has its merits, absent statute,
it is not technically correct. The slayer is entitled to the same interest he had prior to
his act, nothing more and nothing less, and this technique may prove to be the
extreme in, either, over or under compensation depending upon the actual life
span of the killer and the fluctuations in the value of the property.
218o A. (2d) 923, 925 (Del. Ch. 1951).
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equitable principle that a person shall not be permitted to profit
by his own wrong." 16
Equity, in preventing unjust enrichment, has long used the con-
structive trust as an expedient device where title to property has been
obtained under circumstances which would render it unconscionable
for the holder of the legal title to retain itYt As the principal case
points out, the slayer before her act had only a mere possibility of get-
ting the exclusive interest in the parcel through the resolution of
the survivorship contigency in favor of herself, and she has by her
wrong deprived her co-tenant of his chance of getting the fee. She has
rendered that which was uncertain and contingent, certain and abso-
lute. To say with the majority rule adherents that the malfeasor has
acquired nothing by his wrong is to ignore the realities of the situation.
On the basis of this reasoning, the principal case pointed out that
impressing the trust did not constitute a forfeiture because it merely
prevented the defendant "from obtaining more 'rights in fact' than she
had"'8 before her act. As the trust device is not applied until after
the common law or property devolution statutes have been allowed to
operate normally and the title has passed to the new holder, accusa-
tions of judicially legislating or reading implied exceptions into the
statutes are untenable. Furthermore, this action is civil, not criminal,
and the trust is employed because the slayer had been unjustly en-
riched, not as a punishment for the crime. It is irrelevant that the
manner of acquisition may also give rise to a criminal action.19
In spite of the argument some courts advance that the public
policy regarding punishment for crimes is clearly stated in consti-
tutional provisions prohibiting forfeiture of estates, it is extremely
difficult to imagine how public policy could under any circumstances,
be said to favor a murderer over an innocent party. The drafters of
these documents very likely did not contemplate this particular situa-
tion, as is indicated by the fact that many states have enacted statutes
for the specific purpose of overruling case decisions following the
majority view which favors the slayer.
20
1'8o A. (2d) 923, 925 (Del. Ch. 1951).
"Bogert, Trust and Trustees (1946) §741; 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) §426.2; 54
Am. Jur., Trusts §,18, 9ig; Note (1949) 37 Ky. L. J. 113.
218o A. (2d) 923, 926 (Del. Ch. 1951).
'"Another very important attribute of the constructive trust remedy is that it
is an equitable one, and bona fide purchasers without notice would be protected if
they bought from the murderer. Equity would raise the trust on the proceeds from
the property in the hands of the slayer instead of on the property itself which has
passed into the hands of an innocent party.
"'Among the states in which statutes were passed shortly after a court had
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After a court has adopted the method of the principal case, it
must then decide what interest in the property should be covered by
the trust. The decisions have furnished several answers to this aspect
of the problem: (i) The trust should cover the entire estate.21 But it is
obvious that this view ignores any vested beneficial interest the wrong-
doer may have at the time of the act. (2) If the victim was older than
the slayer and so probably would have predeceased him, thereby mak-
ing the slayer ultimate owner of the fee, the trust should give the
heirs of the victim the commuted value of one-half the net income of
the property for the victim's expectancy of life.22 This conclusion dis-
regards other equally important factors of survivorship such as physical
condition and habits of the deceased. (3) If the victim had the greater
life expectancy the wrongdoer should be allowed to retain a life estate
in half the property, but declared constructive trustee of the other half
and of the remainder in fee for the heirs of the deceased.23 (4) One-
half the parcel should descend to each party.24 This view reasons that
violent death at the hands of the spouse is not survivorship in legal
contemplation and that the crime dissolved the martial relationship,
severed the estate and divided it equally.
2
5
rendered a decision in favor of the wrongdoer are: Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. A lower court
decision caused the enactment of the California statute. Wade, Acquisition of Prop-
erty By Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev.
715, 716, n. 7; Note (1949) 22 Temp. L. Q. 443, n. 6.
2 Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,
1o3 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (igi8) (assuming that this case was decided under
the constructive trust theory).
2Sherman v. Weber, i 3 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 At. 517 (1933).
2Bryant v. Bryant, 1q3 N. C. .372, 137 S. E. 188, 51 A. L. R. 1100 (1927). The
North Carolina court declared that the slayer "by his crime took away his wife's in-
terest, and as to this he must be held a constructive trustee for the benefit of her
heirs; the judge in effect having found as a fact that the deceased would have survived
him. Even in the absence of such finding, equity would probably give the victim's
representatives the benefit of the doubt," 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188, 191, 51 A. L. R.
1100, 1105 (1927). This language indicates that the crime gives rise to a conclusive
presumption of survivorship in favor of the deceased victim, notwithstanding all
the factors entering into normal life expectancy and that all doubts are resolved
against the wrongdoer.
"'Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (1930). The court in
this case said that "merely outliving the wife does not satisfy the conditions imposed
by the common law relative to estates by entirety so that the survivor may take
all. One must not only be a survivor in fact but also a survivor in contemplation
of law. Indispensable is the prerequisite that the decease must be in the ordinary
course of events and subject only to the vicissitudes of life. The killer can assert no
right of complete ownership as survivor. And no exception is made in favor of his
heirs .... 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757, 761 (ig3o).
'The Restatement proposes that the trust be impressed to the extent that the
murder has enlarged his interest and states that age, health, and other factors of
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A survey of the cases involving the instant question reveals them
to be deeply entangled with the "precedents and prejudices" 20 which
are a part of the law. There can be no doubt that the undesirable and
uncertain condition of the law needs remedying. The courts could
and should take the initiative themselves by uniformly adopting the
technique of the principal case which reaches a just and satisfactory
result without departing from established principles of equity and rules
of law. However, in view of the great divergence of views and opinions,
it appears very unlikely that the courts will come to an agreement, and
the only apparent dependable answer to the problem lies in a statu-
tory solution.
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life expectancy are immaterial. Restatement, Restitution (1937) §188a. But query,
how is it posisble to know to what extent the slayer has actually enlarged his in-
terests unless you determine what the normal life expectancies would have been?
The only definite points are: (i) that the slayer should not be deprived of all of his
then vested interst and, (2) that the fee should ultimately go to the successors of the
victim. Professor Scott apparently advocates this same view and offers some enlight-
enment by stating "that to the extent to which [the killer's] interest is contigent on
the death of his victim, he should not be allowed to retain it, although if it is
already vested, he should not be deprived of it." 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) 2398. For still
another view on the proper extent of the trust see, 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
(1946) 57-
-ONote (1949) 22 Temp. L. Q. 413.
27 hough many states have enacted statutes covering the general issue, they
have not completely resolved the problem, as they vary in their requirements of
intent, motive, conviction, the crimes included, and the types of property interests
covered. 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1946) 53; 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) §492.1. For
excellent discussions of ideal statutory solutions see, Wade, Acquisition of Property
By Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 7V5; Note
(1948) 26 N. C. L. Rev. 232.
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